




UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG
SCHOOL OF GLOBAL STUDIES

Private security companies and political order in Congo

A HISTORY OF EXTRAVERSION

Peer Schouten



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A history of extraversion

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UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG
SCHOOL OF GLOBAL STUDIES

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'Un scorpion se promène sur les rives du fleuve Zaïre à Kinshasa et aperçoit un crocodile prenant un bain de soleil. Eh, dit le scorpion au crocodile, peux-tu me prendre sur ton dos et m'amener sur l'autre rive à Brazzaville? Que non, répond le crocodile. Je te connais trop bien: tu seras sur mon dos, et une fois au milieu du fleuve, tu vas me piquer et nous allons couler tous les deux. Mais non, rétorque le scorpion! Comment ferais-je une chose aussi aberrante? Si je te pique et que nous coulons tous les deux, je n'arriverai jamais à Brazzaville où pourtant je veux me rendre. Bien raisonné, dit le crocodile, monte sur mon dos et je t'emmène à Brazzaville. Et voilà notre scorpion sur le dos du crocodile qui se met à nager en direction de l'autre rive. Arrivé au beau milieu du fleuve, le scorpion pique à mort le crocodile et tous les deux se mettent à couler. Alors le crocodile mourant s'écrie dans un dernier souffle: Qu'est-ce que c'est que cette affaire? Le scorpion à moitié mort de répondre: c'est le Zaïre, ne cherche pas à comprendre.'

Ilunga Kabongo (1984: 13)

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Abbreviations


ADFL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo)
AGA	AngloGold Ashanti
AGK	Anglo Kilo Gold
AGSL	Armor Group Secure Logistics
ANC	Armée Nationale Congolaise (Congolese National Army)
ANR	Agence Nationale de Renseignements (National Intelligence Agency)
BCK	Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga (Railway from Lower Congo to Katanga)
CADR	Corps des Activistes pour la Défense de la Révolution (Corps of Activists for the Defense of the Revolution)
CaMi	Cadastre Minier (Mining Cadaster)
CAR	Central African Republic
CCCI	Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (Company of the Congo for Trade and Industry)
CFS	Congo Free State (l'État Indépendent du Congo)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNDP	Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress for the Defense of the People)
CSK	Comité Special du Katanga (Special Committee of Katanga)
CSM	Congo Services et Management
CSS	Congo Solution Security
DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
DoD	Department of Defense
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSA	Defense System Africa
DSP	Division Spéciale Présidentielle (Special Presidential Division)
DSL	Defense Systems Limited
EEC/CEE	European Economic Community
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EO	Executive Outcomes
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
EUSEC	European Communications Security and Evaluation Agency
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
FAC	Forces Armées Congolaises (Congolese Armed Forces)
FAZ	Forces Armées Zaïroises (Zairian Armed Forces)

FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FEC	Fédération d'Entreprises du Congo (Federation of Congolese Enterprises)
FNI	Front Nationaliste et Intégrationniste (Nationalist and Integrationist Front)
FP	Force Publique (Public Forces)
FPRI	Forces de Résistance Patriotique d'Ituri (Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri)
Gécamines	La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (The General Company of Quarries and Mines)
GIS	Geographical Information Systems
GSA	Guarding and Services for Africa
G4S	Group 4 Securicor
HAP	Humanitarian Action Plan
HDW	Human Dignity in the World
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HSS	Humanitarian Security Services
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organization
IPIS	International Peace Information Service
IR	International Relations
ISOA	International Stability Operations Association
ISSSS	International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
M23	Mouvement du 23-Mars (March 23 Movement)
MDG's	Millennium Development Goals
MIBA	Société Minière de Bakwanga (Mining Company of Bakwanga)
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (Mission of the United Nations in Congo)
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MPR	Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (Popular Revolutionary Movement)
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Aid
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OKIMO	L'Office des Mines d'Or de Kilo-Moto (Kilo-Moto Gold Mines Board)
ONATRA	Office National des Transports (National Transport Board)
ONUC	Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (The United Nations Operation in the Congo)
OPJ	Officier de Police Justicière (Justice Police Officer)
OSS	Overseas Security Services
OTRACO	Office d'Exploitation des Transports Coloniaux (Colonial Transport Board)
PIR	Police d'Intervention Rapide (Rapid Intervention Police Force)
PSC	Private Security Company
PNC	Police Nationale Congolaise (Congolese National Police)
PO	Province Orientale
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy)
RDC	République Démocratique du Congo (see DRC)
RNP	Rwanda National Police
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
RRR	Réunification de la RDC par la voie Routière (Reunification of Congo by Road)
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAESSCAM	Service d'Assistance et d'Encadrement du Small Scale Mining (Small Scale Mining Technical Assistance and Training Service)
SARM	Service d'Action et de Renseignements Militaires (Military Intelligence and Action Service)
SLT	Saving Lives Together
SMTF	Société Minière de Tenke-Fungurume (Mining Company of Tenke-Fungurume)
SNCZ	Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Zaïrois (National Zairian Railroad Company)
SNIP	Service National d'Intelligence et de Protection (National Intelligence and Protection Service)
SODEMIZA	Société de Développement Industriel et Minier du Zaïre (Company of Industrial and Mining Development of Zaïre)
SOKIMO	Société Minière de Kilo-Moto (Kilo-Moto Mining Company)
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STAREC	Stabilisation et Reconstruction de l'Est de la RDC (Stabilization and Reconstruction of the Eastern Congo)
TA	Territorial Administrator/Administration
TC	Troupes Campées (Garrison Troups)
TST	Troupes en Service Territoriale (Territorial Service Troups)
UMHK	Union Minière du Haut Katanga (Mining Union of Upper Katanga)
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Security and Safety
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDS	United States Defence System
USD	United States Dollars
VPSHR	Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
WFP	World Food Programme

Map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo



1

Introduction

If a monopoly over coercive power is a key indicator of political order, Congolese state is failing to upkeep it. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is home to a profusion of armed groups—around 40 at the time of writing—many of them with connections to neighboring countries (e.g. Fahey 2013; Stearns 2012a; 2013a, b, c; Tamm 2013a, b; Vlassenroot 2013; Vlassenroot & Perot 2011; cf. UN 2014). The Congolese army, and to a lesser extent the police, are disintegrated patchworks of shifting networks of power elites, and often form as big a challenge to political order as rebels (e.g. Baaz & Verweijen 2013; Baaz & Olsson 2011). Finally, as an international response to these challenges, Congo is also home to the largest United Nations mission in the world comprising around 20.000 international peacekeepers. These security actors and the implications of their presence for political (dis)order in Congo have been widely studied and continue to receive much attention as events unfold (e.g. Autesserre 2008; Beneduce, Jourdan, Raeymaekers & Vlassenroot 2006; Herbst & Mills 2013; Larmer, Laudati & Clark 2013; Laudati 2013; Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2009; Stearns, Verweijen & Baaz 2013), to the extent that a number of scholars have asked whether and how political order even persists in Congo (Englebert 2002; Herbst & Mills 2009).

Given the widespread preoccupation with these security actors in relation to political order in Congo, it is surprising that one type of contemporary security actor has hardly received any attention at all. Since the end of the Cold War, over a hundred private security companies have registered in Congo employing over 30.000 private security guards, thus outnumbering both UN peacekeepers and the total amount of rebels in the country (cf. Stearns 2012a).

If the global rise of private security companies in the post-Cold War period is a subject of study in International Relations (IR), it is because it arguably represents a significant departure from the historically previous situation wherein security governance—that is, the management of the (threat of) coercive power—was a public good, monopolized by states. This hypothetical previous situation corresponds to dominant notions of political order that date back to canoni-

cal thinkers such as Weber and Hobbes. The rise of private security companies, from this perspective, ‘challenges over three hundred years of accepted ontology regarding the state as having the sole legitimate right to force and violence’ (Small 2006: 3).

However, as Englebert & Tull (2008: 111) put it, most of Africa’s states ‘at no point in the postcolonial era remotely resembled the ideal type of the modern Western polity’. What this suggests is that perhaps the relationship between security governance and political order in postcolonial societies like Congo never did resemble the ‘accepted ontology regarding the state as having the sole legitimate right to force and violence’. Patricia Owens observes that ‘IR has not been very good on the history and theory of the public–private distinction or at conceptualizing how force is constituted transnationally, that is, in a manner *not* captured by notions of sovereignty, territory and so-called ‘public’ control and constitution of armed force’ (2008: 988, emphasis in original). This raises an interconnected set of empirical and theoretical questions that this thesis aims at exploring.

If the privatization of security does not occur in a context where security is monopolized by the state, then how can we theorize and explore empirically the relevance of private security companies for political order? Or, put differently, given the theoretical assumption of a previously existing monopoly on coercive power that frames concern with private security companies, what was the historical relationship between security governance and political order within which the private security sector arose and in which ways does the privatization of security constitute a departure from these historical relations? What would such an exploration entail for our theoretical understanding of the relationship between security governance and political order?

Objective

This study aims to provide a better understanding of the role of private security companies in relation to political order in Congo, as a case in which broader questions regarding the relationship between security governance and political order can be investigated. The object of study is the rise, in the post-Cold War period, of the private security sector, that is, formally registered companies that offer security services ranging from static guarding to cash-in-transit and from close protection to logistical support. This frames the central research question of this dissertation: *How do private security companies co-constitute political order in Congo?*

In other words, it asks how explicitly for-profit, private market actors (i.e. private security companies) are potentially involved in the co-constitution of

political order. The question points towards empirically investigating the emergence and dynamics of private security companies in Congo.

Given the long-standing association between security and state-centric political order, possible challenges to that association—such as the post-Cold War rise of private security companies—form an important occasion to re-investigate its historical development empirically (paraphrasing Klein 1998: 331; cf. Abrahamson & Williams 2011: 8; Mabee 2003; Mbembe 2001: 6; Owens 2008: 979; Ruggie 1993: 143-144; Sassen 2006: 11-12). In order to explore whether and how the rise of private security companies marks a shift from or rather reflects longer-standing patterns of political order in Congo, this study will address the historical relationship between security governance and political order in Congo, and investigate what the emergence of private security companies after the Cold War entails for that relationship.

This means the main research question can be broken up into two sets of empirically focused subquestions. The first is a historical line of inquiry comprising the following two empirical subquestions:

- 1a. *How has security governance historically been spatialized around political ordering processes in Congo?*
- 1b. *How did the entanglement of security governance with these processes constitute political ordering patterns?*

The main research question itself translates into the following two empirical subquestions:

- 2a. *Around which political ordering processes are private security companies spatialized in Congo?*
- 2b. *How does their entanglement with these processes constitute political ordering patterns?*

The thesis also aims at contributing to a theoretical development of our understanding of private security companies in relation to political order. Paraphrasing Stern (2001: 5), why has it been so difficult to draw the rise of private security companies into IR as a meaningful phenomenon in relation to political order? I aim to explore how it may be possible to shift the focus on the relationship between security governance and political ordering to bring into view the relevance of these actors, that explicitly define themselves as different from the state-centric organization of security.

Finally, a note on definition is in order: normally, PSC are differentiated from private military companies for being defensive rather than offensive (e.g. Singer

2003; Small 2006: 6-7), but this distinction is often difficult to maintain in practice. This thesis refers to PSC without making this distinction *a priori*. While they will often market themselves as the former, they might provide the latter—but this is an empirical rather than an analytical question. This definition however excludes mercenaries (although I discuss them as they appear and reappear throughout Congolese history) and armed groups or networks operating under an explicitly political guise.

Investigating private security companies and political ordering

As Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams observed only recently, ‘there is a relative dearth of empirical investigations of security privatization especially outside the industrialized world and in the non-military sphere’ (2011: 6). This holds in particular for the DRC: to my best knowledge, (De Goede 2008) is the only publication dedicated to the topic at the time of writing. Given this lack of data, how can one start to explore such a phenomenon? Studies of private security companies in other countries suggest that one way in which this can be done is by investigating around which clients private security companies concentrate, and what governance processes these clients are involved in. Abrahamsen and Williams, for instance, have shown how private security companies form part of ‘global security assemblages’ that concentrate around the sites where global capital ‘touches down’ (2011: 122) in different African countries. Absent previous knowledge about the private security sector in a given country, the key empirical question becomes, where do private security companies concentrate in a national space, and around which actors and political ordering—or governance—processes? For purposes of this investigation, this gives rise to research question 2a: Around which political ordering processes are private security companies spatialized in Congo?

This question becomes relevant in particular as absent an overarching ‘political order’ in Congo—following what Mark Brown observes more generally—‘the dispersion of politics and the rise of networks of governance make it impossible to follow Hobbes in identifying politics with the state’ (2009: 120). This is quite a radical observation within the field of International Relations (IR), where security has long been equated with the state, conceptualized as projected over the full extension of national territories (cf. Agnew 1994). While ‘security’, ‘political order’ and ‘governance’ are abstract terms that seem to hover above material worlds, a casual stroll in any large city confirms that these are in fact unequally distributed in space, concentrating in some places and not in others (cf. Bénit-Gbaffou 2008; Bislev 2004; Davis 1990; Schouten 2012).

More radically in Congo, formal state power seems to concentrate selectively in pockets within Congolese territory (cf. Nest 2002b) and only partially overlaps with other ‘topographies of power’ (Ferguson 2004). If the exercise of coercive power is considered inherently political, then the complex choreographies of rebels, Congolese state security forces, UN peacekeepers and private security companies constitute myriad political (dis)ordering processes that take place simultaneously in different sites in Congo, without a clear singular and overarching ‘political order’ emerging (cf. Kabamba 2012; Trefon 2004).

Similar observations lead to the central methodological assumption of this study that security governance and political ordering patterns have a physical presence that can be mapped. These topographies of power are taken to constitute *de facto* patterns of political ordering and state formation (cf. Ferguson 2006: 40; Hönke 2010; Weiss 2006). This frames the overarching approach I take to answering the main research question: I consistently apply a spatial approach to empirically explore both the historical and contemporary entanglements of security governance and political order in Congo.

Given the overarching focus on the way in which the contemporary rise of private security companies constitutes a shift in relation to longer-standing relations between security governance and patterns of political ordering, the first set of subquestions comprises a historical inquiry into the relations between security governance and political order in Congo since Belgian colonialism. The posing of these questions is informed by the observation that ‘in order to fully understand the various phenomena called ‘privatization’, we need to look into the historical construction of the political’ (Chevrier 2004: 241) in the contexts concerned. This means the overall focus of study is neither the past nor the present exclusively, but rather the ‘present-and-past-combined’ (Mann 1994: 39). Based on the above discussion, this enquiry will take the shape of an exploration of the spatialization of security governance around specific political ordering processes throughout Congolese history from Belgian colonialism onward (subquestion 1a). Given that Congo as a political construct was the product of external power relations, particular attention will be paid to investigating the entanglement of security governance around ordering processes that co-constitute both ‘national’ and ‘trans-national’ political ordering patterns (subquestion 1b).

The second set of subquestions is contemporary in focus. I address these questions through a case study that presents original data regarding the size and spatial distribution of the private security sector in the DRC (subquestion 2a), and analyze that in relation to the political ordering processes in the sites where private security companies are concentrated (subquestion 2b). In other words, I present and investigate a ‘political topography of private security’ to answer this part of the question. I will explore whether and how this contemporary topogra-

phy intersects with historical political ordering patterns that will be identified in answering the first part of the question. This is both in order to strengthen the interrelation between the first and second component of the research question and to do heed to Chevrier's call above to situate exploration of contemporary privatization within an analysis of the historical construction of the relation between security governance and political order in Congo.

This delimited focus means I do not purport to make claims about the ways in which private security companies are involved or not in structuring the totality of the 'reality multiple' (Mol 1998) of Congo's political order. Rather, the focus is on the way they intersect with specific political ordering processes to constitute durable patterns of political ordering. However, as we will see, oftentimes, exploration of the specific focus of this thesis requires situating it in relation to other ordering processes with which it is in practice inevitably intertwined.

Securing the critical infrastructure of extraversion

This thesis argues that the post-Cold War privatization of security in Congo has consolidated and diffused a pattern of political ordering set in motion during Belgian colonialism, a pattern that can be called extraverted state formation—i.e., wherein key domestic governance processes are structurally subject to external control. The main argument that this dissertation wishes to maintain is that private security companies co-constitute a particular pattern of political ordering—namely, extraverted—in Congo by guarding the critical infrastructure of internationalized governance processes. I base this argument on a detailed investigation of the spatial distribution of the private security sector around specific governance processes in the DRC. As will be shown in this thesis, the 'political topography of private security' in the DRC concentrates around those sites where internationalized governance processes take place. Irrespective of the vocation of the international actors concerned, private security companies protect the technological infrastructures that are crucial to these processes. Thus, rather than a departure from historical political ordering patterns in Congo, the privatization of security constitutes a consolidation of a longer-standing pattern wherein coercive power is spatialized around the infrastructures of extraversion.

Based on in-depth field research in Congo, a corollary to this argument is that private security allows construing these infrastructures and the political ordering processes depending on them as external to Congolese political (dis)order, while they are, as will be explored, profoundly entangled into Congolese state formation. We will see that the critical infrastructure they protect constitute the key site where the 'governed interdependencies' (Weiss 1995) between national elites

and international actors are configured, contested and extended, largely at the expense of socio-economic development for the majority of Congolese. Mirroring observations for other contexts in Africa (Abrahamsen & Williams 2011; Hibou 2004), the contemporary privatization of security should not be seen in opposition to state control, but rather as part of a displacement of politics (Marres 2005), a reconfiguration of the ways in which both international actors and Congolese state selectively intervene in, or withdraw from, society.

If private security is considered an urgent topic of study for its opposition to a hypothesized previously existing state monopoly on coercive power, I show that Congolese history calls into question this assumption. Despite radical historical shifts in the discourses of external actors intervening on Congo's governance processes (cf. Hönke 2013), we shall see that since Belgian colonialism to the demise of Mobutu, coercive power has always been spatialized and organized around the 'critical infrastructure of extraversion', that is, the infrastructure making possible durable patterns of internationalized control over key governance processes in Congo, in service of national and international elites. I ground identification of this historical pattern in historical research into the spatial arrangement of coercive power around (post)colonial infrastructures that have allowed governing key domestic governance processes from external centers of power.

The way I give substance to these arguments owes a lot to the work of Michael Mann (1984; 2008), which I lodge within a meta-theoretical framework informed by actor-network theory. Mann's key point is to draw attention to the fact that modern political ordering patterns are contingent not only on the projection of coercive power—the core focus of this thesis—but also on the physical extension of infrastructure throughout the realm—what he calls 'infrastructural power projection'. Without roads it is impossible to dispatch taxation officers to remote locales; without surveys and statistics there is no territory, population, or economy to govern centrally. The projection of coercive and infrastructural power often coincide and in most cases do not cover national territories equally, but are rather projected selectively and articulated in corridors around key governmental processes and objects (cf. Boone 2003). These forms of power, in other words, are unevenly projected throughout national territories, meaning that modern political order is also, most of the time, confined to these topographies of state power projection. By extension, the way I study patterns of political ordering—i.e., state formation—comprises exploring historical variations in the distribution, control over, and organization of topographies of coercive and infrastructural power.

The main contribution that this thesis makes is to provide a better understanding of how private security companies co-constitute political order, by probing the variegated and complex ways in which private security companies repro-

duce longer-standing patterns of extraverted political ordering. This is closely linked to the theoretical contribution I make, which is to ask whether broadening our conception of political order to encompass both security governance and the infrastructural arrangements underpinning modern political order might bring into view durable patterns of political ordering that otherwise remain hidden. I hold that taking such durable patterns seriously as part of contemporary state formation can be fruitful to explore the relevance of private security companies for political order specifically, and the relations between security governance and historical state formation more generally, in Congo and other settings.

This thesis also makes an empirical contribution to the study of private security in International Relations. Whereas Abrahamsen and Williams note a 'lack of primary research and extensive fieldwork on private security companies outside of Europe, North America and Australia' (2011: 36), we are witnessing an increasing proliferation both of reports containing a wealth of country-level data and in-depth academic case studies of private security companies in diverse settings (e.g. Gumedze 2007; 2008; Small Arms Survey 2011). Nevertheless, the private security sector in the DRC remains most notable for its absence in this burgeoning archive, to the extent that it doesn't figure in any report, and to date, I know of only one academic chapter exists that is dedicated to the phenomenon (De Goede 2008). This absence of knowledge means collecting and organizing data becomes a valuable contribution to the academic study of private security in and of itself. On the basis of fieldwork-derived empirical material, this thesis provides an overview of the rise, size, and distribution of private security companies in Congo, and empirically explores the interrelations between the private security sector and the two main types of clients—industrial mining companies and development organizations.

An obvious limitation following from exploring how private security companies co-constitute political order in Congo with a focus on patterns of extraversion, is that it downplays how those targeted by such mechanisms are affected by it, internalize, adapt, or resist these power mechanisms. While this might silence agency of Congolese in co-constitution of political order, the point is exactly to explore 'cold' mechanisms of power that, as we will see, indeed aim at construing Congolese as passive objects of government.

Outline

This thesis is composed of three main parts.

In the first part, I engage the relevant literature to devise a way to approach how private security companies co-constitute political order in Congo. In chapter 2, the analytical and conceptual framework of this thesis will be developed. A central goal of this chapter is to specify the study's central concepts such as political ordering and (private) security governance, and situate those concepts in relation to theoretical work in the fields of IR and historical sociology of state formation. This will also comprise a discussion of how the relationship between security governance and political order is understood in this thesis. Chapter 3 discusses this study's research design and main methodological choices. As such, it will elaborate on the analytical framework adopted in this thesis and address questions surrounding case selection, the kinds of empirical material utilized, and data gathering and analysis.

The second part is devoted to a historical analysis of the relationship between security governance and political ordering in Congo since Belgian colonialism. This historical line of inquiry follows from the first set of subquestions above. In chapter 4, I explore the spatialization of colonial security governance in relation to the emergence and transformation of colonial ordering patterns from the Congo Free State into the Belgian Congo. Throughout this chapter, emphasis will be placed on the pivotal importance of infrastructure in the spatialization of coercive power and the construction of a specific, extraverted, political ordering pattern in Belgian Congo. It will be shown how infrastructure mediated the consolidation of colonial administration patterned around the key objects of government of the 'colonial economy' and the 'indigenous order'. Chapter 5 focuses on the shifting relationships between security governance and patterns of extraverted political order in postcolonial Congo until the demise of Mobutu in the 1990s. Equally organized around the spatialization of security governance, this chapter traces the transforming topographies of power and the shifting nature of internationalized economic governance processes in them under conditions of progressive infrastructural disassembly.

Consisting of three chapters, the third part provides an analysis of the emergence and dynamics of the private security sector in relation to the co-constitution of political order in contemporary Congo. Chapter 6 presents a discussion of the rise, size, and spatial distribution of the private security sector in post-Cold War Congo and situates them in relation to the concomitant privatization of infrastructure within international networks of power. Chapter 7 and 8 each zoom in on the topography of private security within a specific region and around a specific type of transnationalized governance—i.e., political ordering—

CHAPTER 1

process. Chapter 7 focuses on the private security sector around industrial gold mining in Province Orientale, and discussed it in relation to the technical nature of gold extraction in the province to explore the significance of private security for reordering gold within international governance patterns. Chapter 8 shifts attention towards the private security sector around the ‘international community’ in North Kivu, and situates it within a discussion of primary and secondary material on the technical nature of development interventions within contemporary international humanitarian governance. The point of the chapters is to investigate how PSC in both spheres of activities are entangled into the technical processes through which subsoil minerals and Congolese are turned into, and durably reproduced as, objects of government amenable to international extraction and intervention respectively.

2

Theorizing private security companies and political ordering patterns in times of governance

Introduction¹

Films such as *Blood Diamond* and *Lord of War* recount the neoliberal greed with which inevitably white mercenaries and gun traders plundered and pillaged the African continent after the end of the Cold War. But in scholarly work, also, Africa continues to be portrayed as an irrational, aberrant place, where foreign commercial interests perversely play into local conflicts (cf. Dunn 2003; Larsen 2007). Such accounts typically involve the former South African mercenary outfit, Executive Outcomes, in Angola and Sierra Leone (cf. Singer 2003); or a coup attempt by British former SAS in Guinea. Yet today, the privatization of security in Africa looms much larger than the occasional recurrence of mercenary activity. A focus on the more mundane practices of commercial security companies reveals a fascinatingly vital tendency with potentially far-reaching political implications.

A brief overview is in order to highlight the sheer immensity of this phenomenon. Globally, legal private security companies (PSC) have undergone an explosive expansion over the past two decades. PSC have spread over the world at such a pace that the ‘privatization of security’ is now an accepted term to denote this stunning growth market. Uniformed security guards are a ubiquitous sight across the globe; and in most countries, private provision of cash-in-transit, the guarding of retail outlets, and alarm systems and armed response are intricately part of the daily hustle and bustle of large cities. G4S and Securitas, the biggest players in the market, are such a familiar phenomenon that they might be considered the

¹ Parts of this introduction have been adapted from (Schouten 2011b: 57-58)

McDonalds and Burger Kings of security respectively—with the first employing 625.000 people in over 110 countries, and the latter 300.000 in 40 countries.²

This tendency is equally reflected in Africa. Over the last 20 years, we have witnessed a stabilization of sorts of the African private security sector: through merger and takeover, in most African countries the sector is dominated by a select number of (often transnational) security giants, and some of the mercenaries of before are now legitimate Private Military Companies (PMC) supporting Security Sector Reform (SSR), de-mining and peace missions across Africa (Abrahamsen & Williams 2011: 124). In South Africa alone, nearly half a million active guards are employed in the private security sector, with PSC outnumbering the police by 2:1 (PSIRA 2011); in Nigeria and Kenya, an average of 2.000 PSC employ at least 50.000 people (Abrahamsen & Williams 2011: 21), while G4S, the world's largest PSC, proclaims itself the biggest private sector employer of the continent. As indicated, the private security sector in the DRC stands at 30.000 and as such outnumbers both UN peacekeepers and the total amount of rebels.

From a consumer's perspective it is estimated that wealthy Africans spend an average of 15% of their income on private security solutions (Byrd & Guimbert 2009: 6; Ramen 2009), while businesses in Africa more often than not pay for security—varying from 31% of businesses in Ivory Coast to 92% in Malawi.³ PSC globally have an annual turnover of somewhere between 120-140 billion USD, and with a spectacular global annual growth rate of 8%, this tendency is far from stabilized (Abrahamsen & Williams 2011: 9; OECD 2004: 6)—indeed, G4S is only reporting increased demand with shifting patterns of unrest across the continent (Maidment 2013).

This chapter aims to develop pragmatic theoretical foundations for exploring the relevance of this phenomenon for political order, as a way to guide empirical analysis of the case of Congo. Calling these theoretical foundations 'pragmatic' reflects a commitment to pragmatism, a philosophical tradition that refrains from any ulterior commitment to particular positions (e.g. postmodernism, postpositivism, critical realism) within the philosophy of science debates (Cresswell 2009: 10-11; cf. Rorty 1982: xiv). This allows the purposeful combination of substantive insights from literatures that are potentially ontologically or epistemologically at odds with one another. As will be elaborated upon, in the present study, this refers to using substantive theoretical insights on power from Mann's historical sociology lodged within a meta-theoretical approach derived from actor-network theory.

² Source: G4S (www.g4s.com) and Securitas (www.securitas.com) websites.

³ World Bank data for 2009, retrieved from <http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Custom/Default.aspx> (Last visited 10 December 2013).

This chapter develops the theoretical foundations of this study through three moves: first, it turns to the academic literature emerging around private security companies within IR that emphasize the restructuring of the state and the reconfiguration of governance in ‘global security assemblages’. This literature informs an important theoretical point of departure for this thesis, namely, that it is not enough to look at private security companies or coercive power alone to understand the ways in which the formation of such cross-actor assemblages constitute political order. I then bring this literature in conversation with actor-network theory, which generalizes the unstable and networked nature of governance in assemblages to a meta-theoretical point of departure. From this perspective, political order and political ordering patterns become an exception that can be explained by pointing towards the kinds of power that lend stability to shifting assemblages. The third move I make is to draw on the work of Michael Mann to argue that political ordering can fruitfully be analyzed in terms of assemblages composed of the entanglement of coercive and infrastructural power. Mann’s distinction provides analytical categories that help clarify how private security companies can be studied as co-constitutive of political order patterns in Congo.

Private security companies and global security assemblages

In assessing the rise of the private security sector in Africa, Michelle Small, cited earlier, argues that this phenomenon ‘challenges over three hundred years of accepted ontology regarding the state as having the sole legitimate right to force and violence’ (2006: 3). In doing so, she makes a claim about private security companies based on a particular understanding of the relationship between security governance and political order that powerfully pervades the field of IR. In this state-centric definition of the relation between security governance and political order, security forces are an institutional entity of the executive branch that embody the state monopoly over violence; an entity deployed to maintain political order by intervening where political order is threatened or its laws are transgressed (e.g. Ryan 2011). This principle—present in political thought at least since Hobbes—has become the cornerstone of modern political order: political order is constituted by a state monopoly over coercive power (Thomson 1994; Weber, Gerth, & Mills 1946: 78) and ‘security’ is *national* security (Walt 1991).

This classical conception of the relationship between security governance and political order implies that any coercive power not held by a hypothetical state automatically translates into a threat to that state (Baldwin 1997: 22; cf. Molm 1997: 43). Conversely, an implication of this equation is that if private security

thrives, this must be the logical result of a ‘power vacuum’ as a result of a temporary waning of a pre-existing political order (World Bank 2004: 90).

However, this reading of classical state theory sheds very limited light on the empirical relations between private security companies and political order. To illustrate, the highest concentration of private security companies is found in the United States where over a million private security guards are active (Krahmann 2011b: 7). Besides inviting outright condemnation of private security companies as a threat to political order in Congo and elsewhere, there lies an interesting substantive theoretical assumption at the heart of the dominant definition of the relationship between security governance and political order. This assumption is that shifts in the organization of coercive power have implications for the very fabric of political order—that is, if the organization of coercive power is not lodged within the state apparatus, political order automatically becomes something different.

From this perspective it becomes possible to ask what a specific shift in the organization of coercive power entails for political order within a given setting. Along this line of reasoning, Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) argue that one cannot grasp the significance of the rise of private security companies in the post-Cold War period if private security companies are studied as a discrete phenomenon in opposition to a state-centric order. The rise of private security companies, they argue, should rather be understood as intersecting with specific governance—i.e., political ordering—processes. Sites where private security companies cluster involve a plurality of actors—what they call ‘global security assemblages’—that are all involved in the co-constitution of security and other governance outcomes in the societies in which they operate. Similarly, Avant and Haufler conceptualize security governance in terms of ‘nodes’, which themselves are ‘institutional actors’ made up of a ‘plurality of actors and mechanisms [that] generate governance’ (2012: 273). They similarly draw attention to the ways in which the spatial articulation of private security companies intersect with the spatial (re)organization of other governance processes within and across national borders. Such assemblages, although thoroughly ‘local’, are truly ‘global’, since the network of different actors present at any such site—either physically or indirectly through regulations—often extends from local security forces and PSC to corporate headquarters and regulatory authorities far away. For IR, this means it is not enough to study the relations between states to get at international order, as contemporary power is organized in networks that operate within and across state borders. Thus, rather than a discrete threat to political order, the rise of private security companies can be analyzed as part of a redistribution of governance processes throughout and across national territories.

The fact that the nodes where governance networks congregate derive their specificity from the concentration of governance actors of different kinds—public and private, international and national—also means that a singular focus on coercive power does not allow articulating the significance of such global assemblages for the reconfiguration of political order. Rather, ‘an analysis of contemporary security calls for a framework that can identify the forms of power at work within assemblages’ (Abrahamsen & Williams 2011:101). Following sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, Abrahamsen & Williams acknowledge that while coercive power was central to state formation, *modern* political order derives its specificity from the folding of *other* forms of power—what Bourdieu called material, economic, cultural and symbolic capital—unto the state in a single ‘field of power’ (Abrahamsen & Williams 2011: 115, cf. Bourdieu 1999: 58). If such forms of power are now spatially rearranged and dispersed in global security assemblages, we in fact witness the reconfiguration and redistribution of these powers rather than the demise of the state.

From political order to political ordering

I thus interpret Abrahamsen and Williams as fundamentally theorizing a shift wherein the redistribution of coercive power via private security companies becomes particularly relevant. This is because it is entangled with the redistribution of other political ordering processes and the forms of power inherent to those—such as expertise, authority and capital—that had formerly been lodged within state institutions. It is important to explore this theoretical move a little further because, as I will argue, it ultimately subverts the very stability of the notion of ‘political order’ to which analysis of private security companies is linked in this thesis and, more widely, in the discipline of International Relations.

Abrahamsen and Williams’ argument is lodged within a larger literature on private security that argues that since the end of the Cold War the constitution of political order has been incrementally less dependent on governmental activity alone. Instead it has begun to comprise a field of activity involving a plethora of actors that co-produce political (and economic, and social) order under the broad header of ‘governance’ (2011: 89ff; cf. Bryden & Caparini 2006; Crawford 2006; Krahnmann 2003; 2005; Leander & Van Munster 2007; Shearing 2005). The terms ‘governance’ and ‘assemblage’ in this literature are connected with re-thinking what has been hailed as a move away from the Westphalian state system towards a more heterogeneous international order in the immediate post-Cold War period (e.g., Klein 1998: 331; Rosenau 1995; Sassen 2006). As Weiss and Wilkinson put it recently, ‘the closing decades of the twentieth century encouraged the shift from state-centric structures to a wide range of actors and mechanisms’ (2013:

210), a political universe populated not just by states but also by for instance non-governmental organizations, corporations, and religious movements.

What this literature suggests is that beyond security governance, political ordering more broadly is no longer confined within the spatial and institutional walls of the state apparatus, but now takes place in assemblages of actors beyond (but not necessarily disconnected from) the state (e.g. Callaghy, Kassimir & Latham 2001; Raeymaekers, Menkaus & Vlassenroot 2008; Rose & Miller 1992; Sasen 2006). As Achile Mbembe puts it somewhat wryly, ‘Breaking away from the influence of Weber, everything has become “network”’ (2001: 6). The important point for our purposes is that these networks of governance are not somehow ‘outside’ of political order in any specific country but, rather, in some way it might be said that ‘political order’ since the governance turn refers to nothing beyond the sum of all these networked governance—i.e., political ordering—processes.

Throughout this study, I use ‘political ordering’ and ‘governance’ processes interchangeably to refer to rationalized efforts to act on objects of government external to the governing subject (cf. Curtis 1997; Lezaun 2006)—a type of activity that is usually associated with, but by no means confined to, state institutions. To illustrate, in many African states governmental activity is so internationalized—for instance because of donor, lender, and NGO participation (cf. Harrison 2004)—that the economy and even the postcolonial state itself can be considered internationalized governance processes, acted upon within networks of power that defy the domestic/international and public/private divides. Literature on political order in Congo neatly aligns with this perspective in arguing that the absence of an overarching ‘political *order*’ does not mean the absence of meaningful political *ordering processes* (e.g. Kabamba 2012; Mushi 2012; Trefon 2004; Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2008).

However, literature on internationalized governance in Africa also insists that the transnationalized nature of governance in Africa is nothing new. Rather, African state formation has been way ahead of the governance literature: political ordering patterns have at least since colonialism consistently been co-constituted by networks of external actors. Historical political ordering processes in Africa can equally be analyzed from the same governance perspective, that is, by trading a focus on institutional actors for the concentrations of actors across institutional divides within networks of power that are concentrated within specific sites but stretch across the globe (e.g. Benton 2006; Hönke 2013; Leutner 2008; Risse & Lehmkuhl 2006). As will be explored in chapter 4, colonial administration during the Free State took the form of the trading outpost where concessionary companies blended with colonial administration, the colonial army and traditional chiefs to exercise governance for a mix of public and private, political and eco-

conomic goals. As I will argue in chapter 4, the early colonial trading post was also a ‘global security assemblage’, cross-cutting public/private, global/local and civil/military divides.

Thus, as insights from the governance literature potentially hold more universal purchase, history calls into question the assertion sometimes pervading this literature that shifting forms of networked governance across institutional divides are specific to the post-Cold War period (Mabee 2003). Congo serves as a case in point: it started as an international association founded by King Léopold II to continue as a Belgian colony ruled from the metropole Brussels; Zaïre, the postcolonial Mobutu state, ‘was born in the international arena, and has remained there’ (Callaghy 1983: 61). Studies of postcolonial⁴ state formation often refer to the consistent imbrication of international actors and domestic political order as ‘extraverted’ state formation (e.g. Bayart 2000; Bouvier & Englebert 2005; Mbembe 2001; Peiffer & Englebert 2012; Tull 2011). It comprises the condition—that to a larger or lesser extent affects all countries—where key domestic governance (i.e., political ordering) processes are the product of *international* relations. Political ordering processes are co-constituted through the exercise of power by actors that place themselves outside of that order; these actors should subsequently not be seen as an external to African state formation, but rather as integral part of it (e.g. Bliesemann de Guevara 2010; 2012; Hibou 2004; McLean 2004).⁵

Given the advances of the governance literature, what seems to merit exploration is not only how private security companies are entangled into global assemblages involved in political ordering in Congo, but also the durability of these transnationalized arrangements throughout historical processes of state (trans)formation. Against the background of the governance literature within which advances of the study of private security are situated, how can we understand the durability of certain political ordering patterns such as extraverted state formation? This construes the theoretical problem I aim at exploring in this thesis: how can we explore the ways in which private security companies constitute political ordering patterns in Congo—e.g., relatively stable political

⁴ Following Mbembe (2001), I use the term ‘postcolonial’ throughout this thesis to refer to ‘postcolonies’, that is, countries that have been colonies, rather than to the subsequent—cultural—legacy of that historical predicament (see Hönke & Müller 2012: 385-386 for discussion).

⁵ The term ‘externalization’ is also frequently used (Clapham 1996; Lock 1999; Leander 2004: 71ff; Tilly 1990: 181 & 195). Studies of extraversion traditionally attempt to impute political responsibility for structural features of the asymmetrical ways in which Africa is entangled internationally, through analysis of the agency of African political and economic elites in strategizing continued dependency on external actors (see especially Bayart 2000). Rephrased differently, the analytical focus is on the processes through which African political elites construct and use external dependency as a form of power (cf. Harrison 2005; Tull 2011). Hibou (2004), for instance, shows how African elites have managed to configure the forced privatization of public services under structural adjustment programs in such a way as to retain and even increase their own hold over key political and economic resources.

ordering processes—if inherent instability seems to be the hallmark of governance?

Let's look in more detail at how I then approach 'political ordering' and the kind of power that could lend political ordering processes the durability that would make them candidates for the substantive 'political order'. To conceptualize the political ordering processes with which I study the entanglement of private security companies, I borrow insights from a theoretical approach that does not take the absence of an overarching singular order in Congo or shifting networked governance more generally as aberrations but rather views—rather like Hobbes' state of nature—the absence of stable orders as the *status quo*, the natural condition of things.

Actor-network theory (ANT) is based on philosophical antecedents such as Whitehead (1978), John Dewey (1927) and Ilya Prigogine (Prigogine & Stengers 1984) and prefers the verb 'ordering' to the substantive (Kendall 2004: 70). While ANT is mainly used to study scientific and technological innovations, its conception of governance and order is increasingly finding resonance in IR (e.g. Best & Walters 2013; Barry 2013; Bueger 2013; Coole 2013; Mayer 2012; Schouten 2013c; Walters 2002), and particularly within governmentality studies. This has led to a number of studies on questions of how modern governments have become capable of governing populations, territories, economies and other aggregate objects of government on such large scales as the national or even international (e.g. Larner & Walters 2004; Murdoch 1997; Rose 1999; Rose & Miller 1992).

ANT holds that stable order is the exception to be explained in a world of shifting social relations. Contrary to Hobbes, for ANT, humans can partially remedy this inherent instability by weaving 'actors' who are more durable through their efforts to build larger networks and stabilize social relations throughout space and over time (Callon & Latour 1981; Feldman 2011; Latour 2005b; Schouten 2013a). If an association stretches across the globe, assembles many individuals into a collective or perdures for more than an instant, ANT holds that physical conduits have been deployed, conduits that can be traced. In the words of Niklas Rose,

'If there are differences between the government of large spaces and processes and the government of small spaces and processes, these are not ontological but technological.' (1999: 5)

To illustrate, contemporary international stabilization operations envision restoring and extending state authority in fragile and failed states in large part through infrastructure projects (Schouten & Bachmann 2014). ANT sees such efforts to stabilize networks as highly political because they entail and often target the redistribution of, for example, agency, power, expertise and capital to new

centers of power (Ong & Collier 2005: 9). Additionally, while some associations, ‘social constructions’ and ‘discourses’ do seem to qualify for the substantive, just as some collective or macro-actors do indeed ‘act’, the stability and maintenance of these ‘orders’ requires hard work in the face of contestation. While ANT has substantial overlaps with Foucault-inspired discourse studies (cf. Feldman 2011; Law 2009; Müller 2013; Pyyhtinen & Tamminen 2011), if a discourse has become powerful ANT would ask how it is spread and stabilized through the physical dissemination of texts (Lenoir 1988).

Ultimately, for ANT, ordering is perpetual and even infrastructurally mediated political ordering patterns remain forever unstable as the fragile entanglement of efforts to constitute it. What I take from this discussion is my definition of ‘political ordering’ or ‘governance’ as the efforts to build stable assemblages, that is, rendering ‘desirable associations solidier and more durable’ (Dewey 1927: 71) by mediating associations through infrastructures (Schouten 2013a). Subsequently, I define political ordering *patterns*—the closest thing to the noun that ANT would acknowledge—as political ordering *efforts* made durable across time and space by the imbrication of infrastructures with the processes and networks concerned. From this perspective, extraverted state formation can be defined as an instance of political ordering efforts—specifically across borders—that, through infrastructural mediation, have formed stable patterns of international political ordering (cf. Meagher 2006: 58). As an instance of political ordering, extraversion cannot be supposed to pre-exist but must rather be constantly (re)assembled (Latour 2005b; cf. Abrahamsen & Williams 2011: 235). From this perspective, studying how private security companies co-constitute political order (the substantive), requires exploring empirically how they entangle with the efforts to stabilize political ordering processes into durable patterns through infrastructural mediation. Michael Mann’s work on power allows further operationalizing this in relation to coercive power.

Power in political ordering: from coercive to infrastructural power, and back

‘Means of communication remain the pivot of the colonial policy’ —Georges Moulaert, Belgian colonial administrator⁶

Mirroring Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) and Leander (2004), I hold that the modalities of power at play in modern political ordering go beyond mere coercion. In light of above discussion, I have been encouraged to expand their insights by building on understandings of power that situate coercion and political ordering in relation to the profoundly *technological* character of modernity (e.g. Barry 2001; Edwards 2003; Ellul 1964). In order to shed light on the interplay between private security companies and political ordering as defined above, I construct my framework around a distinction in the work of Michael Mann. Michael Mann argues that the extensive involvement of modern states in the governance of a wide range of processes and objects of government is not attributable to coercive power but rather to the projection of infrastructural power (1984; 2008). Since the industrial revolution, as Michael Mann observes:

‘The state can assess and tax our income and wealth at source, without our consent or that of our neighbours or kin (which states before about 1850 were never able to do); it stores and can recall immediately a massive amount of information about all of us; it can enforce its will within the day almost anywhere in its domains; its influence on the overall economy is enormous; it even directly provides the subsistence of most of us (in state employment, in pensions, in family allowances, etc.). The state penetrates everyday life more than did any historical state. Its infrastructural power has increased enormously.’ (1984: 189, emphasis in original)

According to Mann, who coined the term, infrastructural power refers to the capacity to render political ordering durable by enforcing decisions and stabilizing meanings, interactions and associations—or, as he puts it with reference to states, ‘the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm’ (1984: 189).⁷ Resonat-

⁶ Cited in (Vanderlinden 1968: 758), translation by author.

⁷ Mann’s observation resonates in a variety of literatures that in different yet overlapping ways have theorized the mundane observation that the assembling and stabilization of objects of government to act on them from a distance is most effectively done by weaving technology or materials through social relations (Callon & Latour 1981; cf. Cohn & Dirks 1988; Feldman 2011; Giddens 1981; Murdoch 1997: 326-328; Rose & Miller 1992). Similarly, Foucault can be read as contending how modern governmental order is most powerfully achieved not when effectuated through the human application of force but rather when such stabilization processes are mediated by ‘technologies of power’

ing directly with ANT's meta-theoretical conception of ordering, if modern political order can be seen as the increasing tendency for states to stabilize ever-more spheres of activities as objects of government, then this hinges crucially on the spread of technological infrastructures to mediate social relations throughout national territories (cf. Barry 2001; Schouten 2013a).⁸ Infrastructural power comprises often mundane material underpinnings of rule: artifacts such as documents, statistics, indicators, mobile telephony, railroads, paved roads and fences—logistical techniques and technologies of inscription through which governance processes are stabilized and objects of government are articulated, ordered, stabilized, and circulated (see Mann 1984; Mukerji 2011; Robson 2002; Walters 2002).

In this thesis, my interest is in exploring infrastructure as a key site in the technopolitics (Hecht 2011) of emerging and shifting political ordering patterns as the fabric of state (trans)formation. Governance processes such as 'the economy' might refer in part to preexisting activities, yet their emergence as objects of government that can be acted upon from a distance within political ordering processes is to an important extent the result of their mediation by nation-wide logistics and technologies of inscription that describe, define, differentiate, quantify, problematize, disseminate, and organize them within centers of power (e.g. Larner & Walters 2004: 506; Lezaun 2006; MacKenzie 2006; Rose & Miller 1992; Ruggie 1993: 148ff). In other words, in modern state formation, infrastructure is the glue strategized to provide stability and path dependency to political ordering efforts by holding objects of government and governance networks—like the state—together, even after those who built those infrastructures are long gone (cf. (Avelino & Rotmans 2011: 801, cf. Greener 2002; Murdoch 1997: 329).

Continuing with the example of the 'economy', Scott's seminal study (1998) brilliantly illustrates the vast infrastructural interventions required to physically reorder economic activities throughout space in order to be able to manage those

(Crampton & Elden 2007: 6; cf. Hörnqvist 2010: 8ff) or what Rose & Miller (1992: 175) call 'governmental technologies'. Scholars like Paul Virilio, Anthony Giddens and in IR John Herz considered considers logistics—military technological innovations such as fortification and all-weather roads—as the most characteristic underpinning of the modern state, as these forms of infrastructural power make possible the projection of coercive power over space and thus the integration of the nation state (Giddens 1981: 11; Herz 1957: 474; Virilio 2006; also see Brown 2010; Van Creveld 1977). Finally, while Marx is a painstaking theorist of the role of technology for historical economic and political power in north-west Europe, I leave him out of this discussion because when Marx shifts his gaze towards non-western contexts, 'there is no analysis of the social organization, the methods of discipline, or the techniques of production that characterize the slave plantation, the shipping industry, the colonizing corporation, the colonial settlement, or the power of the army, to compare with his painstaking analysis of the nineteenth-century English factory. There is nothing except the use of force.' (Mitchell 2000: 11).

⁸ While I take ANT as a meta-theoretical background within which the substantive work of Michael Mann becomes relevant, there are substantial overlaps between the approaches to power and order of ANT and Michael Mann (see Allen 1999; Barry 1993: 463-465; Strandsbjerg 2010: 63).

activities within the realm of state control. His work also illustrates Mann's central point that infrastructural power begets centralization: by applying it to some object of government, this object becomes associated with a novel center of power and is disembedded from local entanglements (cf. Giddens 1990: 21; Mitchell 2002; Thomson 1995: 216). It is thus infrastructures that are core to the 'politics of scale' (Ferguson 2006). As Hull (2012: 4) puts it, 'Order and disorder on every scale (...) are produced through the ceaseless circulation of millions of maps, forms, letters, and reports among bureaucrats, politicians, property owners, (...), businessmen, and builders'.

While historical sociologists have primarily deployed the notion of infrastructural power to account for patterns of *state* formation (e.g. Lange 2009; Lucas 1998; Mann 1986; Slater & Fenner 2011; Soifer & vom Hau 2008), from our meta-theoretical perspective, it is but one example of how political ordering *efforts* are, through infrastructural mediation, turned into more durable political ordering *patterns*. Infrastructural power need not be located in the state apparatus and can equally be part of transnational political ordering patterns. Linda Weiss (2006) argues that contemporary patterns of globalization do not necessarily conflict with (strong) state formation, but, to phrase it in our terms, that both these political ordering patterns are co-produced through the same conduits of infrastructural power. Local, national, colonial or global order, territory, economy and population are the result of the extension of infrastructures in 'technological zones' that allow for aggregating and intervening upon these objects on these different scales (Barry 2006; Edwards 2003).

To illustrate with an example that will be explored in-depth in chapter 4, Belgian colonial administrators considered infrastructure as 'tools of penetration' (Zimmermann 1900: 182, translation by author) that allowed 'ordering in the colony by means of the written documents, maps, administrative and medical reports' (Devisch 1998: 225). Colonial infrastructures did not only serve economic purposes of exporting valuable minerals, but were also 'political infrastructures' (McFarlane & Rutherford 2008), allowing the projection of coercive power throughout the territory and, by extension, the capacity to act from at a distance on the colony as a single, stable, integrated object of colonial administration (Curtis 1997; Mbembe 2001: 32- 33; Muppidi 2005: 280ff; Murdoch & Ward 1997; Rose & Miller 1992: 178). As Belgian colonial administrator Moulaert put it, 'One can summarize the case in a succinct and expressive adage, that "colonizing is communicating and transporting"' (1910: 487, translation by author). In other words, while colonialism is often reduced to coercive power it can also be said to have hinged to a large extent on the projection of infrastructural power, which co-produced transnational colonial ordering patterns as well as a particular kind of Belgian and Congolese 'state'.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that the point is thus not about infrastructures *as such* but about how social, economic, and political relations are rearranged and stabilized through them in the production of political ordering patterns, and it is this co-production—emphasized by critical studies of science and technology (e.g. Carroll 1996; Feldman 2011; Hecht 2011; Jasanoff 2004)—that is the focus of study.

Topographies of power: the intertwining of coercive and infrastructural power

Based on the work of Michael Mann, I understand the relationship between security governance and modern political order as structured around these governmental mechanisms: the nature and spatial organization of coercive power can be analyzed as following—and circumscribed by—the extension of infrastructural power in arrangements aimed at stabilizing political ordering processes. Large-scale infrastructure is key to modern politics but the extension of these infrastructures over large spaces is not possible without the regulation of (the threat of) coercive power on the same scale (cf. Buzan & Wæver 2009; Jamison 2009).⁹ To illustrate, one observer argued that if the international project to supply Africa with electricity through the Congolese Inga III dam is to succeed, the countries through which that current is to pass physically—South Sudan and the Central African Republic—would need to have an equal level of security and stability (Lattier 2013). That is, while political ordering is infrastructural, the intertwining of coercive power is the *conditio sine qua non* for these formations, and that makes them political. Let's explore this a little further.

Because infrastructures are pivotal to constituting and sustaining political ordering processes, infrastructural arrangements frequently form the key concern—the 'referent object' in security studies terminology—of security governance efforts (Aradau 2010). While foregrounding infrastructural power might convey the impression that technical systems are somehow invulnerable, the more complex and interdependent they get, the more 'technological zones' are in reality both extremely fragile and vulnerable to disruptions (Barry 2006; Kendall 2004: 63). Because a significant part of modern political order is contingent on expanding assemblages of fragile technological infrastructures, these complex technological zones themselves have become a key security concern of modern

⁹ While I here define 'security governance' broadly as 'the management of the (threat of) coercive power', I am aware of the essentially contested nature of the concept 'security governance' and of the individual components of that term within the expert security studies literature since the 1990s. For an overview of these debates, see for instance (Baldwin 1997; Bigo & Tsoukala 2008; Buzan & Hansen 2009; Krause & Williams 1997; Smith 1999).

government (Dunn Cavely & Kristensen 2008).¹⁰ Particularly since 9/11, the securitization of technological infrastructures of rule has accelerated, reframed as ‘vital’ or ‘critical infrastructure protection’ (Collier & Lakoff 2009). In general, this means higher concentrations of security governance efforts are found around ‘strategic’ or ‘critical’ infrastructure, which often amounts to spaces where formal economic activities are concentrated or upon which they are dependent (Dunn Cavely & Suter 2009). High concentrations of infrastructural power, be it at mining camps or airports, are productive of technologically mediated governmental processes and such assemblages composed of high concentrations of technology, people, and capital also require extra security efforts.¹¹

It is important to note that critical infrastructure is by and large a political construct: it is a predicate lent by governments to certain infrastructures. Yet at the same time, critical infrastructure can refer to physical installations that are part of the state apparatus (nuclear installations) or not (privatized airports), within a national territory or outside it (oil pipelines). To illustrate, the US Department of Homeland Security added Congolese cobalt deposits to a list of foreign infrastructures vital to US national security (US Secretary of State 2008)—indicating that remote mining sites in the Eastern Congo needed to be secured as part of the fabric of American political order. Critical infrastructures, then, are just as multiple and distributed as the global assemblages hinging on them. They equally challenge global/local, public/private and civil/military divides—both in terms of who ‘owns’ them and the scale on which they co-constitute ‘order’. Yet the difference is that the materiality of critical infrastructures forms a key reason for both their vulnerability and their centrality to security governance efforts.

While the contemporary focus of the above discussion might suggest that the securitization of infrastructures is a novel phenomenon, the imbrication of infrastructural and coercive power seems a more enduring feature of modern political ordering patterns. For Michael Oakeshott ‘a modern state is a ‘policy’ state and this in its extreme is a ‘police’ state’. (Oakeshott 2007: 368) This is precisely because modern governmental apparatuses are complex imbrications of both types of power. Many are the studies that recognize the birth of policing in the moment when infrastructural extension in Europe first allowed—and required—such disciplinary control (Mitchell 1988: xi; Ogborn 1993). Indeed, Foucault attributes the birth of policing to the necessity of maintaining order around the urban

¹⁰ The way that the maintenance of complex apparatuses of rule has fused into conceptions of political order can be illustrated with reference to the ‘broken window theory’, which holds that small cracks in infrastructural apparatuses lead to more sabotage and can lead to the progressive undoing of the infrastructurally mediated order itself (Kelling & Wilson 1982), as the break-down of such infrastructure would entail in the proliferation of ‘ungoverned spaces’ (K. Mitchell 2010).

¹¹ The corollary of infrastructure as referent object is that modern warfare increasingly targets infrastructures to arrive at demodernization and disconnection of military targets (Coward 2006; Graham 2010).

nodes of increased circulation engendered by the expansion of national infrastructures in 18th century Europe (Foucault 2007). Never were the entanglements of infrastructural power projection, coercion and state formation as clear as in Haussmann's redesign of Paris (Douglas 2008). Early forms of private policing—Pinkerton in the US and the private security forces of Cecil Rhodes in South Africa—also concentrated around emerging economic hubs that involved high concentrations of capital and industrial machinery (cf. Abrahamsen & Williams 2011: 10; Hönke 2013: 153; Spitzer & Scull 1977).

This lock-in of coercive and infrastructural power also means that in processes of state formation, coercive power was not equally spread out throughout national territories but rather concentrated around the topographies constituted by the unfolding projection of infrastructural power. As Michael Mann puts it:

'Militaristic control of everyday behaviour requires such a high level of organised coercion, logistical back-up and surplus extraction that it is practical only within close communications to the armed forces in areas of high surplus availability. It does not spread evenly over entire state territories. It remains concentrated in pockets and along communications routes.' (1984: 200)

This observation equally shows that the linkages between coercive power, infrastructural power and political ordering are not unidirectional. Infrastructural power can also serve as a conduit to amplify, extend, and stabilize coercive power throughout time and across space—technology 'imparts presence', as it is called in military doctrine (Shattuck 2000: 71). To illustrate, at the previous turn of century, the British in China recognized that with the railway, 'one soldier can have the impact of a dozen' (Huenemann 1984: 43).

Infrastructural power projection thus not only forms the static referent object around which the organization of coercive power can be understood, but also forms a conduit for the projection of coercion. Infrastructures allow rapid communication between, and the dispatch of, mobile security forces rather than requiring their continuing presence across territories (Barry 1996; cf. Montesh 2007; Van Creveld 1977), or even the replacement of human security forces by technological and infrastructural security measures (Higgs 2001; Lyon 1994; Schouten 2014). To clarify with a classical example, the panopticon—that combination of guard and watchtower, woven into the architectural fabric of the corrective facility—is the apparatus structuring or making possible the prison-assemblage and the eye of power (Foucault 1975; cf. Müller 2013: 62). All in all, the centrality of infrastructural power for the organization of coercive power in modern political order is so pervasive that Janice Thomson has argued that perhaps we are witnessing 'the state's shift from despotic to infrastructural (Mann 1986: 477-483) or administrative (Giddens 1985: 172-197) power' (1995: 226).

Following the meta-theoretical framework outlined above, I propose to distinguish between security assemblages and security apparatus in order to make explicit how the weaving of infrastructural power affects security governance arrangements. I follow Abrahamsen & Williams in using ‘security assemblages’ to refer to the fluidity of security networks and the institutional plurality of security actors involved in specific sites. In order to underscore how infrastructural power is woven into security assemblages to stabilize political ordering patterns, I will speak of a ‘security apparatus’ for its semantic resonance with the term ‘machinery’ (cf. Latour 1999: 192). A security apparatus is thus a security assemblage rendered more durable (Schouten 2013c; cf. Adey & Anderson 2012: 101; Beck & Kropp 2010: 7; Feldman 2011: 380; Foucault 2007: 44-45). This definition suggests that security governance efforts might envision relaying contestation as much as possible to more durable materials such as fences, barbed wire, walls and access-control technologies, but ultimately hinge on human enforcement of (the threat of) coercive power (cf. Sack 1986: 20).

I propose Mann’s understanding of power, lodged within our meta-theoretical approach to order and ordering, can help theorize and explore empirically the historical relationship between security governance and political ordering in Congo, with direct implications for exploring how private security companies co-constitute political order today. To illustrate, the physical presence of Belgian colonial administrators never became more than 10,000 for a territory the size of Western Europe, meaning that their capacity to project coercive power was to a large extent limited to and contingent on amplification through infrastructural power (Herbst 2000: 78; cf. Barry 1996; Bézy 1958: 137; Vander Eycken & Vander Vorst 1967: 416-7). The editors of a recent volume on transport in Africa indeed note that ‘Roads were not built just for the practical purpose of transporting goods and people but also as a measure of control and reprisal in the context of disciplining a subject population’ (Gewald, Luning & van Walraven 2009: 5), because colonial regimes throughout Africa started to ‘recognize the importance of their physical presence throughout the colonies as a critical element of control’ (Njoh 2008: 151). As will be explored in chapter 4, the coercive mechanisms of Belgian colonial administration never spread out equally to the limits of colonial territory. While claiming sovereign power within the whole of colonial territories, it seems ‘colonial rule’—including coercion—generally extended only as far as colonial infrastructures did (Benton 2006; Eriksen 2011: 240; Hönke 2013; Nest 2002b).

Fast forward to present times, it is stunning to observe to which extent analyses of the contemporary rise of private security companies in Africa mirror the spatial insights regarding colonial security governance. For one, research on the spatiality of private security in South Africa seems to suggest that private security

companies are not spread out equally throughout the territory, but—mirroring colonial topographies of power (Hönke 2013)—rather concentrate around the infrastructurally-dense technological zones of mining companies and urban business districts (e.g. Paasche, Yarwood, Sidaway 2013; Schouten 2012). While such technological infrastructures abound in OECD countries—to such a degree that they are often taken for granted in social science analysis of governance—they are much scarcer in the DRC and sub-Saharan Africa more generally and therefore more significant for competitive advantage, to put it in economic terms, or—to put it in political language—power discrepancies (Schouten 2013a). For the purposes of this study, this also encourages looking backward into history to explore what seem durable features of the relationship between security governance and political ordering in Congo today.

Chapter summary

This chapter has outlined the connections between the central analytical concepts that guide empirical investigation in this thesis: private security companies, political ordering, and coercive and infrastructural power. The key point this chapter has tried to articulate is that how private security companies co-constitute political order cannot be fully understood by solely exploring political order in terms of coercive power. If modern political order—whether within or across borders—hinges on rendering durable inherently unstable governance networks, then this requires us to complement analysis of coercive power with a focus on the technologies of infrastructural power that are crucial to the stabilization of political ordering patterns.

The literature discussion has shown that neither infrastructural power nor coercive power need to be tied to the state apparatus, and neither is equally distributed throughout national territories. Rather, they both concentrate in specific places—the aggregate of which can be understood as a ‘topography’ of political ordering construed through circuits of infrastructural and coercive power respectively. The spatial concentration of infrastructural and coercive power can be expected to be uneven and combined (cf. Boone 2012) and construed in assemblages around specific political ordering—i.e., governance—processes. If we assume patterns of political ordering are to a large extent contingent on infrastructural power projection, a large question mark looms as to how infrastructural power has historically played a role in the constitution and transformation of political order in Congo, and how private security companies—arguably a self-proclaimed embodiment of coercive power—might relate to political ordering in Congo today.

CHAPTER 2

What this points to, in short, is that we can explore how private security companies co-constitute political order in Congo by paying attention to how they entangle with efforts to stabilize political ordering patterns through infrastructural mediation. We can historically situate this by contrasting this contemporary topography of power to earlier entanglements of coercive and infrastructural power in Congo.

3

Analyzing security governance and political ordering: methodo- logical considerations

Introduction

This study explores how private security companies co-constitute political order in Congo through a qualitative case study approach. The design of the case study is guided by the main research question and the theoretical discussion of the previous chapter. The main task of this chapter is to explain the methodological choices made that structure inquiry, elaborate on the framework that will guide analysis, and to discuss basic techniques deployed to collect and analyze the data gathered to answer the empirical questions.

Private security and political order: a case study approach

This first section goes through the design of the study, specifying the components that will be focused on as well as how their relations are conceptualized. As will be discussed, the overall design is that of a country case study with two within (or embedded) cases.

Case selection: the rise of the private security sector in the DRC

A first reason to select the case of private security companies in the DRC is that while security in the DRC is not understudied, only one—limited—study exists of the private security sector in the DRC (De Goede 2008), despite the aforementioned fact that the private security sector outnumbers both the number of

peacekeepers in the DRC and the number of rebels. As mentioned in the introduction, the rise of the private security sector in the DRC occurs in a context in which ‘political order’ is challenged to such an extent by the proliferation of security actors, that a number of scholars have asked whether and how it even persists. While this might raise the question of whether it is even possible to speak of a political order in relation to which to analyze private security companies, this makes it urgent to explore what the addition of yet another non-state security actor to this already complex choreography of security actors entails for political (dis)order in Congo.

Congo is selected as a case to study how the rise of private security companies relates to political order because it constitutes an *extreme* case (Seawright & Gerring 2008) of extraverted state formation. This study is a case of the rise of private security companies within a larger ‘universe’ populated by countries where key domestic political ordering processes are embedded in international ordering patterns (see Figure 1 below). Today, Congo’s government budget depends largely on foreign aid (e.g. Development Initiatives 2013: 258) and transnational mining companies, and key aspects of political order in Congo—such as the mining economy and services essential to the well-being of Congolese population—depend to a considerable extent on relations to centers of power and decision-making in other countries (Kudithshini 2008; Vircoulon 2007). This makes Congo an ideal case to study the entanglement of private security companies with internationalized political ordering processes.

But there is another way in which Congo is an extreme case. It has been explained that political ordering will be studied with a specific focus on infrastructural power, which was, in the previous chapter, construed as a central form of power for the construction of durable political ordering patterns over large distances. While the role of infrastructures in political order in Western Europe is so pervasive that it seems to have receded to the background of political sciences (Latour 2005a), the importance of infrastructures for power is very much evident in the everyday struggles of most Congolese to get by, as what is perhaps most characteristic of Congo’s ‘state failure’ is exactly the marked absence of this form of power (Schouten 2013a; cf. Herbst 2000; Rotberg 2002). This scarcity of modern infrastructure means that the infrastructure that exists stand out, are relatively easy to locate, and this makes Congo a unique site of study to explore the spatialization of private security companies in relation to distributions of infrastructures. While the kind of infrastructural disassembly of the DRC is fortunately rare, it would equally have been possible to focus on, for example, South Sudan or Somalia, which have equally limited working infrastructure. However, relative

familiarity with these other cases indicates that they are not home to equally burgeoning private security sectors, albeit for different reasons.¹²

Figure 1. Design of the case study




Figure by author, adaptation from figure 2.4 in (Yin 2009: 46)

Within-case selection: mining in Orientale and humanitarianism in North Kivu

In the research design for this thesis, within-case selection (Gerring & Seawright 2008) also merits discussion. The within-case (or embedded) cases are constituted by the specific extraverted political ordering processes in relation to which I investigate how private security companies co-constitute political ordering patterns (see Figure 1 above). Rather than attempting to exhaustively explore how private security companies co-constitute political ordering patterns in Congo, this thesis looks specifically at international political ordering patterns around the birth and transformation of the (post)colonial *economy* and Congolese *population* as internationalized objects of government in Congo. This thesis follows these objects of government and the international political ordering arrangements that sustain them throughout Belgian colonialism, as they transform in the

¹² In South Sudan, it seems the relative dearth of private security companies is largely due to the fact that the main economic activity—oil extraction—is operated by China, Malaysia and India, countries that to date seem to rely more on state security forces and less on private security companies for their operations abroad, a subject that definitively merits more attention. In Somalia, the overall security situation is so volatile that private security companies of the type under study here seem absent altogether. The relative dearth of infrastructure seems to hold more generally for Africa (Dowden 2005: 20; cf. Debrie 2010 for West Africa).

immediate postcolonial moment and under Mobutu, to—in the contemporary part of this thesis—zoom in on the way they are (re)constituted today in specific sites: the mining economy in Province Orientale and vulnerable humanitarian populations in North Kivu.

This choice is motivated by a combination of a literature review that indicates that Belgian colonial administration seemed to have revolved crucially around two extraverted political ordering patterns: the ‘civilizing mission’ and resource extraction (as will be elaborated on in chapter 4), and a previous study (Schouten 2011b) that noted the concentration of private security companies in Congo around developmental activities and extractive industries respectively. An empirical focus on these within-cases allows me to trace the entanglement of coercive power with these specific governance processes throughout Congolese history, as a way to anchor study of the contemporary rise of private security companies in relation to concrete political ordering patterns (cf. Tull 2003: 430).

Situating private security companies in relation to these governance processes which occur not only in Congo but are widespread throughout sub-Saharan Africa and the broader ‘developing world’, makes the analysis of these within-cases resonate with similar processes in other sites (cf. Snyder 2001; Yin 2009: 48). For instance, literature indicates that development and humanitarian organizations have started to consistently adopt private security companies for their operations, irrespective of the country of operations (e.g. Bruderlein & Gassmann 2006; Cockayne 2006; Perrin 2008; Pingeot 2012; Spearin 2001; 2008; Stoddard, Harmer & DiDomenico 2009). Given their explicit ambition to uphold similar security regimes for different locations, exploration of dynamics in a specific site might reverberate across the broader specter of humanitarian security governance.

The embedded cases translate into a focus on spatially delimited ‘strategic contexts’ (Boone 2003: 9), in the sense that I focus on these governance processes in specific ‘local’ sites within Congolese territory. To emphasize how these sites are analytically relevant to study the within-case governance processes selected, I will call them ‘construction sites of extraversion’. The construction sites chosen are ‘strategically situated’ (Marcus 1995) contexts for interrelated reasons. While mining constitutes an important livelihood in North Kivu, there is no large-scale industrial mining currently ongoing (Spittaels 2010). At the same time, most humanitarian activities in Congo are concentrated in the province, because of the concentration of rebels and the designation by the UN of Goma as its operational HQ (see chapter 8). On the other hand, Province Orientale is home to a number of gold mining companies located away from the humanitarian efforts in the province (see chapter 7). This means that both contexts constitute ‘clean cut’ sites

to observe the entanglement of private security companies with the two governance processes that form the respective analytical foci of both embedded cases.

However, there would also be arguments against selecting Province Orientale, and for focusing on Katanga. The Katanga province is by far home to the most important industrial mining efforts (mainly copper) and is home to a high concentration of private security companies. It is also relatively more secure than Province Orientale. However, for these exact reasons, Katanga has been studied more elaborately (e.g., De Goede 2008; Hönke 2010) and this makes focusing on Province Orientale a contribution to the knowledge on private security companies in Congo.

Validity and generalizability: making the logics explicit

Case selection and design directly impinges on questions of validity. In terms of external validity, the fact that this is a single-country case study means it is not the ambition nor possible to generalize about the way in which private security companies co-constitute political order in other settings. Nevertheless, findings for this case study may resonate with, and speak back to, other cases situated within the same context of extraverted state formation (Yin 2009: 43). On the other hand, this limitation is also an advantage, as it is necessary to delimit enquiry in order to be able to explore the significance of the rise of private security companies in depth and arrive at nuances that would otherwise be lost (cf. Tull 2003: 430).

Internal validity is ultimately problematic for single case studies, but by making transparent the principles the researcher adheres to in constructing his research design, the logic that underlies the study is made explicit and its validity can thus be inspected and evaluated by the scientific community (Bryman 2008: 32). In this study, the ambition towards validity is reflected in three ways.

First, correspondence between the theoretically informed focus on the intersection of the spatialization of private security companies and that of infrastructures and empirical data constitutes a form of explanatory validity. While this case study cannot and does not make a claim pertaining to the existence of causal mechanisms, in terms of case study design, explanatory validity consists of an expectation regarding the way in which the context of extraversion relates to the ways in which private security companies co-constitute political order in Congo (cf. Yin 2009: 136).

The second way in which the ambition to reach validity of analysis is manifest in this study is through identifying similarities in the ways in which private security companies relate to different governance processes within contrasting within-cases in the case study (cf. Snyder 2001). Studying private security companies in relation to these governance processes and actors is one way of avoiding the

endogeneity trap, which comprises, to paraphrase Sassen (2006: 4), trying to understand x —in this case private security companies—by confining empirical enquiry to the characteristics of x . A risk with this type of within-case study design is that analysis can remain at the level of embedded cases and fail to return to the level of the case (Yin 2009: 52). Chapter 6—which situates the embedded cases within a countrywide discussion of the rise of the private security sector and the ‘political topography of private security’ in the DRC—is a mechanism with which to avoid this pitfall.

The third technique of validity relates to the deployment of a wide variety of sources of information as a measure of triangulation. Specifically in the case where academically validated information is not widely available (see below for discussion), this measure of construing validity by checking different sources against each other becomes important (Berndtsson 2009: 21; cf. Yin 2009: 101).

Analyzing security governance and political ordering

This section goes through the moves through which I analyzed how private security companies co-constitute political order. As indicated, absent an ‘overarching political order’ in Congo with which to relate private security companies, to ask how private security companies co-constitute political order involved asking how private security companies are entangled in efforts to turn specific political ordering processes—i.e., extraverted ones—into durable political ordering patterns through infrastructural mediation. To break this inquiry down, the main research question is addressed through a set of specific subquestions. First, how has security governance historically been spatialized around political ordering processes in Congo, and how did this entanglement constitute political ordering patterns? Second, around which political ordering processes are private security companies spatialized in Congo, and how does this entanglement constitute political ordering patterns?

In order to analyze how private security companies now, and other forms of security governance earlier in Congolese history, co-constitute political ordering patterns, I defined security governance as the management of (the threat of) coercive power and discussed how the entanglements of security governance in spatial assemblages comprising other governance processes constitute the unequally distributed fabric of political order. This reflects the meta-theoretical ‘process-oriented view of the state’ (Tull 2003: 431) adopted, in which change is immanent and stability of ordering patterns the exception that requires explanation (cf. Hobden 1998). I use ‘political ordering’ and ‘governance’ processes interchangeably to refer to rationalized efforts to act on objects of government external to the governing subject, and the focus is specifically on how security governance—from colonial policing to private security—co-constitute political order by

reinforcing efforts to turn such political ordering processes into durable political ordering patterns.

In the following paragraphs, I lay out further my analytical framework. In a first move, I explain how the spatial distribution of security actors around specific governance processes is of particular relevance for analyzing how security governance co-constitutes political ordering patterns. I then discuss how the relationship between security governance and political ordering are addressed in the material through a focus on the entanglement of security assemblages with the infrastructures that form the ‘political cement’ (Pélissier 1966: 671, cited in Boone 2003: 100) of political ordering patterns. A final move I make is to discuss how understanding the ways in which security governance co-constitutes political ordering patterns may not be fully determined by infrastructural power projection but also hinge on exploring the contingent geopolitical and geoeconomic considerations deriving from specificities within the historical and spatial context.

The spatiality and relationality of security governance

In light of discussions of the previous chapter, the first analytical move I make in this thesis is to empirically investigate historical and contemporary security governance deploying the same spatial and relational approach to both. A key insight from the previous chapter is that security governance and political ordering processes do not spread out equally throughout national territories. Taking this insight as a methodological point of departure means two things. First, the *spatial* component means empirically exploring the distribution of security governance throughout the Congolese territory at different historical moments. I locate security governance, which has been defined as the management of the (threat of) coercive power, in the physical presence of security forces, whether the colonial Force Publique, Mobutu’s Special Forces or private security guards today. As detailed in the previous chapter, security governance is often also located in physical security measures (configurations involving those were conceptualized as ‘security apparatus’). In those cases, I equally locate security governance in such material setups as checkpoints, fences, double access gates and guard towers. In the case of contemporary security governance, I empirically accessed security governance through field observations. In case of historical configurations of security governance, I could not observe security governance directly but accessed it through policy documents on colonial and postcolonial policing, maps showing the deployment of security forces, second-hand descriptions of security arrangements and architectural drawings of physical security arrangements.

Second, the *relational* component entails not trying to impute significance to the topographies of specific security governance actors—i.e. colonial police or

private security companies—alone, but rather to take the assemblages in which different security actors entangle with other governance processes seriously as political formations. Methodologically, this means I explored the ways in which the spatial articulation of security governance—from the colonial Force Publique to contemporary private security companies—intersects and has intersected with the spatial (re)organization of political ordering processes across national borders. Simply put, this means I took recourse to maps of the spatial distribution of security arrangements—located in the physical deployment of security forces and material security setups—and systematically analyzed how these security topographies intersect with the spatial distribution of governance processes, i.e., around which specific actors and political ordering processes private security assemblages are constructed. A relational approach also means that in analyzing how private security companies co-constitute political order today, I took into account how the entanglement of public security forces might form part of localized security assemblages. As we will see throughout the thesis, this raised further questions about the utility of the public/private divide to understand the significance of private security companies for political order in Congo (cf. Owens 2008). In sum, a spatial and relational analysis of how security governance co-constitutes political ordering patterns is particularly suited because capital, coercive power, and modern infrastructure are unequally distributed within and across territories, and historical intersections of these different distributions constitute ‘political topographies’ composed of varying assemblages and that can be studied as *de facto* state (trans)formation.¹³

In relation to the historical questions of this thesis, and as shall be discussed in more detail in a subsequent section, I studied colonial archives and other historical sources to systematically analyze material on the historical development of colonial and postcolonial security governance in Congo, reading those sources with specific attention to the main tasks attributed to (post)colonial security forces and their spatial distribution around specific governance processes. In relation to contemporary analysis, this concretely entailed mapping the distribution of private security companies in the DRC, and as a second step, investigating around which specific actors and political ordering processes private security assemblages are constructed. Here, data concerning the size, distribution, and main clients of the private security sector collected from interviews with PSC representatives, their clients, and operations managers formed a central part of the investigation.

¹³ For studies that use a topographical approach in relation to political order in Africa, see (Boone 2003; Ferguson 2004; 2006; Hönke 2010; Schouten 2011b; Tull 2003)

Topographies of security governance and infrastructural power projection

It has been argued in the previous chapter that political ordering patterns can only durably extend through space and time to the extent that they are mediated by infrastructural arrangements. As indicated, my intent has been to explore how private security companies co-constitute extraverted political ordering patterns, defined as internationalized governance processes rendered durable through infrastructural mediation—what, following Michael Mann, has been called the projection of infrastructural power. This means that the question is thus not solely around which governance processes security governance is and has been spatialized, but how security governance has historically entangled in particular with efforts to render these specific governance processes into durable political ordering patterns through infrastructural mediation. From this perspective, the historically varying entanglements of security governance with infrastructure development from Belgian colonialism onwards become a key site of study.

In the previous chapter, the relationship between security governance—i.e., the management of (the threat of) coercive power—and infrastructural power has been conceptualized in two ways: infrastructural power projection can figure as a ‘referent object’ of security governance, and infrastructural power can serve as a conduit for coercive power. I therefore purported to explore empirically whether and how security governance has since Belgian colonialism concentrated around infrastructural power arrangements in internationalized political ordering patterns from what was at the time called colonial administration into post-colonial government and now governance (cf. Burton & Jennings 2007; Cooke 2003).

I concretely delimited my enquiry by focusing on the role of both forms of power in ‘political ordering efforts’, i.e., the endeavors to establish durable political ordering patterns throughout space by weaving coercive and infrastructural arrangements through political ordering processes. I locate these efforts in the statements—whether in interviews or in policy documentation—that ascribe governance—i.e. political ordering—outcomes to security and infrastructure arrangements. A variety of historical sources provided the material needed to identify, and create as comprehensive an analysis as possible of, the historical and contemporary deployment of coercive and infrastructural power in efforts to stabilize political ordering patterns in (post)colonial Congo. My delimitation of security governance, mentioned above, has a physical embodiment that can be mapped. Infrastructural power, it is remembered, was defined as comprising the deployment of mundane physical technologies—communication lines, railways, statistical systems, all-weather roads—in political ordering efforts. First, because of its material embodiment, infrastructural power has a spatial articulation; this

means that in theory the exercise of infrastructural power in efforts to stabilize governance processes into durable political ordering patterns can be mapped (cf. Murdoch 1997: 321). This points to historical and contemporary maps of infrastructure development in Congo as one source of information.

Second, both in the historical and contemporary chapters, analysis of policy documents takes a central role, heavily informed by methodological approaches within governmentality studies to the extent that these documents were seen as representative of the reflexive policy agenda's of the institutions under study, agenda's within which both security governance and infrastructure become meaningful in attempts to stabilize political ordering patterns in Congo (Dean 1994; see Stoler 2002 for colonial archives specifically). Consistent with the meta-theoretical framework outlined above, infrastructures as such have no agency; they only become instances of technopolitics or infrastructural power when woven through political ordering processes (Latour 1999: 192). Because physical infrastructures only constitute infrastructural power if woven through political ordering efforts, instances of infrastructural power projection were expected to be reflected in policy documents detailing how infrastructure is strategized politically and can thus be accessed empirically. This points towards reading documents expounding the rationalization of infrastructure development from Belgian colonialism onwards. Policy documents (whether colonial or from development organizations), project assessments and statements by security managers are the locus where infrastructural and coercive arrangements are inscribed as linked to political ordering efforts. This means that they become important sites to explore how coercive and infrastructural arrangements are strategized within political ordering efforts.

Mapping coercive and infrastructural power in history

In analyzing this relationship historically, in chapters 4 and 5, I read historical material on infrastructure development to get at the ways in which infrastructure development was strategized in colonial and postcolonial efforts to establish and transform ordering patterns across borders. If a particular infrastructure project was discussed within the context of efforts to establish durable ordering patterns around specific spheres of activities—such as the indigenous order or extractive economy—I analyzed it as an instance of infrastructural power projection. It is remembered that I located these efforts in historical sources that ascribe governance outcomes to technological advances in the administration of the domains at hand. I also studied historical material with an eye to discovering whether and how infrastructure development begot transformations in security governance. This means that I looked for explicit or implicit linkages in these texts that draw a connection between infrastructure development and changes in the mission or

organization of security governance. This points to documents that concern themselves with the stationing of security forces around specific sites, or shifts in the core mission of security forces—for instance from pacification to colonial policing—in the wake of infrastructure development efforts.

An additional move I made was to approach source material to explore whether and how infrastructural power was woven through security assemblages at different times since Belgian colonialism, and with what effects for the relationship between coercive power and political ordering patterns. This entailed investigating how security governance itself transformed into more durable apparatuses woven through infrastructurally-mediated political ordering patterns. This points to sources discussing how transformations to the built environment were planned from a security perspective—such as spatial segregation in urban planning, the integration of private security guards with physical security measures around mining sites, and so forth—and what these meant for the way in which security governance was entangled in political ordering efforts. Simply put, I asked how changes to the built environment for political purposes entailed reconfigurations of the roles of security governance. For example, as will be explored in-depth in chapter 4, the initial projection of infrastructural power throughout the colonial territory led to a radical change in the organization of the Force Publique from mobile ‘pacification’ operations to static ‘policing’ of order around colonial infrastructures, in which security forces were deployed to enforce a colonial order built into checkpoints, access gates, widespread identification mechanisms and other infrastructural security governance measures.

Mapping contemporary coercive and infrastructural power

For the contemporary analysis of how private security companies co-constitute durable extraverted political ordering patterns, I first explored how the aggregate topography of private security in Congo intersects with the distribution of modern infrastructures in Congo. Methodologically, this entailed bringing into conversation original fieldwork-derived data on the distribution of private security companies within the Congolese territory with data gathered on the distribution of infrastructures in Congo (chapter 6). I did this concretely by inferring from documents, explicit statements, and physical setups observed during fieldwork the degree to which both are part of the same assemblages, i.e. endogenous elements of the operational strategies of international actors that attempt to establish durable ordering patterns in Congo.

Besides interviews and field observations, periodic reports and project assessments by mining companies and international development organizations provided an important source of information, as they often make explicit the importance of, and expenditures on, infrastructure development for the govern-

ance processes at hand, for necessary infrastructure is often absent in Congo. As will be discussed at length in chapter 6, as modern infrastructure is most notable for its absence and Congo is considered highly insecure by most international actors, these increasingly make security and logistics part of their operational strategies. Field observations and interviews allowed getting at the ways in which international actors strategize private security companies in relation to their critical operational infrastructures. Mapping around which infrastructurally-mediated efforts at stabilizing internationalized governance processes—i.e. governance processes in Congo by actors that place themselves outside of that order, such as multinational corporations—private security companies concentrate within Congolese national territory, allowed taking the resulting topography seriously as the fabric of extraverted political ordering patterns.

Contingencies of ordering

Infrastructure has connotations with engineering as a technical and scientifically informed rational conduct applied ‘from above’ to a problem. Additionally, given that infrastructural power projection in efforts to stabilize political ordering patterns often outlasts these historical efforts (Avelino & Rotmans 2011), the remaining infrastructures potentially continue to shape governance processes afterwards (Jackson, Edwards, Bowker & Knobel 2007; Kay 2005: 563) and might present themselves as external to, or as the context of, contemporary governance efforts. However, efforts to stabilize political ordering processes are also profoundly shaped by the contingent historical considerations flowing from limited interpretations of the geoeconomic and geopolitical context within which these efforts take place. Following Foucault (1973), to uncover the essentially instability and contested and political nature of the order of ‘things’—i.e. what might seem like exogenous technical artifacts—we need to study the efforts in which they are strategized within the historical contexts within which the relations between security, infrastructure and political order were yet to be settled (cf. Schouten 2014: 26). Looking at the projection of coercive and infrastructural power in ongoing efforts to reassemble and reinforce political ordering patterns allows getting at these seemingly cold and fixed structures as contingent and unstable products of fallible human efforts.

This leads to a third methodological move. Whereas the focus of the previous moves has been on the aggregate level of the intersecting topographies of security governance and infrastructural power in the case of Congo, the present discussion points towards a detailed exploration of how private security companies co-constitute efforts to stabilize political ordering patterns in specific ‘construction sites of extraversion’—the sites where the efforts to (re)produce these patterns concentrate and respond to perceived contextual threats, challenges and oppor-

tunities. In chapters 7 and 8, I examine how private security companies co-constitute the extraversion of the mineral economy and humanitarian governance, by investigating how private security companies are folded into these governance processes to secure ‘both the “mechanical” foundations of these phenomena and the actual processes and structures that define their scope and significance’ (Ong & Collier 2005: 10).

In order to study these co-constitutive relations within the contexts of the governance processes at hand, I asked my material two specific questions: first, how conceptions of order inherent in the governance processes at hand direct the deployment of infrastructural power and security governance; second, the way in which infrastructural power, once projected, thereupon becomes part of the context of subsequent political ordering efforts.

In order to address the first of these questions, I situated how private security companies co-constitute political order within the contingencies of the context by exploring it in relation to shifting conceptions of envisioned order and what is construed as a threat to that order. It was expected that the conceptions of ‘order’ within the domains of mining and development aid differ, leading to distinct approaches to the role of infrastructural power and security governance respectively. I focused on the ways in which the infrastructural power projection strategized to extend and render durable the governance processes at hand require, shape, and direct specific private security governance configurations. Exploring this required inferring the underlying logics in the texts as to how ordering within that domain is conceived and bringing those into conversation with the infrastructural and coercive power arrangements through which ordering patterns have been imposed within the context of operations in Congo. The focus was on how security governance and infrastructural power projection are lodged within broader prevailing conceptions of what constitutes envisioned order. Mining companies and development organizations make explicit the international normative regimes—i.e. human rights standards, treaties, codes of conduct—that they strive to conform to and make explicit, in security and risk assessments, the contextual threats posed to their operations as conforming to these normative regimes. I brought these different materials into conversation to analyze the ways in which private security companies are considered to be both part and co-constitutive of prevailing legitimate political ordering patterns and counter threats to the broader normative orders attached to them.

Regarding the second of these questions, I was interested in exploring the ways in which historically developed infrastructural absences and presences subsequently shape the spatial distribution of security governance and political ordering patterns since Belgian colonialism. How did particular colonial entanglements of coercive and infrastructural power direct postcolonial political order-

ing efforts? How can we understand the ways in which subsequent infrastructural delinquency reverberates through contemporary governance efforts? This means reading political ordering processes at any particular moment as circumscribed by infrastructure developments and disassembly in previous historical moments. In practice, this entailed frequently returning to my analyses of historically preceding moments when analyzing the entanglements of coercive power, infrastructural power, and political ordering patterns in subsequent historical moments, to explore the extent to which their spatial reach was circumscribed or amplified by pre-existing infrastructural pathways. In this sense, the relation between security governance and political ordering efforts was understood to always be both new and an expression of an unfolding ‘technological *longue durée*’ (Arnold 2005: 91; cf. Mbembe 2001).

Data

As indicated before, previous information on private security companies in Congo is scarce. This means that a wide range of sources—varying from media reporting to corporate reports and field visits to interviews—will be deployed as material for this case study, also with a view to strengthening reliability of observations on the phenomenon at hand. For this reason, the data collection approach adopted here is geared to maximally deploy ‘large amounts of information the author collected across a wide range of dimensions’ (Gomm, Hammersley and Foster, 2002: 2, cited in Kabemba 2011: 22). In the following, I discuss the main categories of data employed in this study.

Interviews

Between November 2010 and March 2014, I conducted a total of 68 interviews with 61 individuals from, or related to, the private security sector in the DRC (see Appendix 1 for a full list). For the analysis in chapter eight, I conducted interviews with representatives of all private security companies in Goma, NGO and UN staff, including humanitarian security managers. Interviews in Kinshasa with Congolese police, private security managers and country managers for mining and humanitarian organizations complemented the ones in Province Orientale and Goma (see Appendix 1). The main purpose of these interviews—conducted largely in Congo but also in a wider range of places from whence security is governed in Congo—was to arrive at an accurate overview of the size, distribution and rise of the private security sector in the DRC. A central argument for using interviews with private security sector employees, their clients, and other stakeholders to map the size, rise and distribution of the private security sector is that the individual and institutional knowledge of these actors can be expected to

form the key locus of reliable information. For instance, to learn about one aspect of the case study, the rise of the private security sector in the 1990s, I have sought to identify private security managers that were long involved in Congo's private security sector, as well as security managers for firms that had been present in Congo when it was still Zaïre. As a result, the majority of the interviews conducted are with operational, country, or regional level managers in the private security sector. Given that country-level private security managers try to have an overview of the sector in view of enlarging market share of the own firm, it was possible to compile an overall picture of the size and distribution of the private security sector in Congo on the basis of these interviews. A large part of the data resulting from these interviews is presented in Table 1 on page 123 (chapter 6), which comprises an overview of the private security sector in the DRC with explicit figures for the 10 largest private security companies, which together comprise roughly 80% of the market. Chapter 6 provides a more detailed discussion of the numbers and how the figures my interviewees provided me relate to those collected by De Goede (2008).

In view of the second empirical subquestion, these interviews also allowed me to map out the main 'referent objects' of the private security sector, that is, the different types of clients and the governance processes in which these were involved. Subsequently talking to the main clients of private security companies in Congo allowed refining the image of the governance processes private security companies concentrate around. Interviews also served to better understand how security considerations were linked, first, to the technical nature of the transnationalized governance processes at hand—i.e., how intimately the use of private security companies was linked to the projection of infrastructural power—and second, to the prevailing conceptions of order and threat implicit in the ordering efforts at hand.

Overall, the interviews yielded vast amounts of transcribed interview material, only a fraction of which made it into this thesis. This means that much data still remain to be analyzed in the course of further research, which will be further discussed in the concluding chapter.

Fieldwork

The second type of empirical material consists of the field notes I took during fieldwork trips to the Eastern DRC. During these fieldwork trips, data collected took the form of first-hand observations translated into field notes (further discussed below). In contrast to interview material, which is recorded or elaborately transcribed on the spot, field notes comprise quickly jotted down keywords and observations, which are elaborated at a later moment (cf. Patton 2005).

In the period between November 2010-September 2012 I conducted 6 fieldwork visits of between 2 and 6 weeks to Kinshasa and the Orientale and North Kivu provinces in Congo, some of which I visited twice. Two visits to Kinshasa were organized with a view to conducting interviews with country managers and operations managers of PSC, and with security managers of their clients at national headquarters. For the trips to the Eastern DRC, the first main objective was to arrive at a more specific overview of the size, scope and distribution of the private security sector in these provinces. The second main objective was to better understand the ways in which private security companies mattered for the governance processes at hand. I have returned to Goma five times between 2010-2012, and I have been particularly lucky for having been able to visit the mining sites of four different industrial gold mining companies in Province Orientale: Anglo Kilo Gold; Kilo Gold; Loncor Resources—all three close together in Ituri—and Kibali Gold remotely located in Watsa, Haut Uele. Finally, during a visit to Bukavu in the summer of 2011, I also visited the offices of Banro, the sister company of Loncor. The common denominator of the sites I visited in Eastern Congo was that they were home to high concentrations of private security companies, clustered around two different types of governance processes (see discussion above on embedded cases). I attempted to include sites that house the highest concentrations of private security companies in both provinces.

I estimate that during these visits, I have conducted an additional 150 interviews—some formal, others informal; some open, other confidential—that technically do not deserve the name because there was no opportunity to properly transcribe them (see next section for discussion). The essence of the data derived from fieldwork trips in Province Orientale is presented in Table 2 on page 163 (chapter 7), which lists all gold mining companies currently operating in Province Orientale, and provides the respective number of private security guards, Congolese police, and/or Congolese armed forces attached to those mining companies. Data from fieldwork in Goma, North Kivu, is presented in Table 4 on page 200 (chapter 8), which lists all private security companies currently active in Goma and the number of their guards, together with their respective main clients and relations to Congolese police. Both these tables present original data of the size, players, spatial distribution, and relations to state security forces of the private security sector in respective provinces. In both cases, the information compiled in these tables was the result of a combination of semi-structured but often formally unplanned interviews and on-site observations by the researcher. The data presented in Table 4 is also partially the result of investigation conducted by a research assistant from Goma—Bonjean Mulume—who triangulated data I derived from interviews with additional interviews. In both cases, all figures provided by representatives of a given PSC were triangulated through interviews

with private security guards of the same company, clients or other knowledgeable stakeholders.

Before further discussing how data gathering proceeded and what challenges were encountered during that process, the documentary material deployed in this study will be discussed.

Historical sources

I used archival research and secondary historical sources to learn about the way in which coercive and infrastructural power were spatialized in the construction and transformation of political ordering patterns during the colonial and post-colonial period. The historical material I used is itself divided into two types of material: academic sources and policy documents. Congolese history has been well-documented and throughout the dissertation extensive use has been made of many meticulously researched Belgian sources from the Cold War period, in order to learn about the spatialization of coercive power from colonial times up to the demise of Mobutu.

Policy documents also formed an important source of historical material. In particular, colonial policy documents and development organization policy documents have been consulted on the subject of infrastructure development in colonial and postcolonial Congo because academic literature on the topic remains relatively scarce. Because of the modernist fetishism that pervaded Belgian colonialism, the colonial administration published richly on the centrality of its infrastructural power for the 'civilizing' effort. Because this topic was considered technical and not political, it has been well-documented. Additionally, we may object to the claim that secondary sources and colonial archives primarily reflect ideologically colored colonial discourse, thus telling us little about historical 'facts'. While, given my interest in the ways in which infrastructural power was strategized politically, this is not directly a problem, I found both types of archives agreeing on dates, the evolution of railways, and the deployment of security forces, only differing in the significance they lend to these empirical puddles (cf. Mann 1994: 44). For instance, while I might or might not concur with the way the World Bank frames (under)development in Congo, the swath of reports on individual World Bank projects to develop or rehabilitate Congo's infrastructure contain a wealth of assessments of the state of that infrastructure and the importance accorded to it by the World Bank, the Belgian colonial administration, and later the Zaïre government. Thus, such documents both formed sources of information about the projection of infrastructural power throughout space and time, and allowed me to reconstruct how important infrastructure was for the construction and reconstruction of international political ordering patterns over time.

In relation to historical material, a note on terminology is in order. If this thesis throughout deploys the notion of ‘infrastructure’ (as in ‘infrastructural power’), it is used as a stable analytical notion referring to a set of socio-technical instruments whose denomination shifts throughout Congo’s history. Whereas in Belgian colonial parlance is spoken of *‘transports’* and *‘voies de communication’*, the World Bank started referring to the same entities around the moment of decolonization in terms of ‘infra-structure’ (‘quay walls, port areas, etc.’) and ‘super-structure’ (‘cargo handling equipment, yards, warehouses and other buildings’) (World Bank 1960a: 6). The term ‘infrastructure’ began dominating international developmental discourse in the immediate postcolonial years (Rankin 2009; cf. Schatzberg 2006), shifting towards ‘logistics’ in the 90s (World Bank 1991), and in the 2000s towards the term ‘transport connectivity’ (World Bank 2013). Similarly, where the Belgian colonial administration discusses its interventions in Congo in terms of ‘administration’—a field of activity that was purposefully kept out of the nascent discipline of International Relations (Schmidt 1998)—in much the same way, the actors now intervening in Congo are not described in terms of ‘government’ but rather under an equally depoliticizing header as ‘governance’ (cf. Burton & Jennings 2007; Cooke 2003). The point of employing the same concepts to analyze the construction of extraversion over time in Congo is to explore durable patterns of political ordering in Congo that perdured in spite of these discursive shifts.

Contemporary documentation

Contemporary documentation used in this study served two purposes. On the one hand, material was collected to situate analysis of the fieldwork-derived data on private security companies in each of the within-cases in relation to the specificities of these governance processes. Both industrial gold mining companies and humanitarian organizations in Congo produce vast amounts of documents that are publicly accessible; they also have large controversies surrounding them, which means others—such as NGOs—publish information about them. One conceptual scale up, there are even academic debates about the role of private security companies in relation to these governance processes more generally or in other cases.¹⁴ In chapters 7 and 8, analysis of the ways in which private security companies co-constitute political order in relation to these governance processes proceeds by discussing fieldwork-derived data (discussed above) in relation to

¹⁴ For the intersection of private security with humanitarian governance, see, for instance, (Bruderlein & Gassmann 2006; Cockayne 2006; Perrin 2008; Pingot 2012; Spearin 2001; 2008; Stoddard, Harmer & DiDomenico 2009). For the entanglement of private security and extractive industries, see, for instance, (Avant 2007; Bebbington et al. 2008; Ferguson 2005; Hönke 2010).

these types of documentation and the controversies they articulate. While this doesn't constitute a mechanism of external validity properly speaking, it does allow situating the case of Congo in relation to larger debates taking place on similar dynamics in other contexts.

On the other hand, contemporary documentation was collected about modern infrastructure in contemporary Congo. Mainly taking the shape of project documents and policy reports of developmental organizations and mining companies, these documents served as sources for information on the distribution of modern infrastructure throughout Congo, and the role that these infrastructures play for efforts to establish durable political ordering patterns in Congo. As such, discussion of these sources allows raising questions with regards to the extraverted nature of political order in contemporary Congo, and relating that to the distribution of private security companies in the country. Analysis of these documents is focused on primarily in chapter 6.

Data gathering

Interviews were semi-structured and revolved around a recurrent order of themes. Interviews with PSC employees would typically start out by inquiring into some basic facts: the year and location of founding, size of the company in terms of guards, and main clients. They would then move on to a discussion of Congolese private security sector more generally: who are the large competitors, when did it all start, how are relations with public security forces, and how is the sector regulated? A final set of questions would typically revolve around more 'abstract' or normative questions: What is being secured against what? Why is this sector here? To which reasons do PSC themselves attribute the emergence and growth of the sector? Would they consider Congo an exceptional context requiring more security?

When I differentiate between interview material and data derived from fieldwork, I do so because the nature of data collection on fieldwork visits in Eastern Congo is profoundly different from conducting an interview. For instance, whereas conducting an interview in the more formal setting of the capital city usually comprises making an appointment beforehand, the absence of previous contacts, mobile telephony or internet network coverage in parts of Province Orientale I visited often meant that encounters were organized *ad hoc* after arrival at a certain site and cascaded quickly one after another. Another consequence of the particularities of the setting is that recording interviews has largely been restricted to interviews outside Congo, and to expatriate personnel in Congo. A microphone (or camera, for that matter) changes the way informants frame and understand the interview as, in a first encounter, it tends to associate the interviewer with either formal state authorities or international aid organizations (cf.

Büscher 2011: 32). Therefore, most interviews in Eastern Congo, especially in the mining zones of Province Orientale, were conducted making notes of keywords and quotes using pencil and paper during the interview or, sometimes, directly thereafter. Thus, conversations were not recorded, field notes were in steno and could only be turned into more elaborate observations in the evenings, during which analysis immediately started to flow into the writing down of observations of the day. Fieldwork-derived data were corroborated as subject positions within the field of security shape the expectations, interpretation and framing of research topics. It has to be noted, finally, that conducting research in Congo is surprisingly easy. Interviews spontaneously formed while waiting, easily dragged on for hours, and often resulted in friendships.

Finally, it is also worth discussing collection of historical material. I commenced by reading secondary academic sources extensively—the vast historiography of Congo’s colonial and postcolonial history. Where I started out reading contemporary dissertations and expert studies dedicated to colonial and post-colonial state formation, my readings gradually turned predominantly—but not exclusively—to the writings of Belgian academics and administrators on the colonial period and on Belgian and Zairian writings for the period from independence onward. I encountered, for instance, references to very detailed studies of the evolution of colonial administration and the specific roles played by, on the one hand, transport infrastructure and on the other, the Force Publique (the colonial security force) in the evolving colonial effort. While elaborate documentation was available on security governance in Congo under colonialism and under Mobutu, there is hardly any material in circulation on colonial and post-colonial infrastructures. A research visit to the colonial and postcolonial archives of the Royal Museum for Central Africa in Tervuren, Belgium, was used to collect and consult the list of works I had pre-selected through secondary literature and study of their online archival database. In particular, this archival research in Tervuren served to unearth studies of infrastructure development that have remained at best tangential to Congolese historiography.

Ethical considerations

For reasons inherent in the subject matter of this thesis and because of the particularities of the context, it is important to discuss ethical considerations that were taken into account in conducting this study.

One core methodological challenge of researching (private) security is that private security companies in Congo might not *want* to be studied. Indeed, not only do PSC thrive on secrecy (Berndtsson 2009: 15), but a larger concern is that researching security actors might be unethical, dangerous, and difficult (Salter & Mutlu 2012: 101). Studying security in Eastern Congo where people are weary,

and sometimes outright suspicious, of inquiries into sensitive topics even remotely related to questions of ‘national security’ can pose a risk to the researcher and the people he or she interacts with (Büscher 2011: 38ff). It is here that the care, creativity and prudence of the researcher and research assistant play a pivotal role.

In line with the Ethical Guidelines of the Swedish Research Council for social science research (Vetenskapsrådet 2002), a number of precautions have been taken to avoid unethical treatment of interviewees and to mitigate security risks associated to conducting this type of research. The first precaution is that from the outset, all interviewees have been explicitly communicated about the purpose of the study and the *a priori* condition of anonymity attached to participation in the form of an interview. In case of a number of formally conducted interviews, I managed to agree in writing with interviewees on the interpretation of ‘anonymity’ according to the Chatham House Rule, which allows referring to setting, function of the interviewee, and date of the conversation when using a quotation (e.g., ‘as a security manager in Goma put it in 2010, ...’), but not the identity nor affiliation of interviewees.¹⁵ While many interviewees repeatedly requested confirmation of the absolute condition of anonymity, others have made clear that I could attribute citations from vetted transcripts to them, sometimes scrapping passages that were confided off-the-record.

Conducting field research in Congo brings with itself another set of ethical questions. A first and pivotal consideration regards the safety of ‘research subjects’ or participants in less-than-planned interview situations. As private security and its relation to political order is an extremely sensitive topic in Congo, where politics is highly securitized in the formal sphere, having a highly visible foreign researcher inquiring about such questions inevitably leads to widespread curiosity. I have encountered multiple circumstances in which interview situations were inadvertently assisted or even interrupted by ‘eyes and ears of the state’, leading to semi-formalized inquiries that put participants at risk of being interrogated or even arrested. While many of the representatives of intelligence and security services or the authorities at large might be self-appointed, it is indicative of the extent to which interaction during fieldwork is structured against the background of the state.

This is particularly the case when conducting research in relatively volatile areas of Eastern Congo, where anything political is even more heavily securitized. This makes it hardly possible to embark on a research trip in Congo without an ‘*ordre de mission*’, which Jason Stearns describes eloquently as a hangover from

¹⁵ See <http://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/chathamhouserule> (last visited 24-4-2014)

Belgian colonial times (2011: 108).¹⁶ It is still the case that upon encountering local state representatives or traditional authorities—self-appointed or not—one has to produce this piece of paper. The ritual of ‘civilities’ as it is locally called, can involve hours of waiting in old dilapidated offices; figuring out who is the appropriate representative of a given level of the hierarchy; and showing apposite respect for that authority to be able to get the right stamp. Arriving at the locality of destination, all the different levels of the state and traditional authorities have been passed. It was a great learning experience that a trip into the remote areas of Congo is not, as I expected, a gradual removal from state representatives and other agents of order, but rather also a complex trip past all of them.

Underpinning these considerations is a more fundamental but difficult to articulate question of uneven power relations. While utterly dependent on contacts as an individual researcher, the subject position of a western white male raises expectations regarding interactions. Congolese are extremely kind and helpful yet tend to place white foreigners on some sort of post-colonial pedal, a position both difficult not to slip into or to completely shed. This however also means that my insensitivity to contextual situations combined with an eagerness by Congolese to help me out have in some instances tended to produce the kind of situations described above, in which research visits would draw attention of, and be hindered by formal or self-appointed state representatives.

Where I embarked on fieldwork with steadfast notions of protocol in conducting interviews, similar occurrences prompted me to adapt my research strategy with a view to the contextual securitization of the research topic. This gave rise to my adopting of more flexible and pragmatic interview formats (cf. Vlasenroot 2006) and developing the habit of avoiding broaching such subjects outside of informal settings. I also quickly learnt that it is not particularly fruitful to start an interview situation with questions about security. A strategy evolved in which I stroke up conversations that did not center primarily on ‘security’ but would eventually, depending on the interaction, embed discussions thereof within a broader interest in respondents and Congo.

From data gathering to grounded theorizing

Finally, it is important to explain how the actual experience of fieldwork grounded the theoretical approach I adopt in this thesis. While the theory discussion is presented up front, theorizing emerged in large part within on-going reflection during and between different fieldwork visits (see Corbin 2001; Thornberg 2011 for discussion). As conducting fieldwork in Eastern Congo is not obvious and the

¹⁶ In colonial times, when the alien state apparatus was so firmly in place that South Africans came to admire it, one was not allowed to travel without explicit orders from the Belgian colonial government—suspicious as it was of foreigners that could denounce their regime and native insubordination alike.

experience so profoundly shaped the questions that underpin this thesis, I propose to dedicate some space to discussing the role of experiential data in grounded theorizing within this study.

The road to Mongbwalu: assembling the local field, across the globe

Inspired by Abrahamsen & Williams (2009), I wanted to study private security through a mapping of ‘security assemblages’ around mining in Congo through the primary method of interviewing. Yet it seemed impossible to directly access these assemblages. PSC and large mining companies are hidden behind corporate websites that present us with the ‘outside’ of their operations, consisting of annual reports and images of a smoothly operating global black box (cf. Megret 2011; Müller 2012). None of these representations of the assemblages I was keen on studying on the ground in Congo actually provided access to them.

In line with Abrahamsen and Williams, while security assemblages are thus ‘local’, they have ties that stretch across the globe; and in order to study security assemblages in specific sites, one could not simply go there and conduct interviews. Fortunately, these ties spanning the globe also made that specific security assemblages were globally distributed and accessible in other places. Thus, part of the preparatory method consisted in conducting multi-sited fieldwork (Marcus 1995), accessing the network that tied into these local assemblages in Johannesburg, London and Amsterdam. In other words, I had to start assembling my field elsewhere, in the hope of gradually establishing associations to the local assemblages in the jungles of Eastern Congo.

G4S, Amsterdam

Knowing of one mining company in Congo—the only one that did not hide its security arrangements behind showers of good governance terminology—worked with the private security company G4S (the largest in the world, with over 625.000 guards across the globe), I decided that perhaps that would be an entry point. In order to experience what it was like to conduct research on private security—and to test it in a context I knew—I conducted a case study on the involvement of private security in airport security in Amsterdam during the winter of 2009-2010 (published as Schouten 2014), and this brought me in touch with the public relations manager of the private security company G4S in the Netherlands. Having gradually established good contact with him, he subsequently opened up the black box of G4S to me, acting as a ‘gatekeeper’ that was now—after an initial vetting of my intentions and viewpoints—willing to connect me to other relevant G4S spokespersons. As such, I was connected to the regional manager for G4S Africa, who, after a particularly open interview, further connected me to relevant country managers, making suggestions for my research

design along the way. E-mails were sent across the globe and I was ‘plugged in’. In this sense, corporate headquarters in a business district on the outskirts of Amsterdam proved an obligatory passage point in my journey along the network that structured the security assemblage I wanted to study in Eastern Congo. Furthermore, as his framing of (in)security in effect co-structured the security assemblage locally in Congo, I had to consider him as a spokesperson for, and thus part of, the security assemblage (cf. Gould 2010). By interviewing him, then, I had begun the work of constructing my field, by gathering pieces of the security assemblage.

AngloGold Ashanti, Johannesburg

G4S’s regional manager however explained, that if I would want to visit a mining company in Congo, I’d have to pass through the mining companies themselves. I had already put my stakes on the one mining assemblage that stood out above all others: the Anglo Kilo Gold project of South African mining giant AngloGold Ashanti (AGA). It sits on top of one of the largest proven deposits of gold in the world, in a region that is described by insiders as ‘the last frontier’ or ‘the new wild west’, littered as it is with rebel groupings, small ramshackle artisanal mining projects and fortune seekers from across the globe. Its website furthermore was more open about the challenges of operating in Congo than that of any other mining company there. AGA had published a few reports on ‘corporate social responsibility’ and there I found some names: most notably of their ‘VP global security’ and their human rights person. Within 4 days of writing I received an answer welcoming me over for an interview in Johannesburg. In order to access the local security assemblage in which I was interested in Congo, I first had to pass through *another* corporate headquarter that constituted another obligatory passage point. As I landed in South Africa in July 2010, I had the feeling on the one hand that all I was doing was moving round in circles far from where I should be. On the other hand, the security assemblage already started changing analytical shape from a localized and spatially bounded phenomenon to a site that is highly structured by a network of actors in faraway capitals. For an outsider aiming to get in, access to Congo was highly structured by a global apparatus of checkpoints.

The VP global security cordially received me in AGA’s global HQ, a beautiful building with security measures equaling that of advanced airports. Among others, AGA hopes to have the same security arrangements in place for all their sites, irrespective of the context. More and more, it started dawning on me that Congo’s (in)security, how it is governed and how it is rendered intelligible, is not a local affair, but rather performed through highly transnationalized assemblages. My ‘local’ site, and fieldwork, became increasingly less local. Even before I had

made it to Congo, then, my whole idea of what I was studying had already changed.

NGOs, Goma

The VP Global Security, after a long session, decided it would be safe for his organization if I were to visit their local mining operations, and as such put me in touch via e-mail with the security manager of their mining camp in Mongbwalu. While I had now finally created access to the local security assemblage—only after traveling from Gothenburg to Amsterdam and Johannesburg—I would still have to arrange how to practically *get* to Mongbwalu, a mining camp situated in the central African rainforest in the north-east of Congo. I spent a few days in Goma to arrange the trip. Those few days proved to be an eye-opener with regard to my notions of the ‘field’. I had hitherto assumed that private security companies were concentrated around mining operations—constituting global assemblages of liberal extraction in the worst way—but in Goma, I was confronted with an urban landscape composed of highly militarized *aid* compounds—all adorned with the colorful uniforms of private security guards.

Even before I made it to the mining camp I had wanted to study, I had unwittingly stumbled upon disturbing similarities between private security assemblages around mining and the humanitarian community: security was structured in the same way—distributed across intersecting networks of global standards, corporate headquarters. Local security arrangements for humanitarian compounds actually looked a lot like what I expected mining camps to be: barbed-wired fences; double gates; watchtowers; PSC guards and local police at the gates. I realized I could not leave this unaddressed in my PhD.

Anglo Kilo Gold, Bunia

A local representative of AGA picked me up at the airport in Bunia. She escorted me to a Landcruiser that would take me over the rough road from Bunia to AGK’s base camp in Mongbwalu. On the backseat of the car sat an unarmed G4S private security guard and a Congolese policeman with a Kalashnikov. As we sped past the small huts that seemed to be built from the same red soil that contained so many rich minerals on November 24, 2010, what most surprised me was the way in which our white jeep was looked upon as a foreign object. It was evident from the many cries, hues and looks, that white people were considered not to come to Ituri unless they’d leave rich. White people—*wazungu* as they are called locally—cluster in privately secured compounds disconnected as far as possible from surrounding Congo. What made possible, and what justified, our speeding past locals in mud huts on a road constructed by the mining company to gain huge profits from this foreign soil? Arriving at the compound and learning about the

highly technical work from which security considerations seemed to flow, only raised more questions: how can we understand that security is so entangled with technological considerations?

What I wish to emphasize here is that in the whole year I had hitherto spent getting there, I had been greatly inspired with regard to choice of method in actor-network theory. From this I learned to express how doing 'local' fieldwork requires global resources and the capacity to enroll many heterogeneous actors. While the field might be geographically isolated ('local'), doing fieldwork in a 'remote' place requires establishing many associations to that site. In order to get 'off the beaten track', I had to actually profoundly entangle myself in modern institutions, and corporate office spaces formed obligatory passage points to reach the outposts of the system, in the middle of Congo.

However, the question of what made it possible for this assemblage to efficiently extend into remote parts of Congo pushed me to reconsider the theoretical and analytical approach adopted in this thesis. First, the spatial clustering of private security companies around expatriate compounds prompted me to adopt a spatial approach to data collection and analysis in terms of topographies of power. Second, at play in the construction of a global security assemblage in Congo, was a form of power not easily rendered visible with the theoretical tools that I entered the field with. Seeing the important role of technological infrastructures, I was drifting towards approaches to power and political order that would allow me to 'get at' international ordering in a different way. This led to a reformulation of the focus on power in terms of the distinction by Michael Mann between coercive and infrastructural power (1984) and the principles of actor-network theory, which, in short, conceives of political ordering as a practice of stabilizing inherent change (disorder) by fixing and framing social interactions through non-human (material or technological) entities (cf. Callon & Latour 1981; Schouten 2013a).

Chapter summary: recapitulation of the analytical framework

This chapter has laid out the methodological research approach adopted in this thesis as a way to explicate how research questions will be answered in this study. It discussed case study design, data types deployed, data gathering and analysis methods, and the relation between fieldwork and grounded theorizing situated in research experience. Before moving on to my empirical analysis, I will recapitulate the analytical framework that structures this inquiry.

This thesis is concerned with how private security companies co-constitute political order in Congo. The theoretical chapter provided definitions of key

analytical terms. *Private security companies* are defined as formally registered, for-profit enterprises that explicitly specialize in the provision of security services. Private security companies are taken as an instance of security governance, which is defined as the management of (the threat of) coercive power. *Modern political order* is defined as an ideal state comprising stable political ordering patterns, which, in accordance with the meta-theoretical framework adopted, does not exist in practice. Instead, it is better to speak of a multiplicity *political ordering* or *governance* processes, referring to rationalized efforts to act on objects of government external to the governing subject—activities that are usually associated with, but by no means confined to, state institutions. Modern *political ordering patterns* are here delimited as political ordering processes made durable through *infrastructural power*, which refers to the weaving of infrastructures through social or political relations extending through space and time. For the purposes of this study, ordering patterns were delimited as only being political if the threat of coercive power—i.e., security governance—is also woven through them.

This chapter stipulated how the interrelations of these key analytical elements will be investigated in the case of private security companies in Congo. It was discussed that because both coercive and infrastructural power have a physical embodiment, political ordering processes and efforts to stabilize them into patterns are empirically identifiable because of their spatial articulation. I defined political ordering *efforts* as the endeavors to establish durable political ordering patterns throughout space by weaving coercive and infrastructural arrangements through political ordering processes. I locate these efforts in the statements—whether in interviews or in policy documentation—that ascribe governance—i.e. political ordering—outcomes to security and infrastructure arrangements. I locate *security governance* in the physical deployment of security forces and material security setups such as fences, walls, checkpoints and watchtowers; and I locate *infrastructural power* within the physical infrastructural arrangements that are explicitly construed as strategic in policy documents. Hence, to answer the historical empirical subquestions, the main line of inquiry consists of exploring how coercive power was since Belgian colonialism spatialized around and entangled in efforts—inscribed in policy texts—to establish or develop durable political ordering patterns in Congo. To answer the set of empirical research questions with a contemporary focus, I map the political topography of private security in Congo, that is, the spatial distribution of private security companies around, and their entanglement with, specific efforts to turn political ordering processes into political ordering patterns through infrastructural mediation. I locate this entanglement in the physical setups observed during fieldwork and in the statements—whether in interviews or in policy documentation—that ascribe

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governance—i.e. political ordering—outcomes to security and infrastructure arrangements within efforts to stabilize political ordering patterns. The operationalization of the context within which the case study is situated further refined the focus on the ways in which private security co-constitute internationalized governance processes as part of extraverted patterns of political ordering in Congo. Exploring this in-depth constitutes the way I answer the second contemporary subquestion, by studying how private security companies entangle with specific internationalized governance processes in specific sites, namely, mining in Orientale province and humanitarian governance in North Kivu.

4

The colonial construction of extraversion

Introduction

In many accounts of colonial history, the Congo Free State (*l'État Libre du Congo*) is often brought forward as exemplary of the exclusive reliance of colonialism on coercion (e.g. Booth 2013: 61; Legg 2007: 1; Owen 2000: 10; Shaw 1984: 125; Young 1997: 45). While Belgian colonialism is often equated with the brutalities of the Free State period, it extended for fifty more years. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between the exercise of coercive power and the constitution and transformation of colonial political ordering patterns throughout Belgian colonialism in Congo. What is of interest for the purpose of this thesis is how colonial governance was made durable—how were coercive and infrastructural power woven through efforts to stabilize colonial political ordering patterns?

As we will see, where the Congo Free State was premised nearly exclusively on coercive power, the takeover by the Belgian state of the colonial portfolio entailed a radical shift from coercive power as the principal colonial ordering mechanism, to a huge expansion of infrastructural power to establish colonial ordering patterns. The chapter explores how the extension of infrastructural power meant that in Belgian Congo for the first time colonial objects of government could stably be acted upon from a distance.

This subsequently allows me to trace the evolution of the relation between security governance and colonial political ordering patterns in the postcolonial period in the next chapter, setting the stage for the analysis of the contemporary emergence of the private security sector.

Bula Matari? The Congo Free State (1884-1908)

The topography of the Free State: the militarized trading outpost system

Where the specter of the modern state has been typified as the panoptic prison by Michel Foucault (1975) and Crawford Young likens the colonial state to the coercive behemoth Bula Matari (1997), perhaps the best typification of king Léopold II's Congo Free State is the specter of the ivory or rubber *trading outpost*. The trading post was an isolated set of—nominally fortified—wooden houses used by overlapping commercial and military networks along Congo river, extending nominally over pre-existent caravan routes (Lemaire 1896: 4; cf. Lyons 1992: 22).¹⁷

The Congo Free State started as a limited number of posts near Matadi, with new posts gradually pushing up Congo River and its main tributaries (Nest 2002b: 12). In 1885, there were only 160 white administrators in Congo (De Clerck 2006: 188). In 1904, at the height of the Free State, the number of outposts peaked at 321 for the entire territory of the vast colony: 251 administrative posts and 70 agricultural stations (Bujac 1905: 58), manned by a wide variety of Europeans.

The posts were, as much as possible, located where extraction of ivory and rubber could be accomplished easiest, but in practice the location of posts was as much conditioned by commercial interests as by the limitations of the environment. The battle of colonial settlers, Hochschild observes, was 'directed mainly against the territory's forbidding landscape, not its people' (1998: 67; cf. Cornet 1958). It is important to explore this observation a little further because it sheds light on the subsequent importance of infrastructure development for colonial governance. It meant that outposts would be located close to waterways or along trade paths carved out by Arab and African slave and ivory traders (Roes 2010: 636-7). In fact, many of the Free State trading posts were simply set up on conquered Arab trading posts (Lyons 1992: 9-10). While through advancing mapping of Congo River, this became increasingly navigable (Lemaire 1896: 10; Zimmermann 1897: 379), the spatial reach of the outpost system remained confined to the main branches of Congo River (Huybrechts 1970: 8).

For the purposes of our analysis, it is important to observe that the trading posts merged the presence of all kinds of institutionally different actors. Under this concessionary system, 'order' at the individual outpost was officially main-

¹⁷ Johnson (2003: 5) observes much the same for 19th century South Sudan (cf. Benton 2006: 20).

tained by the duo of the white *chef de poste* (state agent) and his African *capita* (headman) (Leslie 1993: 9). However, in practice, all colonists would carry arms and exercise coercion for purposes that were difficult to distinguish in terms of commercial or political goals. At the trading post, as De Boeck observes wryly, ‘One individual was, alone, “the company”, another represented, by himself, “the state”’ (2005: 11, translation by author)—and Africans could hardly distinguish between one white (working for a company) and another (working for the administration) (ibid: 4). This is important because it means the public-private distinction that haunts analysis of coercive power is of little use to understand the way it was organized in the Congo Free State. Rather, both intertwined at the limited infrastructural site of the outpost and confronted the Congolese as one. Trading outposts prefigured contemporary global security assemblages in that they merged ‘state’ and ‘market’, civilian and military branches of the state, formal and traditional authorities, and local and international actors. Yet rather than a novelty, this itself resembled the Arabized networks that had hitherto occupied these trading outposts and also operated according to ‘tributary commerce, interweaving markets, way stations, and networks’ (Jewsiewicki 1979b: 35).

The intertwining of coercive power into the colonial outpost system is illustrated with the observation that if in 1904 the CFS was composed—as indicated—of a network of 251 administrative posts, 215 of these were manned by agents of the Force Publique (Bujac 1905). The Force Publique—‘Public Force’, as the colonial army was formally called—in retrospect admitted that it had been organized in a decentralized fashion because of the vast size of Congo; and that soldiers had proven unable to cultivate sufficient food, and therefore often had to recur to taxing it from local villages (État Major de la Force Publique 1952: 62 & 66). Yet to say that the Force Publique was ‘organized’ is in fact a euphemism, for in practice, ‘it resembled a series of small disconnected military bands, not a traditional pyramidal chain of command with its apex in Boma’ (Shaw 1984: 18). In practice, the Force Publique—just as the Free State ‘civilian’ administrators—operated as a for-profit enterprise, raiding slaves and dealing in ivory (Nest 2002b: 13). Despite constituting 30% to 50% of the colonial budget (De Boeck 2005: 17), the Force Publique remained an extremely thinly spread ‘network of garrisons’ (Hochschild 1998: 101). For instance, between 1892 and 1900, ‘there were never more than six Belgians in Katanga’, a province the size of France, ‘at any one time, and the nearest CFS post was 1.000 miles (1.500 km) away’ (Nest 2002b: 15). Even if in 1904 nearly all outposts had a military presence, the total Force Publique amounted that year to no more than 450 white commanding staff of 16 different nationalities, and 16.175 African soldiers for the totality of the

huge colony (Bujac 1905: 61 & 63; cf. État Major de la Force Publique 1952: 47-48).

During Léopoldian rule, the reach of the colonial administration was minimal, and individual colonizers still saw their venture as a competition over profitable trade routes and posts with other—often similarly organized—networks of power and accumulation (Jewsiewicki 1979b: 35; Peemans 1975: 18). In sum, the political topography of the Congo Free State, much more than an integrated apparatus projecting power equally across its territory and population ‘from above’, was a rhizoid network, weakly connected between different trading posts, projecting coercive power only locally.

Ordering processes: lack of infrastructural power

‘Sans le chemin de fer, le Congo ne vaut pas un penny’ —Henry Morton Stanley¹⁸

As the years advanced, a substantial bureaucratic regulatory framework emerged in Brussels and Boma, stipulating how Congo was to be ordered, and this ideal type often implicitly hinged on the practical application of infrastructural power to colonial ordering processes. The Free State hinged for its legitimacy on a vigorous civilization mission, or, to put it into theoretically informed terms, the colonial effort hinged explicitly on the protection and administration of the ‘indigenous order’. Around the turn of the century, according to the colonial administration,

‘there was a twofold aspect to the colonial concept of “order”: its establishment entailed “ordering” an area via the recognition of a traditional leader as chief; its maintenance entailed fulfillment of the statutory prescriptions imposed by the colonial state’ (Shaw 1984: 126).

The Congo Free State administration already started recognizing the ‘indigenous order’ and ‘colonial economy’ as central to colonial ordering efforts; autonomous spheres of colonial administration that needed to be molded and ordered from Brussels. In the official regulatory discourse, the colonial territorial administrator at each post, for instance, was responsible for enforcing colonial order through inspections in which he would ‘see how laws and decrees are being applied, how roads and villages are being maintained, to map the region, to make censuses, to collect taxes, etc.’ (Shaw 1984: 127).

Léopold II praised such views in his addresses and enshrined them in official colonial discourse. First, realizing that cartographic knowledge was fundamental

¹⁸ ‘Without the railways, Congo isn’t worth a penny’. Cited in (Bézy 1957: 73)

to politically manipulate the African continent from a distance,¹⁹ Léopold II from the start invested heavily in cartographic explorations of Central Africa and strategically deployed (biased) maps to gain political control over his colony (Bru-gaillère 1993; de Maximy 1995; Nicolai 1993). Second, he also recognized the importance of infrastructure as an ‘instrument of progress’ (Lorin 1898: 463, translation by author) when he argued that ‘without this government intervention, this enterprise on which depends all the political and economic development of the colony, would be a guaranteed failure’ (cited in Joye & Lewin 1961: 20, translation by author).

However, as suggested above, on-the-ground administrative practice in the Free State was marked by ‘a total absence of political “structuration”’ (Gérard-Libois & Verhaegen 1961, translation by author). Léopold II proved reluctant to actually enable advances in infrastructural power by making any serious investments in his domain. Instead of through railroads, lorries, processing plants and modern administrative techniques, colonial administration and extraction were effectuated through coercion of what were euphemistically and derisively called *moteurs à manioc* (Challaye 1909: 42) in general or *mains d’oeuvre* and *pieds d’oeuvre* respectively.²⁰

Only in Bas-Congo (Lower Congo), around Boma, Matadi and what would become Léopoldville, did Léopold II ‘lay down the infrastructure which prepared the ground for profitable investment’ through a single railway (Peemans 1980: 261; cf. Goffin 1907). However, moving outwards to increasingly sparse trading posts, infrastructural power largely subsided (Joye & Lewin 1961: 19; Roes 2010: 654). I want to suggest that the absence of infrastructural power from colonial ordering efforts led to a number of problems, two of which stand out.

First, the Free State was not a government ‘apparatus’ at all when this presupposes the capacity to stabilize political order and ‘act at a distance’ on colonial objects of government. Events in the first decade of the 19th century illustrate the problems stemming from this. A big problem with the applications of coercive power by the Force Publique and Territorial Administrators at trading posts was that they were autonomously undertaken with ‘little or no regard’ to regulations from above—indeed, the administration in Boma and Brussels would only hear about events and military raids weeks or even months later (Shaw 1984: 160). Léopold II and his colonial administrative ‘centers of calculation’ in Boma and Brussels could not ‘act at a distance’ determining how individual administrators would exercise their function and enforce colonial order. Because of the generalized lack of communication and transport infrastructure, statistics were badly kept; reports seen as a formality to be filled with equally empty language; regula-

¹⁹ He never actually visited his colony (Kanyarwunga 2006: 33).

²⁰ Translation: ‘engines running on manioc’, ‘hand power’, ‘feet power’.

tions were often overlapping, contradictory, and surpassed faster than they could reach individual administrative outposts (e.g. Lyons 1985).

Second, it seems that this absence of infrastructural power can in part explain the disproportionate use of coercion at the local level of the trading post. As De Boeck observes: ‘the Congolese army was one of the least *encadrées* in Africa at the time [...] this lack of *encadrement* was certainly a constraining factor aggravating the excesses committed by the army’ (2005: 14, translation by author; cf. Shaw 1984: 66). In the absence of either sufficient manpower or the means of infrastructural power—such as working roads, vehicles, and communication systems—‘the level of penetration of external ‘governmentalities’ (...) into the domestic society was necessarily shallow’ (Clapham 2000: 6; cf. Eriksen 2011: 240; Steinmetz 2007: 28-29). Rather, at the local level of the trading outpost, violence was the key currency of trade between colonizer and colonized. Around 1913, posts were still often manned by a single European overseeing a hundred African soldiers. But as he was hardly ever at his post—on all kinds of expeditions and raids in the vast area under his jurisdiction—his authority and control over African soldiers and local populations remained truncated (Lyons 1992: 16). A commission installed to look at the Force Publique’s abuses against natives came to the heart of the matter: there was little distinction between peaceful taxation and military expeditions targeting rebellions; and, by extension, little distinction ‘between the state of war and the state of peace, between administration and repression’ (État Major de la Force Publique 1952: 472, translation by author).

The lack of infrastructural power to weave administrative goals through governance processes at local trading posts meant that actual practices of governing (characterized by disproportionate violence) led to the progressive destruction of the indigenous order—the very object of government around which the rationale of the Free State was discursively constructed.

Section summary

This section aimed to suggest that many characteristics of the ordering processes during the Congo Free State can be understood better, not only framed in terms of an *excess* of coercive power, but also an *absence* of infrastructural power, in political ordering processes. The Congo Free State was an outpost system badly paid, supplied and organized, of local plunder economies that went and fended for themselves—as famously described elsewhere (e.g. Conrad 1899; Morel 1919). Thus, while in Brussels ‘colonial administrative order was measured by well defined criteria: chiefdoms, censuses, and tax collection’ (Shaw 1984: 174), the lack of infrastructural power meant that colonial order as envisioned in colonial centers of administration hardly reached the ground.

If one asks ‘What about the colonial state as a material “apparatus”?', it has to be observed that Congo Free State trading outposts, as Steinmetz observed for another context, ‘were extremely weak in terms of material resources and their ability to penetrate indigenous society’ (2007: 31). This translated into the networked and fragmented topography of the Free State: in the Free State, ‘even more so than in other African colonies, state power (...) was ‘arterial’ rather than ‘capillary’ (Roes 2010: 653). Even if the administrators *tried* to ‘penetrate’ Congolese territory and society—as echoed at least in formal policy—they simply were unable to extend beyond a meager network of badly supplied posts and *therefore*, at least in part, resorted to excessive coercive power for ‘primitive’ accumulation. The lack of infrastructural power that characterized the mainstay of the Congo Free State period severely curtailed the capacity of both centralized rule and for individual administrators to enforce quota without recurring to violence.

Infrastructural empire: Belgian Congo (1908-1960)

‘Communiquer et transporter, c’est coloniser’ —Colonial administrator Moulaert²¹

Introduction

The violent contradictions at the heart of the CFS—and the fact that Léopold II accrued most profits privately—led the Belgian government to vote to take over the colony in 1908, with the ambition to ‘accomplish a task of emancipation and progress’, as one Belgian Minister later put it (Joye & Lewin 1961: 40, translation by author). Often, the subsequent period in Congo’s history is neglected, with scholarly emphasis placed on the brutality of the Free State (Gardner 2013: 131; Vansina 2010: 150). Yet for purposes of this thesis, the 1908-1960 period proved crucial, as it entailed the overall introduction of infrastructural power to the colonial effort. The point of this section is to explore how this approximate historical moment constituted a radical break with the past for the effects that the addition of technological infrastructures to colonial relations of rule and extraction would entail for the aggregate organization of coercive power and patterns of colonial political ordering. As we will see, the introduction of infrastructural power would have far-reaching consequences for political order in Congo, which would become marked by the administration of two central ordering processes, the colonial economy and the indigenous order, and this would change the way

²¹ ‘Communicating and transporting, that’s colonizing’ (Moulaert 1910: 487)

coercive power—as vested principally in the Force Publique—would be organized.

The great leap in infrastructural power

‘Au début, fut le rail.’²²

‘It is said that the world is shrinking. On the contrary, I think that it is growing larger.’ — Belgian colonial administrator²³

Reflecting a firm belief in the significance of infrastructural power for colonial ordering, the Belgian Minister for Colonies in the 1950s observes that ‘the story of the Belgian Congo began *politically* forty years ago when the territory was annexed and, *practically*, fifty years ago when the first train, from Matadi to Léopoldville, opened the door of that impenetrable continent’ (Wigny 1951: 313, emphasis in original). While the word infrastructure as such doesn’t figure in many colonial texts, the importance of what we now understand as infrastructure for the colonial enterprise is well illustrated by the pervasive adage ‘coloniser, c’est transporter’ (Bézy 1957: 91).²⁴

The shift towards infrastructural power in colonial discourse is largely due to the discovery of large copper reserves in Katanga in 1906. As the rubber economy was dwindling because of competition from other—better-organized—colonies, the discovery of the *scandale géologique* in Katanga (Angoulveni 1950: 57) was both welcome to the colonial administration and occasioned a reorientation of colonial rule. Arguably, the very takeover of the colony from Léopold II was due to the requirements of copper mining. Negotiations for the takeover were ongoing since 1906, and it might well have been that the long-term stability indispensable to make the vast technological infrastructure investments required to make mining a profitable business, have played an important role in the reorganization of the colonial enterprise (e.g. Zimmermann 1909: 92).

Huybrechts (1970: 7) distinguishes four phases in the history of transport infrastructure in colonial Congo. The period 1878-1989, he observes, was largely dedicated to exploration and the construction of the railway to bypass the cataracts between the mouth of Congo River and Léopoldville. Between 1899-1918, the main railways are developed and connected to the river network to constitute

²² ‘In the beginning was the rail.’ (Joye & Lewin 1961: 108)

²³ (Wigny 1951: 317)

²⁴ After 1908 or so, each manual or report on the Belgian colonial enterprise consistently devotes a chapter singularly to problems pertaining to infrastructural power, discussed in terms of ‘*moyens de communication et voies de transport*’ (Moulaert 1910: 488). It fit perfectly within broader prevailing ideas of the role of technological innovation for colonial administration in Europe (cf. Schmidt 1998: 138).

the *voie nationale*. The extension of infrastructural power throughout the colony was, initially at least, hardly a contrived master plan (see Moulaert 1910 for discussion). However, when the Matadi railway was seen as a success in 1900, this led to the impetus of using infrastructure development elsewhere as a colonial ‘tool of penetration’ (Zimmermann 1900: 182, translation by author). In the immediate period after annexation the Belgians aimed at ‘pacifying’ outward regions through military expeditions followed by infrastructure development. However, only to the extent that railways and river steamers would lead to profitable asymmetries in their position vis-à-vis existing Arab and African trade networks (Birmingham 1981: 154). When due to shifting global markets copper exports became a main source of income over the next decade, it became pivotal to connect the copper mines of Katanga to the Atlantic (American Geographical Society 1907: 482). Between 1919-1939, the hitherto limited infrastructure topography can be seen extending throughout Congo like ice crystalizing on glass, particularly through the development of the road network. The 1940-1960 period, Huybrechts argues, is not one of extension of the infrastructural grid, but rather a period of capitalizing on it complemented by continuing improvement of the existing grid. This evolution can be followed through the series of maps Huybrechts published. The following maps, from Huysmans (1967; cf. Soyer 1949: 26), show the spectacular development of infrastructure between 1919 (Figure 2) and 1960 (Figure 3), and illustrate that in the latter days of Belgian colonialism, we can speak of a veritable ‘*dispositif de transport*’ (Pourtier 1991: 25).

It is important to underscore that the extension of infrastructural power was initially not an effort to establish colonial order: private companies first administered the extension of infrastructural power throughout the colony. As mining was much more technology intensive than the forced labor system around rubber or ivory, 75% of mining firms’ gains were dedicated to the infrastructure development during the first three decades. The extension of infrastructure allowed mechanization of economic activity over the unfolding transport infrastructure.

Figure 2. Map of transport infrastructure in 1919




Figure 3. Map of transport infrastructure in 1960



Source: both maps from (Huybrechts 1967)

This, in turn, required an expansion of colonial administrative capacity, engendering a Lockean 'liberal' spatial extension of political ordering throughout the colonial territory. In order to have the infrastructural nodes where business and colonial administration entangled and congregated function as smoothly as possible, the colonial state had representatives detached at all the companies (Jewsiewicki 1979a: 560; see Joye & Lewin 1961: 281; Young 1966a: 36). This was important because Belgian corporations constituted the main taxpayers in the colony (World Bank 1957b: 3). The leap in infrastructural power thus required a vast expansion of the colonial administration. As a consequence of larger infrastructural power projection, as a Belgian commander put it at the time, 'the soldier, the explorer, the traveler give way to the administrator, to the engineer, to the planter' (Moulaert 1910: 487, translation by author). Under Belgian rule, Congo ended up having more colonial agents per square kilometer than nearly any other African colony (Nest 2002b: 18; cf. De Clerck 2006: 189 & 192). The increased capacity to project corporate infrastructural power over distances thus also begot a proliferation of political ordering along economic corridors (cf. Bézy, Peemans & Wautelet 1981: 28). Just as during Léopoldian rule, these administrators were not equally spread out through the territory but rather expanded with and clustered around concentrations and extensions of infrastructural power (cf. Fetter 1983: 74).

From 1917, the colonial administration became interested in extending infrastructures to unify control over the country (Jewsiewicki 1979b: 38), and started to strategize infrastructure development in areas where they found their authority truncated—most notably in foreign concession companies and remote areas, where the 'appareil administratif' (Bézy, Peemans & Wautelet 1981: 18; cf. Rodney 2000: 361) wasn't so strong and foreign colonial interests were feared to enter. Illustrating how infrastructural power projection was a precondition for the consolidation of colonial order within the colony, a Brit—sympathetic to the Belgian colonial cause—observed in 1949:

'The construction of roads has been pushed by the government especially to facilitate movement of the administrators and to get out agricultural products. The government rightly insists that its officials move about frequently and widely in their districts, not only to ensure law and order, but to see to the production of the required crops' (Pendleton 1949: 392).

The colonial government became so bent on control over infrastructural power throughout its territory that it initially subsidized private infrastructure development and accepted that transport companies operated without profit (Munger 1952: 2). In 1935, it merged individual transport infrastructure companies into the OTRACO (*Office d'Exploitation des Transports Coloniaux*) to scale

up and centralize infrastructure governance to the level of the aggregate colony (Whiteley 1941: 17; World Bank 1951: 6). This increasing control was tantamount to the creation of a distinctly national unified space (Bézy, Peemans & Wautelet 1981: 31). The administration could transfer some expenses by levying taxes to companies and by requiring maintenance of ‘roads of public interest’ from companies—often because companies were simply better equipped to do so. The fact that which roads were ‘of public interest’ and which ones were considered as roads for the private goals of the mining companies shifted constantly (Bakonzi 1982: 319 & 330), suggests that the categories of public and private were not settled in relation to infrastructure and its effects for political order but rather subject to a constant negotiation.

While, because of the interpenetration of corporations and colonial administration, ‘it is difficult to draw a line between business activity and public responsibilities’ (World Bank 1957b: 3), in Belgian Congo, this entwinement across the public-private divide was a much more institutionalized matter of formal cooperation and delegation than the Free State. In the late 1940s or early 1950s, then, we can definitively speak of a ‘*bloc colonial*’ (Vellut 1982) or colonial state apparatus, if we take that to refer to the integration both of commercial enterprise and colonial administration, and of infrastructural and coercive power in arrangements concerned with governing the colony. However, while ‘bloc’ seems to imply a solid extension over territory in practice, colonial ordering processes were spatially concentrated in nodes that were thinly distributed throughout the Congolese territory.

The topography of Belgian colonial administration

Around the late 1940s, we see an infrastructural inflation of the network of trading posts into a durably connected colonial topography of power. The colonial transport infrastructure of Belgian Congo comprised 140.792 km of road, 175 airports, and 5.152 km of railroad (E.E.C. 1963b: 2). As a result, by that time, ‘Congo could well have been the best-equipped colony in Africa’ (Leslie 1993: 100; cf. World Bank 1960b: 4). Infrastructural power projection had solidified the loose assemblage of trading posts into an arborescent transnational network, assisting in the territorial integration of centralized colonial rule administered from the distant centers of control of Brussels and Léopoldville. Yet rather than a rational grid extended over the Congolese territory, the geography of infrastructural expansion concentrated in corridors, in a topography that seems shaped by two main factors.

First of all, infrastructural development was all in service of full Belgian political control over exports (cf. Kanza 1968: 56-57; Mutambaï 1971: 361; Van de Walle 1964: 383). The mines in the eastern provinces were historically part of the

hinterland of the Indian Ocean, making it cheaper to export minerals from there via existing British railways and roads to the Indian Ocean. Still, given the colonial competition for land and resources, the colonial administration at all costs aimed at precluding this by infrastructure development complemented with tariffs to stimulate integration of the country (Bézy 1957: 77)—cost what it may cost, the dependency of different parts of the colony on the center Léopoldville, and of the center on Belgium, was imperative (Ministère des Colonies 1911: 20; Société belge d'études coloniales 1920: 119). Connecting the Katangan copper mines to the coast engendered the idea of creating a *voie nationale*, a hermetic transport apparatus from Katanga to Brussels (Lederer 1982; Pourtier 1991: 27). This 'iron network of Katanga'—a rail- and waterway linking Katanga to Matadi (Huybrechts 1970: 18; cf. Charlier 1993)—explicitly served both economic and political goals: to mobilize agricultural surpluses for the 'hungry' mining sector and 'to integrate the eastern regions of Kivu and Katanga into the hinterland of Matadi' (Bézy, Peemans & Wautelet 1981: 28, translation by author).

Because of this imperative, infrastructural power projection in Belgian Congo by and large remained concentrated what in French colonial parlance was called *l'Afrique utile*: 'around a port, border, or primary resource' (Badibanga 1985: 849, translation by author; cf. Balandier 1957; Boone 2012: 625; Hibou 2004: 35). In Belgian Congo, the infrastructural power grid concentrated most intensely on the triangle of nodes constituted by the port of Matadi, the transshipment point and administrative capital Léopoldville (now Kinshasa), and Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi)—the latter two also constituting the main locations of manufacturing industries (Vander Eycken & Vander Vorst 1967: 424). As Peemans puts it: 'The economic surplus was produced through a highly extraverted structure, both in terms of physical and of money flows' (1975: 153, translation by author; cf. World Bank 1951: 7). In order to move between urban hubs, which were not connected by road, the white population made use of air transport (World Bank 1957b: 1). Therefore, from the perspective of mobility in a *nationale* territory, the infrastructural grid remained, according to one contemporary observer, 'incoherent' (Prévoit 1961: 97).²⁵

This brings us to the second imperative conditioning the projection of infrastructural power, what I propose to call 'infrastructural path dependence': new infrastructural development projects were thought from, and connected to, the patchwork of preexistent railroads or river ways (Bézy 1957: 74). The first railroad, as we saw, was between Matadi and Léopoldville, bypassing the great cata-

²⁵ Neither did the infrastructural grid ever reach sufficient capacity to relay all mineral exports through Léopoldville: during Belgian colonialism, an infrastructural connection had to be kept open to Lobito in Angola and to Dar es Salaam (Pourtier 1991: 27; cf. Huybrechts 1970: 27), through which around 20% of Congo's exports and imports were channeled in 1957 (World Bank 1957: 1).

racts on Congo River; the second imperative was to connect the Katanga copper mines to this existing grid (American Geographical Society 1907).²⁶ With each extension radiating eastward, the goal was linking it to the export infrastructure in the west, and to send resources from the hinterland to Belgium through Matabidi (Jewsiewicki 1979b: 43; see E.E.C. 1963b: 3ff for details). This served commercial interests but, for the colonial administration, the political effects were even more important: with each extension of the infrastructural grid inland, Léopoldville became a more central and powerful ‘obligatory passage point’ (Pourtier 1991: 25, translation by author; cf. Mutambaï 1971: 360–261). As such, the expansion of infrastructural power did not completely undo the topography of the Free State, for transport was still based on Congo River and its tributaries (World Bank 1951: 6). Under Belgian rule, it rather extended, amplified, and intensified it radically, further integrating it in the extraverted political order of the Belgian colonial enterprise. The fact that the colonial economy was extraverted also means it was only half an economy, with the other half in Belgium, where all the processing plants, factories and transformation industries were located that turned cheap raw material into profitable half- and end-products (Prévoit 1961: 97).²⁷

New political ordering patterns arise from infrastructural power

Concomitant with the increasing spatial projection of infrastructural power by the colonial administration, we start to see transformations in the way in which the colony is ordered. What stands out is that colonial government in the Belgian Congo is not so much seen as a political activity—something for the parliaments in Brussels—but rather as something different: the ‘administration’ and ‘policing’ of distinct spheres of activity (cf. Schmidt 1998: 125; Steinmetz 2007: 28).²⁸

Two political ordering patterns revolving around distinct objects of government can be lifted out in this regard: the Congolese ‘economy’ and ‘indigenous order’, correlating with the central double mission of the Belgian colonial venture

²⁶ This generalized topography of railroad grid from resources to seaport seems to have held for African colonies more generally (cf. Coquery-Vidrovitch 1988: 50; Debrie 2010; Njoh 2008: 149; Senghaas-Knobloch, 1975); for analysis of Ghana and Nigeria specifically, see Taaffe, Morill & Gould 1963.

²⁷ On the other hand, the dependency of Congo on exports was mirrored by a concomitant Belgian economic extraversion or dependency on imports of natural resources—Belgium producing only a third of the raw materials it needed at the time to drive its economic and technological progress (Wigny 1951: 310). See Rodney (1973: 173ff) for a broader argument about the entanglement of colonial underdevelopment and European technological development.

²⁸ Colonial administrators pragmatically bracketed the coercion of their venture, considering colonial occupation as a *fait accompli*, a point of departure from which to reason their tasks (see Feltz 1998: 45)—yet this initial ‘violent moment’ had been crucial to make possible the subsequent weaving of infrastructural power through colonial political ordering patterns.

of the civilizing mission and the *mise en valeur* of the colony through the extraction of surplus (cf. Bakonzi 1982: 17-18; Shaw 1984: 126). We shall look in some depth at the infrastructurally mediated constitution of both political ordering patterns as they prefigure the governance processes around which private security companies now mainly cluster.

Mise en valeur: ordering the colonial 'economy'

So how was the colonial economy assembled, stabilized, and acted upon from a distance? The elaborate transport grid and the development of technologies of inscription in the colony made it possible for the colonial administration and large trusts to manage the colony as a single *system* (Bézy 1957: 5-6; Vander Eycken & Vander Vorst 1967: 417; Wolfe 1966: 368; cf. Mitchell 2002: 82). By adding infrastructure to the administration of the colony, it had become possible to concentrate labor forces where industrialized machineries of the mining economy required them, as it was possible to supplant settlement patterns based on subsistence agriculture with concentrated human settlement supplied, through a mix of infrastructural power and coercion, with agricultural surpluses from elsewhere in the colony (cf. Mitchell 2011: 15).

The ordering of 'the colonial economy' required that detailed information about its characteristics and specificities were accrued in the colonial centers of power. Indeed, the key difference with the Free State was to become that 'the process of exploitation of resources became organized in a more "rational," even "scientific," way' (Buelens & Cassimon 2013: 232). This type of ordering was possible only because of the vast expansion of both logistical techniques and technologies of inscription throughout the Congolese territory. To illustrate, as commander Moulaert put it for telegraphy lines, 'thanks to them, and only to them, we can stably exercise governmental action until the confines of the colony' (1910: 489, translation by author). Yet establishing a colonial economic ordering pattern also depended on logistical techniques: colonial 'authorities were also quick to recognize that the objective of "learning what was happening" could not be accomplished without roads' (Njoh 2008: 151). Léopoldville, and, to a lesser extent Brussels, became centers of calculation acting on vast amounts of data contained in documents that traveled along the infrastructures of extraversion. This facilitated the constitution of a more stable and centrally governed colonial political order.

The Congolese economy became the most meticulously statistically mapped of all African colonies at the time (Huybrechts 1970: 3). The intensive application of technologies of inscription to the administration of the economy allowed attaching the colonial administrative apparatus to all entities thus mapped. To cite the main author of the Ten Year Plan, 'the project aimed not at pushing a whole

economy to ideal objectives, but at giving an economy in full expansion the necessary public equipment ... [it] builds a machinery but does not impose the product' (Wigny 1951: 311).

Importantly, constituting a national colonial economy required intense monitoring of all aspects of economic life within the colony. Echoing Foucault's observations regarding the pervasiveness of disciplinary measures in modern society, not only economic processes needed infrastructurally mediated regulation; the ordering of the economy also required the production of economic subjectivities. In fact, through the *impôt indigène* ('indigenous tax'), the native was constructed as a central locus of colonial economic government (Gardner 2013: 142). Such exercises of governmental ordering hinged crucially on the deployment of—rather mundane—technologies of rule:

'Each native must carry an "identity card," a small record book in which his employer must regularly note the length of employment and the amounts of wages paid, and also the value of the rations supplied weekly; for the government demands that every employer must supply certain quantities of different kinds of food weekly, and one pull-over sweater and one blanket at the beginning of service. This is because once the Black has learned what he can do with his money, he is apt to spend too much of it for other things than food, with detriment to himself and his work.' (Pendleton 1949: 393)

Thus, prefiguring a subsequent section, infrastructural power here slides into a specific kind of use of coercive power, namely, policing. As already suggested in Pendleton's observation, the fact that the 'colonial economy' started being articulated in Belgian colonial administration as a distinct object of political ordering does not preclude the intertwining of colonial mechanisms to govern the colonial economy and the colonial or indigenous subject population. Rather, in order to constitute the economy, other spheres of activity had to be differentiated, that is, rearranged to behave so that the distinction between the economy and, say, indigenous subsistence would be maintained (see Mitchell 2002).

All in all, treating 'the colonial economy' as a separate, spatially delimited, object of administration was in a sense opportune as it depoliticized the political ordering processes and arrangements involved. It removed from sight the attachments between corporations and colonial administration that acted jointly on the 'Congolese economy' as a single apparatus, and, despite the domestic territorial associations that the semantic language of a 'national economy' invokes, the ordering of the Congolese colonial economy was in fact thoroughly extraverted, constituted through associations that spanned the globe (cf. Depelchin 1992: 119; Wolfe 1963: 164; 1966: 376). In effect, in 1954, five western governments and four international organizations had either loans or bonds outstanding to Belgian Congo (World Bank 1954; 1955).

Civilizing mission: governing the 'indigenous order'

'It is not only a matter of furnishing seed or providing new techniques; it means redoing the education of an entire people, of modifying profoundly its mentality—of giving it a new soul.'
—Colonial administrator Ryckmans²⁹

'The native' would turn into a central subject of colonial ordering after 1908, based on the belief that Congolese formed 'a malleable clay in the hands of the colonizer' (Young 1966a: 35; cf. Mbembe 2001: 33). Since then, a heavy emphasis on the *politique indigène* pervades colonial administrative documentation. The problem of the 'indigenous order' or the 'supremacy of native interest' was enshrined in the first Belgian colonial law of 1908, in important part in response to criticism of the Free State that derived from the structural decimation of Congolese under Léopold II (Van Wing 1947; Wigny 1951: 313; cf. Ghu-Gha 1978: 190).

The mechanisms to control the 'indigenous order' can be conceptualized as hinging crucially on a combination of infrastructural power projection and human intermediaries. To illustrate the importance of infrastructural power, the colonial administrator Moulaerts posited that 'every kilometer' of infrastructural power projection—both of logistical techniques (transportation) and technologies of inscription (communication)—'constitutes a definitive conquest of civilization' (1910: 487, translation by author). On the 'human' side of the colonial apparatus, indigenous chiefs were strategized as pliable human intermediaries of the colonial order (Jewsiewicki 1979b: 40; cf. 1977: 162 & 169; Peemans 1975: 19), but were also made responsible for the infrastructural projection of colonial order onto the local level through the maintenance of local roads and buildings (cf. Jewsiewicki 1987: 114; Pourtier 1993: 53-54).

The colonial administration deemed the 'indigenous order' completed in 1925 (Jewsiewicki 1979b: 41-42) when the indigenous population was fixed in a specific place. Through the colonial apparatus, the native Congolese that did not form part of the mining labor force became 'naturalized', further precipitating the legitimacy for the regime to either police that natural order or purport to civilize the indigenous subject by incorporating it into the mining assemblage (cf. Antheaume & Giraut 2005: 18; Arnold 2005). However, the technical work of native administration continued through the creation of knowledge of that indigenous order. What was new with intensively governing colonial regimes such as in Belgian Congo was that their understanding of 'administration'—i.e., political ordering—made it possible more radically than anywhere else, to experiment with governing the 'population'. Not as a constituency on which the administra-

²⁹ Cited in (Young 1966a: 36)

tion depended for its legitimacy, but rather as an object, separated from the administrator because of its own radically and specifically different characteristics and dynamics. Never before had scientific experiments in psychology (Ombredane 1949), demographic surveys (Matumbai 1971: 363; Sanderson 2000) with the administration of public health (Lyons 1992), labor, demographics and settlement been ordered at such a penetrative level of detail (cf. Legg 2007: 24). Where we introduced the adage ‘coloniser, c’est transporter’ before, we can now understand how intimately the infrastructural power implicit in that adage is linked to another one, ‘coloniser, c’est civiliser’ (Jewsiewicki 1983: 176).

Because of the concentration of these documents in Brussels and Léopoldville, the colonial administration became an obligatory passage point for anyone wishing to know about Congo, claiming as it did a ‘monopoly of knowledge about Africa and the Africans’ (Peemans 1980: 274) which were considered ‘qualitatively different’ (Jewsiewicki 1979b: 47)—or, as one Belgian colonial administrator put it, ‘Differences in treatment are founded on undisputable facts’ (Wigny 1951: 315).

Yet this also meant that any threat to the indigenous order as devised by the Belgians meant a threat to the extraverted political order of the colony itself. The civilizing mission was always also contingent on the projection of coercive power to police indigenous—and by extension, colonial—order. The co-production of the infrastructurally mediated economic and ‘natural’ indigenous ordering patterns required violent processes of disentangling both.³⁰

Despite their self-proclaimed expertise in social engineering, the colonial administration struggled to deal with a central tension between the dual imperatives to ‘stabilize the indigenous order’ (Bézy, Peemans & Wautelet 1981: 26, translation by author) and at the same time feed enough labor to the mining economy, a problem more widely recognized among European colonial powers in Africa. In fact, it so preoccupied them that they turned the frequent European conferences surrounding the ‘problem’ of the indigenous order into a permanent commission for technical cooperation in Africa (Angoulveni 1950: 59). In effect, here we witness the birth of European humanitarian governance and a consensually shared European claim to internationalized technical expertise regarding the administration of African natives.

³⁰ As an example, in order to control the mineral rich areas of the Kilo-Moto mines, the colonial administration had to intervene both administratively and violently to reorganize the indigenous fabric according to Hema domination (Fahey 2013: 21–22), working through the ‘natural’ fabric of native tribal society. As another example, in 1912, ‘territorial administrators were frequently instructed not merely to confiscate but to destroy any rivercraft they discovered which had been hidden by Africans’ (Lyons 1985: 88) to weed out competition in trade, in effect destroying African infrastructural power—thus violently affirming their belonging to a sphere where infrastructural power is not part of the natural order of things.

From pacification to policing: the transformation of coercive power in Belgian Congo

This section explores how the emergence of these colonial political ordering patterns, due to the projection of infrastructural power, influenced the organization of coercive power. As we will see, the emergence of infrastructurally mediated colonial ordering patterns can be argued to have played a dual role in relation to security governance. First, the extension of infrastructural power became a conduit facilitating more efficient and penetrating security arrangements, which in a way rationalized the amount of violence applied. Second, the elaborate network of colonial technological infrastructures became itself representative of colonial order, a vital stake to be protected.

Infrastructural power as a conduit for colonial coercive power

The first transformation in the organization of coercive power as a result of the extension of infrastructural power in the Belgian Congo was that infrastructural power became woven through the organization of coercive power, leading, from the 1919 reform of the Force Publique onwards, to a gradual shift from violent military raids to a more conservative rationality of maintaining and policing colonial order. Colonial administrators considered infrastructure a *conduit* for the more efficient organization of coercive power.

The projection of coercive power throughout the territory

The first aspect of this transformation entailed the *encadrement territorial* of colonial order (Pourtier 2005: 39). As we have seen, when the Belgian state took over the colony from Léopold II, the projection of coercive power was at best partial and geographically circumscribed. While the Force Publique already existed on paper as an institutionally distinct entity during the Free State, in practice, its organization was thoroughly intertwined with that of the fragmented trading post assemblage. The application of raw violence would continue under Belgian rule but now under the header of ‘pacification’ missions, which were part of a program to extend the state apparatus consistently over the entire colonial territory (Janssens 1979; cf. Jewsiewicki 1979b: 38). This movement would only be completed by 1925 when the last military pacification operations ended (Joye & Lewin 1961: 43 & 45).

By that time we see a shift in the rationalization of coercive power from fighting ‘external’ enemies—the pre-existent east African trade networks and resisting chiefdoms—to policing the internalized population; most notably by fixing the native population in its ‘natural’ place and enforcing cultivation (Young 1966a: 35). Infrastructural expansion for economic purposes led to the unforeseen possibility of territorially enforced political control. And indeed, in

the post-1920 period, the ‘Belgians constructed a colonial state apparatus over all the indigenous polities that lay in their path, rendering the Congolese one of the most meticulously administered and coerced colonial populations in Africa’ (Nest 2002a: 3). Infrastructural power projection was seen as part and parcel of establishing colonial order. To cite commander Moulaert again, ‘as elements of organization, of pacification, telegraphy lines give the country its unity [...] and make the governmental impetus felt throughout the entire colony’ (1910: 489, translation by author). Infrastructure allowed a certain professionalization of the Force Publique that entailed a crystallization of coercive power into the local level to stabilize and maintain colonial order (cf. Jewsiewicki, Brett & Roberts 1986: 471; Nlandu Mayamba 2012: 36).

Even so, like during the CFS, the kind of social control the Belgian colonial administration exercised throughout its territory was neither equally spread nor borne out by the workings of the Force Publique. Rather we see the gradual dilution of coercive violence throughout the colonial administrative apparatus that Shaw subsequently characterizes as a ‘coercive panoply’ (Shaw 1984: 127) that concentrated mainly around the colonial infrastructure of extraversion. Thus, we see for instance the construction of a series of road checkpoints, manned by private sentinels, at the borders of large mining concessions to police the circulation of people and goods in and out of the concessions (cf. Fahey 2013: 22; Hönke 2013: 142).³¹ These checkpoints were central to the constitution and enforcement of stable colonial ordering patterns.³² By ‘establishing different degrees of access to people, things and relationships’ (Sack 1986: 20), the circulation of economic goods and labor forces was allowed while the indigenous population was kept in place, according to the ‘natural order’ of things and as necessitated for the production of agricultural surpluses. The functioning of such security checkpoints as an integral part of colonial order across the territory, however, required substantial administrative infrastructures. For example, that a widespread system of personal identification—mentioned before—was also in place (Bouvier 1967: 445).

In sum, the extension of infrastructural power throughout the colonial territory entailed a ‘scaling up’ of regulatory governance—and coercive power—mechanisms to a level that could manage the infrastructural grid that now permeated the colony (cf. Jamison 2009). There is thus a veritable move between the CFS and the Belgian colony from warfare and pacification to the policing of infrastructurally mediated colonial ordering patterns, particularly in the mining prov-

³¹ Some of these checkpoints still exist manned by colonial-era security services around the Kilo goldmine in Ituri.

³² They are also the kind of places where a long-standing tradition of extortion—‘*petits profits*’—of the population would emerge, reason why individual soldiers preferred joining the corresponding TST (*troupes de service territoriale*) rather than the TC (*troupes campées*) (Shaw 1984: 94)

inces and at other central nodes in the Belgian colonial topography. Ultimately, the shift to copper as the mainstay of the colonial economy was pivotal in requiring large-scale infrastructure and thus a different mode of organizing long-term capital investment and political administration but also a new and radically different—because concentrated yet consistent over large distances—of security governance.

The rationalization of coercive power

This brings us to the second aspect of the way in which the extension of infrastructural power served as a conduit for the organization of coercive power: the more ‘efficient’ use of coercive force through intermediation of infrastructural power. This played out in two ways. First of all, the extension of colonial infrastructural power led to a more targeted application of coercive power because security operations could be related to detailed knowledge about incidents, which was swiftly communicated and transported to soldiers stationed in barracks at strategic places along the colonial infrastructural grid (see Figure 5 on p. 80). Second, in many cases the entwinement of infrastructural power and coercive power allowed the symbolic use of coercive power as a sufficient mechanism to curb resistance.

First of all, the projection of infrastructural power did not mean that brute violence was dispensed with as part of Belgian colonial ordering. Rather, it was much more mobile and applied more efficiently to specific violations of the colonial order. While the Force Publique concentrated around infrastructural nodes, the colonial administration was able to project coercive power and enforce colonial order throughout non-occupied parts of the territory because infrastructural power projection allowed governmental intervention without continuous and colony-wide presence of soldiers.

Figure 4. Telecommunication networks in Belgian Congo



Source: (Office de l'information et des relations publiques pour le Congo belge et le Ruanda-Urundi 1960)

In the case of threats to colonial order, technological infrastructures allowed communicating those events rapidly and efficiently to colonial centers of administration and, from there, to the Force Publique. In contrast to the Free State, the colonial communication network (see Figure 4 above) made it possible for questions of whether action to maintain order needed to be taken, could pass through the obligatory point of the colonial administration's center, which could then act at a distance and, in a way, be present locally when action was taken. As Commander Moulaert put it, 'telegraphy and telephone lines are veritable antennas of the government' (1910: 489, translation by author).³³ The existence of elaborate

³³ 'Although the tom-toms of the central Congo can, under particularly favorable weather conditions, be heard for 50 miles and can transmit by code relatively complicated messages, obviously the radio, telegraph, and radio telephone are infinitely more effective, with a working radius often reaching throughout Congo' (Pendleton 1949: 373; cf. Jewsiewicki 1979b: 43). As Andrew Barry observes more generally, communication technologies 'enabled threats to

networks of all-weather roads and vehicles facilitated swift subsequent intervention of mobile security forces. Thus, an indigenous chieftaincy might not at all times be confronted with the Force Publique. However, if the colonial administration received reports of an indigenous chief failing in his indigenous tax or agricultural produce obligations, an ‘occupation’ could temporarily be dispatched under which the FP would ‘assist’ the chief in fulfilling his ‘obligations’ (Shaw 1984: 129).

Second, the consistent intertwining of coercive and infrastructural power also involved using the threat of colonial coercive power as a symbolic means of control. Using visual strategies as a way to enforce order by preempting resistance was at the core of so-called *promenades militaires*, which aimed to instill awe through ritual display of sheer colonial weapon force (Ministère des colonies 1925: 150; cf. R. Smith 2005: 207). At the same time, such *tours* presupposed the presence of infrastructures. Reinforced by, and conjuring up, the power disparities between colonizer and colonized, this system kept the Congolese population disorganized and hence little of a systematic threat until the eve of independence.

In sum, despite the fact that the Force Publique didn’t grow radically in size between the period of the Free State and Belgian Congo, the addition of infrastructure rendered it an ever-more efficient coercive apparatus. The point here is to illustrate to which extent infrastructural power projection altered the role of coercive power in colonial political ordering. Yet the extension of infrastructural power didn’t only entail the reinforcement and rationalization of coercive power: it also engendered its own topography of ‘referent objects’ to be secured.

Infrastructure as a referent object of colonial security

This brings us to the second aspect of the transformation entailed by the projection of infrastructural power under Belgian colonialism: the aggregate topography of infrastructures of rule itself became the embodiment of colonial order and, by extension, the focal point of the organization of coercive power. This has—again—two aspects: first, coercive power followed the topography of colonial infrastructures which, as we have seen, did not spread out equally across the colony but rather concentrated around certain nodes. Second, because the projection of infrastructural power was arranged so as to structure the central political ordering patterns of Belgian colonialism, a wider range of spheres of activities become subject to coercive arrangements, particularly in the mining areas. We thus see an intensification of the colonial apparatus at the local level in certain parts of the colony leading to the emergence of a kind of ‘disciplinary paternalism’ particularly for African populations in mining areas.

be responded to rapidly and effectively *without* the necessity of creating a detailed system of surveillance’ (Barry 1996: 124, emphasis in original).

Figure 5. Location of Force Publique garrisons in Belgian Congo in 1924



Source: Royal Geographical Society of London, 1924 (courtesy of the RMCA Tervuren).

Force publique, police privée?

First, as already hinted at above, the topography of colonial coercive power correlated with the distribution of infrastructural power. An official document explained the rationale of the Force Publique in the first place as ‘to insure tranquility and security where foreign nationals are found’ and to enforce there the colonial administrative order by inculcating ‘respect for authority and security, the rendering of services required by the tax collector’ (Shaw 1984: 17). The colonial regime refrained from the projection of coercive power where it was not immediately necessary, i.e., beyond the administrative and economic necessity carved out by colonial infrastructural power.

That this spatial focus strictly followed the topography of colonial infrastructure is illustrated by the fact that from the start of the first large infrastructure development project—the Bas-Congo railway—dedicated police forces were assembled to protect the slow advancement through potentially hostile territory, but perhaps more to discipline forced labor (État Major de la Force Publique 1952: 91-92). When the colonial infrastructural network became more sophisticated in the 1940s and 1950s, the colonial administration became aware of its complexity and fragility (Bruneau & Simon 1991), and the projection of colonial infrastructural power required, and engendered, a corresponding spatial dispersion and concentration of the Force Publique.

As such, to the extent that colonial infrastructures themselves formed a referent object that influenced the organization of colonial security, colonial security arrangements can be characterized as an early example prefiguring what is now called ‘critical’ or ‘vital infrastructure protection’ (Collier & Lakoff 2009). This can also be understood in part because, as we have seen, infrastructure in the Belgian Congo formed a geopolitical stake, both as a conduit for the extraversion of Congolese resources and a bulwark against geopolitical ambitions of mainly the British in Katanga (cf. Fetter 1976). Particularly from the end of WWI onward we see a concentration of the Force Publique stationed around the critical infrastructure of the country—its main waterways, mining hubs, and strategic transit and border posts. This is reflected in the map (Figure 5) above, which details the distribution of Force Publique garrisons in 1925 along the *voie nationale*, Léopoldville, and the mines in the east (cf. Shaw 1984: 79). The extension of colonial infrastructural power, it seems then, presupposed the extension of the coercive colonial apparatus for the regulation of behavior of populations around that infrastructure.

While centralizing control over the totality of colonial administration, the extension of infrastructurally mediated order allowed the Belgian administration to decentralize the discretionary power of using the Force Publique to a great extent. This because extended communication lines and consistent reporting meant

that local administrators, in contrast to the Free State, were strongly integrated into the centralized colonial apparatus and therefore formed the local embodiment of the colonial capacity to act at a distance on objects of government. The civilian territorial authorities were responsible for establishing and maintaining order for which they were provided with a ‘statutory “spectrum of force”’ (Shaw 1984: 126). Yet this also facilitated a smooth integration of the deployment of coercive power for the management of the joint interests of companies and administration, which were articulated at the level of the mining operation and the corresponding territorial districts (Jewsiewicki, Brett & Roberts 1986: 471).³⁴ As in the Free State, coercive power was integrated in transnationalized assemblages that defied institutional lineaments.

The concentration of coercive power around the accumulation of infrastructures and resources was also necessitated by the fact that the projection of infrastructural power had led to a vast concentration of wealth around a very small part of the population, even though observers sympathetic to the colonial enterprise refused to see this (e.g. Wigny 1951: 312).³⁵


This economic geography was secured through a combination of Force Publique and infrastructural techniques of territorialization (cf. Sack 1986). From 1926 Colonial Governor Ryckmans started to organize the large urban centers with a clear spatially articulated separation between Europeans and ‘indigenous’ (see Figure 6). They were separated by a *cordon sanitaire* consisting of a zoo, botanical garden, and golf course (cf. Beekmans 2010: vi; Njoh 2007: 217)—and it is, as Mutambaï observes, in the European spaces that

‘we find the majority of economic activity, particularly industries, factories, offices... Here we find what is understood as modern social equipments such as schools, or hospitals and versatile networks such as motorable and tarred roads, the airport, the harbor, the station; such as the transport of electric energy, the adduction of water, the evacuation of used water, the telephone, the telegraph, the radio’ (1971: 362, translation by author).

³⁴ This is why Hönke calls the kind of local security arrangements in colonial Congo an early example of public-private partnerships (2013: 143).

³⁵ ‘In 1958, the colonial minority’, composed then of around 110.000 to 115.000 Europeans (Pourtier 1993: 53; World Bank 1957: 2), ‘represented 1% of the population but controlled 95% of the stock of the capital invested, 82% of the production enterprises and 70% of the materials of production’ (Bézy, Peemans & Wautelet 1981: 10, translation by author).

Figure 6. Plan for segregated colonial urban planning



Title: 'R. Schoentjes, Schéma d'une ville congolaise', 1933 (source: Vellut 2005: 34).

Under this 'architectonic government' (Devisch 1998: 224), Belgians—about 89,000 of the 112,000 Europeans in Congo at the time (Vanthemsche 2012: 208)—increasingly lived in infrastructurally dense colonial bubbles. These comprised concentrations of infrastructural power, security governance and capital at certain nodes, where—just as at the trading post—the colonial administration and corporations were thoroughly interwoven through the 'interpenetration of interests between the colonial administration and the technocracy of the large industrial groups' (Jewsiewicki 1981: 75, translation by author). The physical segregation between spaces for 'natives' and 'Europeans' (even those born in Africa) is perhaps the clearest example of how colonial administration constructed itself as 'external' to the native order, which required different life standards and more intense policing methods.

In that same year 1926, an additional, administrative police force (the Territorial Police) was created uniquely with the goal of enforcing this architectonic government in the rapidly expanding urban hubs of Léopoldville, Elisabethville, Stanleyville, and a handful of other urban centers (Fetter 1976: 28-30). While this administrative provincial police force had as its explicit mission to uphold 'public order' (Edmond 2001: 55), in practice, however, the Force Publique and the Territorial Police played essentially the same, precisely defined, role (Young 1965: 463)—that of protecting the colonial order as composed of the infrastructure of rule and the colonial administration; a role that explicitly defied the distinction

(applicable, it was seen, to ‘civilized countries only’) between army and police (Shaw 1984: 106).

While the extension of infrastructural power throughout Congo entailed a radical transformation and relative professionalization of colonial coercive power, it was neither pacific nor public at all; rather, one observer strikingly typifies the Force Publique and other Belgian colonial security forces as ‘la police privée des colonisateurs’³⁶ (Edmond 2001: 57). Thus, besides a blurring of the public/private distinction, Belgian colonial deployment of coercive power also defied the civil/military divide; rather, it seems to have followed the projection of colonial infrastructural power, which had become in its own way an embodiment of Belgian colonial order to be secured. Again, the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ tells us little about institutionalized asymmetries concentrated in these political ordering corridors; much more relevant becomes the distinction between ‘externalized’ spaces and populations that fold upon these concentrations of infrastructural and coercive power, and spaces and populations targeted by the resulting political ordering patterns.

Mining panopticon

Second, while in general the deployment of the Force Publique could be rationalized because of their capacity to be swiftly dispatched, the extension of infrastructural power both made possible and required ‘an intensification of regulation both at the local level’ of the zones where colonial efforts were concentrated and at the level of the centers of calculation of the colonial administration (Barry 1996: 124; Leslie 1993: 100). It is at the intersection of the colonial rationality and the management of that local level that the logic of the colonial order to be upheld was most clearly articulated. Within the general canvas of security governance in Belgian Congo, the arrangements at mining concessions stand out. There, we gradually see an egregious level of control over the mining populations clustering around the valuable technological infrastructures of the Belgian mining corporations developing.

As we have seen in the discussion above of the ‘indigenous order’, while the addition of machines to mining efforts initially resulted in a decreasing necessity of African labor (Bézy, Peemans & Wautelet 1981: 38), it also required investment in specialized labor and we thus see emerging an explicit policy of ‘stabilization’ of the labor force from the 1930s (Higginson 1989: 215; Wolfe 1966: 363). This entailed the putting in place of a vast all-encompassing disciplinary system (Devisch 1998; Hönke 2013: 136-137) with many welfarist characteristics—such as a heavy emphasis on education and public health—but this equally demanded that the gamut of aspects of life that the Force Publique needed to regulate and

³⁶ ‘the private police of the colonizers’

enforce also expanded. Because of the high level of infrastructural power woven through administration of the mining population, as Harris observes for another colonial context, ‘As the years went by (...), physical power moved into the background (while remaining crucial)’, replaced by ‘the disciplinary strategies associated with modern states and economies’ (2004: 174).³⁷ Just to take a minor example from the extensive description given by Jean Dresch of the exceptional level of governmental disciplinary control we witness in mining zones, newborn babies were immediately taken under control by the medical staff of the mining company, and women were subsequently forced to bath daily under supervision (1947: 81). Because of such interventions, the mining population was seen as civilized, taken out of the state of nature. It seems that in the mining zones, the logic of the trading outpost that related to the native as a mix of enemy and forced labor had been abandoned for that of the camp, where the Congolese working class was the product of the joint ambition of resource accumulation and civilizing mission, with an unhealthy dose of coercive power.

Chapter summary

This chapter explored how the Belgian takeover of the colony amounted to the construction of an extraverted political ordering pattern, through a focus on the shifting roles of coercive and infrastructural power in mechanisms of colonial administration. In an initial phase—that of the Léopoldian Congo Free State (1884-1908)—this extraversion was characterized by the nearly unique application of coercive power to the extraction of surplus from the colony. While much of this is common knowledge, emphasizing what the lack of infrastructural power meant for the organization of the Free State allows articulating the crucial difference made by the subsequent introduction of infrastructural power for colonial ordering patterns. During a second phase—that of the Belgian Congo (1908-1960)—colonial order became characterized by the emergence of an infrastructurally mediated colonial ordering pattern. The extension of infrastructural power in the Belgian Congo made it possible for the colonial administration in Brussels to act as a powerful center from where not only economic but all kinds of aggregate data on the colony was acted upon from a distance. As Pendleton observes: ‘Decisions on many matters, even seemingly small ones, are made in Brussels; most scientific and official reports are printed and published there—all

³⁷ Here, we see the most perfect example of what Michel Foucault has called the governmental prism of discipline, which he exemplified with the model of the panopticon that underpinned first modern European prisons, and later schools, hospital, and which for Foucault characterized modern society more in general (1975). As Timothy Mitchell observes in this regard, ‘Foucault’s analyses are focused on France and northern Europe, yet forms of power based on the re-ordering of space and the surveillance and control of its occupants were by nature colonising in method’ (Mitchell 1988: x).

CHAPTER 4

in all, the reins seem to be held very firmly' (1949: 396). The CFS has been characterized as a weakly integrated network of trading outposts constructed against, and as an extension of, preexisting Arab-African caravan routes. The period of the Belgian Congo entailed the fortification and extension of this network of outposts and linking it through the projection of infrastructural power to the extraverted transportation grid operated by the assemblage of colonial administration and capital groups. The military operations that characterized the CFS persisted during the Belgian Congo as 'pacification operations', which now did not have the function of isolated raids but were entangled with the piecemeal projection of infrastructural power throughout the colonial territory through the construction of roads, telegraphy, and permanent administrative offices. The very fact that costly colonial infrastructure was extended in itself required a shift in the focus of coercive power from aggressive raids to more conservative policing of the infrastructure of rule that stabilized colonial political order. I explored the complex and shifting entanglements of coercive and infrastructural power in the unfolding topography of Belgian colonial administration, as it emerged around the intersecting political ordering patterns around the 'indigenous order' and the 'mining economy'. Coercive power, in sum, was unevenly projected and woven through a topography of colonial political and economic ordering processes that defied global/local, public/private and civil/military divides, much in the way global security assemblages are observed to function today.

5

(Dis)ordering Zaïre: shifting topographies of power in postcolonial Congo

Introduction

‘The problem of the nature of the state created after independence is perhaps the secret of the failure of African independence.’ —Amílcar Cabral³⁸

This chapter shifts attention towards the relation between coercive power and political ordering patterns in postcolonial Congo/Zaïre. It does so by tracing how the infrastructural and coercive arrangements intertwined in Belgian colonial ordering patterns underwent changes during the ‘postcolonial moment’ and Mobutu’s Zaïre. In order to set the stage, this introduction briefly reiterates some of the discussion on the political ordering patterns in place before independence, to be able to assess the importance of the chaotic independence period for the subsequent structural problems of the independent polity.

As we have seen, the colonial *economy* depended heavily on the coerced supply of agricultural surpluses at fixed prices that the colonial administration would ship to the mining regions to keep African labor cheap, and thus keep afloat an overall profitable venture. The economy constituted an extraverted political ordering pattern, which force-fed Congo its economic dependency on external forces and dynamics (cf. Vander Eycken & Vander Vorst 1967: 415). The projection of infrastructural power throughout the colonial territory meant that at the moment of independence, the Congolese economy was a veritable political ordering pattern, compartmentalized in sectors, each of which was thoroughly meas-

³⁸ Cited in (Young 1997: 1)

ured, monitored, reported, and governed from the centers of calculation in Léopoldville and Brussels.

When it comes to the second colonial ordering pattern, the *indigenous order*, the late Belgian colonial state had made a leap in its paternalist developmentalism. Though an elaborate apparatus of surveys and statistical analysis, the Belgian colonial administration could, towards independence, influence and speak with a measure of accuracy about the health and dynamics of the aggregate indigenous order. In sum, infrastructural power appeared key to the very existence of these entities as stabilized objects of colonial political ordering.

This chapter attempts to show how these political ordering patterns radicalized in the post-independence period. The core argument is that despite political decolonization and a strong nationalist policy under Mobutu, these governance processes remained thoroughly extraverted in the Republic of Congo and Zaïre. This chapter explores this by tracing the historical transformation of political ordering patterns in the postcolonial period, again focusing on the infrastructural and coercive arrangements underpinning them. Therefore, this chapter is dedicated, on the one hand, to discussing this extended ‘postcolonial moment’ and, on the other, elaborating on the continuity and change of arrangements resulting from that ‘moment’ under Mobutu’s subsequent reign. As we will see, colonial political ordering patterns underwent radical transformations, determining in great part the context in which private security companies would emerge.

The ‘postcolonial moment’ (1960-1965)

The Economic Roundtable: internationalizing infrastructural power

‘Avant l’indépendance = Après l’indépendance’ —Gen. Janssens³⁹

While the Belgians were deeply involved in the first of what they envisioned would be a series of Ten Year Plans, riots on January 4th, 1959 showed that among Kinshasa an anti-colonial spirit had taken hold. All things Belgian had to be torn down, including schools, missions—violence turned symbolically against the infrastructural power of the colonial apparatus. Completely overwhelmed, the Belgian colonial administration hastily convened the Political Roundtable to discuss independence (Leslie 1993: 19).

While individual Belgians would from the date of the riots literally start to hoard cans of sardines, the corporate equivalent of the same principle had started

³⁹ ‘Before independence = after independence’, the text that Gen. Janssens wrote on the schoolboard of a Force Publique garrison on July 5, 1960, provoking the unleashing of already impending mutiny (Young 1966b: 34)

a few years back. From around 1956-1957, we witness the mass export of capital from Congo through disinvestment and radical amortization of all infrastructures (called 'fixed assets' in economic language; cf. Lumumba-Kasongo 1992: 30; Wolfe 1966: 364; 1967: 18; see figures 4.1 and 4.2 in Vanthemsche 2012: 151). What corporate managers of Congolese companies of course feared most—a legitimate fear, given the unrest of the period—was the expropriation of the value contained in the fixed assets (Depelchin 1992: 23). The colonial government engaged in a wholesale 'public' equivalent to this corporate amortization, when in the last decade it financed its—considerable—investments in infrastructure and security not through profits accrued through participation in companies, but rather through heavy public borrowing—rising from 9 to 44 billion between 1950 and 1959 (Vander Eycken & Vander Vorst 1967: 416).⁴⁰

Congolese independence was celebrated on June 30, 1960, but was actually a fact months before, during the Political Roundtable that took place in January and February that year in Brussels. During this roundtable, Congo was granted official independence from Belgium, and the date of independence set. Most of the historiography of Congolese independence focuses on this series of events, but if the focus is shifted from independence, understood as sovereign control over the political apparatus and coercive power, to encompass control over infrastructural power, the Political Roundtable alone does not explain the significance of independence for post-independence political order. In order to appreciate how the postcolonial moment entailed a significant reorganization of the aggregate balance between coercive and infrastructural power in Congo, we must focus on the fourteenth of the sixteen resolutions adopted at the Political Roundtable. This fourteenth resolution stipulated that economic and social questions that had not yet been resolved would be settled during a subsequent Economic Roundtable that was squeezed in between the Political Roundtable and the moment of formal independence (Lejeune 1969: 535; Radmann 1978: 29). The central importance of this second roundtable is also in line with how the Belgians conceived of the impending independence, in continuation with how they perceived their own colonial order: not centrally as a political problem, but rather as the governance of a series of administrative, economic, and social processes (De Vos 1975: 77; Gérard-Libois & Verhaegen 1960).

The Belgians aimed to make certain that with political independence, the Congolese would not also inherit the colonial administration's control over, and stakes in, the colonial productive infrastructure. The mixed public-private corporate entities holding those were advantageous during colonialism but were now a

⁴⁰ Capital flight had accelerated during 1959—8 billion Belgian francs in 1959, 1 billion in February 1960 alone (Hoffherr 1960: 120); and all in all, from 1958 to 1964, private capital investment in Congo diminishes from 56,4 million to 2 million US dollars (Vander Eycken & Vander Vorst 1967: 422).

threat, as they would entail majority ownership for the Congolese state (Commission du Droit International 1970: 178; Kovar 1967). Yet, as the World Bank reported in February 1960, ‘Belgian and foreign interests seem resolved to continue to operate in Congo much as before’ (1960a: 9). If the central question of Congolese independence concerned the modalities of the ‘transfer of power’ from Belgians to Congolese (Monaville 2008: 330), and if this thesis has insisted that understanding colonial order in terms of coercive and infrastructural power, the question needs to be asked *what kind* of power was transferred, and what kind remained in foreign hands.

One of the Congolese present at the Economic Roundtable has narrated his experience. Sent by his friend Lumumba, Joseph-Desiré Mobutu was one of the young men to negotiate with the team of Belgian economic experts.⁴¹ Mobutu would later recount the experience of the Economic Roundtable: ‘by a whole series of juridical and technical inventions our interlocutors managed to completely secure the grip of multinationals and Belgian capitalists on the Congolese portfolio’ (cited in Van Reybrouck 2010: 279, translation by author).

The Economic Roundtable should indeed be seen as a key moment in which the Belgians aimed to effectuate a wholesale breakup of the colonial order—that had hitherto integrated economic and political arrangements—into a politically independent Congolese state on the one hand and an equally independent market on the other, so that ‘administrative and economic power stayed in European hands’ (Vander Eycken & Vander Vorst 1967: 418, translation by author). The Congolese economy, because of the decades of efforts at separating it out and purifying it as a distinct object of government, was now approached by the Belgians but also the World Bank as disconnected from colonial or postcolonial political arrangements (cf. World Bank 1957b: 18; 1960a: 8-9). Overall, the public-private distinction was a tool that the Belgians deployed in service of maintaining a political ordering pattern that had formerly comprised arrangements cross-cutting this boundary (cf. Depelchin 1992: 42).

Aware that the Economic Roundtable was not legally conclusive (see Lejeune 1969 for discussion), the Belgian parliament additionally took the unilateral decision to allow Congolese corporations to incorporate in Belgium on June 17th (Moniteur Belge 1960; cf. Kovar 1967: 750; Moreau 2010; Vanthemsche 2012: 243; Verwilghen 1970: 125). In what amounts to a well-contrived move, Congolese corporations that opted for incorporation in Belgium would retain their actives in

⁴¹ The senior cadres of Congolese political parties were so content with the results of the Political Roundtable and so busy with preparations for upcoming national elections, that only inexperienced juniors were sent to the Economic Roundtable (*Conférence de la Table ronde économique, financière et sociale*, 26 April - 16 May 1960) in Brussels (De Vos 1975: 78 & 81; Depelchin 1992: 16; Kikassa Mwanalessa 2001: 472; Lumumba-Kasongo 1992: 31; Radmann 1978: 29).

Congo, which would then be held in a Congolese subsidiary controlled by the—now Belgian—holding. Thus, in Belgium, ‘in the wake of independence, several management and finance companies sprang up’ (Depelchin 1992: 24). In Depelchin’s meticulously detailed study, we see how colonial companies that had had infrastructural development and exploitation as their core mission before independence, now redefined the central mission of the Belgian holding company in terms of finance management and technical service provision. At the same time, the Congolese subsidiary of the newly created Belgian multinational would only serve to contain assets that were literally fixed and thus could not be moved out of the country, and would contain the African labor that had little value added (Kovar 1967: 750). These Congolese subsidiaries would be of little worth compared to the Belgian holdings: the value of fixed assets, as we have seen, was completely amortized and thus transferred to Belgium, where capital could now be placed in the Belgian holding company without any risk of expropriation.

This not only entailed the massive transfer of infrastructural power away from the now independent state, but also, as Wolfe observes, ‘central to this complex is the development of a new type of economic unit, the multinational enterprise’ (1977: 615). Just as challenges to Belgian colonial administration had earlier given rise to the first international humanitarian efforts in Congo, so, now, we see the consolidation of the multinational enterprise as a way to maintain internationalized governance patterns under conditions of political independence. In fact, this entailed the further institutionalization of a political ordering pattern deeply involved in governance in Congo *as external to that order*.

At independence, then, much of the structural underdevelopment of the new state was a *fait accompli*, forming the basis for what became the protracted ‘*contentieux belgo-congolais*’ (Lejeune 1969; Klein 1991) that reverberates until today. What we witness, in effect, is that coercive power became enshrined in the new Congolese state, together with all the responsibility of governing the object of government ‘population’ in a totally new—democratic—fashion. Yet as infrastructural power was to a large extent privatized away from the newly independent state into the new Belgian holdings, the object of government ‘economy’—which provided revenue to uphold political order—was retained from Congolese control.

Post-independence chaos: internationalizing coercive power

‘Congo will need white troops for many years to come... The work we have started has to be completed, and the only way to complete it is to kill all rebels.’ —Mike Hoare, 1964⁴²

⁴² Cited in (Glejeses 1994: 226)

Given the above, it is no surprise that ‘within a week of independence that state’s gimcrack governmental edifice had collapsed’ (James 2000: 154). In the immediate post-independence period, we witness the rapid decoupling and disassembly of the infrastructural and coercive power arrangements that had been intertwined in colonial ordering patterns. Within less than a year, the Congolese state’s monopoly over coercive power disintegrated almost completely. In 1961, the Territorial Police forces followed provincial, rather than central government, dictates; the Kasa-Vubu government only controlled Léopoldville and surrounding areas through special elite forces; Lumumba controlled Stanleyville; Kasai was in rebellion; and Katanga under Tshombe had seceded, backed up with unilateral Belgian action and Rhodesian support (Young 1965: 451ff; 1966b: 37). This, in turn, triggered the UN intervention (ONUC—*Opération des Nations Unies au Congo*), which Lumumba considered ‘as a surrogate for the Congolese government’ (Leslie 1993: 22). Underscoring the internationalization of political ordering and security governance, the UN aimed to restore order and remove the Belgians, seeing that Katanga was pivotal for maintaining the integrity of the country—copper being the keystone of the Congolese economy (Clarke 1968: 21).

In the face of mounting disorder, General Mobutu—by now head of the Congolese armed forces—would echo Gen. Janssens (cited above), in stating that ‘even when there was political discontinuity in Congo, there would have to be military continuity’ (cited in Mobe 2011: 1, translation by author). However, in practice this ‘military continuity’ did not mean the military guarantee of Congolese political order. The continuities that did exist were, first, the concentration of governmental efforts to secure critical infrastructure—in Léopoldville and the copperbelt (Young 1966b: 39)—and, second, a large role for international actors in the organization of coercive power in Congo. To support Tshombe, mercenaries were sent.⁴³ The mercenary force would become legendary—called ‘*les af-freux*’, composed of such figures as Mike Hoare, Bob Denard, Jean Schramme—but was quickly defeated by ONUC forces. Before a year passed, we thus witness a swift internationalization of the conflict (Bustin 1987; Monaville 2008: 334). The chaos culminated in the assassination—co-organized by Congolese factions, Belgians, and the CIA—of prime minister Patrice Lumumba in 1961 (Church Committee 1975; Omasombo Thsonda 2004). Mobutu would play a central role behind the scenes, with support from the United States and Great Britain for representing an element of Cold-War stability, willing to oust the Soviets.

⁴³ A mix of, initially, 210 Belgians soldiers wearing the FP uniform, French soldiers, and a number of the old guard who had helped Léopold II extend his hold during the Free State under command of the Nova Scotian Captain W. G. Stairs, and later, over 200 South African and Rhodesians, totaling between 400-500 (Clarke 1968: 24-25 & 28; CRISP 1961)

To emphasize the extent to which political order in Congo had become conceived as hinging on internationalized arrangements of coercive power, the Americans were worried at the time about the shape of the *Armée Nationale Congolaise* (ANC), that they considered it would not survive without the mercenaries: the US ambassador to Congo at the time observed that the ‘cardinal source of (the) GDRC (Government of Congo) is (the) mercenary force’—and Mobutu agreed (cited in Gleijeses 1994: 221). Mobutu finally organized a military coup on November 25, 1965—ending the heightened military interest of the world in Congo. While many of the mercenaries left after, the 5 Commando—as they were called officially—would be maintained by Mobutu until 1967, supported by American logistics (Clarke 1968: 216-7; Weissman 1979). On balance, the period proved that the effective organization of coercive power in Congo was heavily extraverted—depending as it did on concerted consent from international powers; in the absence thereof, direct and indirect military intervention structured Congo’s political (dis)order.

The disintegration of state infrastructural power

According to Jean-Philippe Peemans, in 1961, ‘not only was Lumumba overthrown and killed, but the State apparatus began to crumble’ (1975: 154). And indeed, the mutiny, skirmishes, and even more the lack of maintenance, meant a 1963 fact-finding mission of the European Economic Commission (EEC) had to conclude that 80% of the road network was destroyed; river traffic was reduced by 40%. The road network, for instance, dropped between 1960 and 1965 from 145.000 km to only 5.000 km for the whole of Zaïre, of which only 2.000 were asphalted.⁴⁴ Yet rather than attributing this exclusively to bad governance by the newly formed Congolese government—as Belgians continue to be prone to do—the collapse of infrastructures should be understood in terms of the vast withdrawal of the Belgian technical expertise that had dominated maintenance and governance of technological infrastructures. As the World Bank observed, ‘From nearly 13,000 in 1960 the number of Belgian technicians in the administration dropped to less than 100 right after independence’ (1970: i; cf. Young 1966b: 35).

The collapse of state infrastructural power would have vast repercussions for political ordering processes. First, it further debilitated the means for the central government to control its armed forces: because of bad roads and faltering communication systems, the immediate postcolonial state was unable to maintain order in either cities or countryside, visible in the generalized proliferation of banditry (Vander Eycken & Vander Vorst 1967: 421; Pournier 1993: 53). The E.E.C., in its report, observed that repairing infrastructure would translate direct-

⁴⁴ Vander Eycken & Vander Vorst 1967: 421; World Bank 1979: 1-2; see graphs in Huybrechts & Van der Steen 1980: 202-203 and Van de Walle 1964: 384-385 & 387; see E.E.C. 1963b & Van de Walle 1964 for discussion.

ly into ‘restoring of public order and the security of people and goods’ (E.E.C. 1963b: 5). That is, where we saw an expansive dialectic between coercive and infrastructural power during Belgian colonialism, we now see a disintegrative dialectic between the two. Destruction of their infrastructural connection to the hierarchy meant individual ANC and administrative posts would fall back to resemble the Free State trading outpost system, although now much more widespread (see Young 1966b: 38). As public office, disconnected infrastructurally from other parts of the state apparatus, became a tool for personal enrichment, the destruction of state infrastructural power was an important—yet under-acknowledged (Schouten 2013a)—step in the vast dynamic of predation that would continue to characterize Congo to today (cf. MacGaffey 1983; 1991).

Second, the destruction of Congo’s infrastructure entailed the disintegration of the political ordering pattern around the extraverted object of government of the ‘economy’ as contrived during Belgian rule (E.E.C. 1963b: 6). As we have seen, under Belgian rule, investments in productive capacity and thus in fixed assets (infrastructure) were seen as ‘the basis of the civilizing mission undertaken in the Colony’ (Depelchin 1992: 56). Barring widespread physical destruction, Belgian investors had already disinvested in fixed assets and were reluctant to restart investing in non-mineral sectors with political conditions as they were. The disintegrating infrastructure entailed the destruction of commerce and manufacturing outside of urban centers, and with it the impossibility of government taxation, while the government was faced with increased public spending for its burgeoning civil and military administration (Bézy, Peemans & Wautelet 1981: 54; Vander Eycken & Vander Vorst 1967: 425-26).

The profound effects of the breaking up of colonial ordering patterns can be illustrated through a focus on agriculture, which was during Belgian colonialism governed by arrangements comprising as much coercive as infrastructural power. The infrastructural system had fulfilled a pivotal function in Belgian Congo, which it could no longer perform: the transport system ‘transferred the agricultural surplus to the cities and the coast, and linked the rural market with urban industries’ (Peemans 1975: 155). With the disintegration of infrastructural power this whole system collapsed: after 1960, ‘this system would lose its strength for reasons related either to the evolution of policies or the disorganization of the centralized system of transport it presupposed’ (Bézy, Peemans & Wautelet 1981: 35, translation by author). Of course the destruction of infrastructural power was compounded by the fact that agricultural surpluses had been generated through Belgian force applied to the ‘indigenous order’; as Alwin Wolfe put it at the time, ‘the present government, dependent as it is on Congolese support, can no longer enforce so effectively this program’ (1966: 375).

Yet at the local level, the colonial administration had also forced indigenous chiefs to organize the opening and maintenance of public local roads; gone the colonial *encadrement* (coercive power regulating behavior of the population vis-à-vis infrastructure), the indigenous Congolese were all too happy to abandon this form of forced labor, leading to an acceleration of the disintegration of the local arteries of the colonial infrastructure within a few years (Pourtier 1993: 53-54), and entailing an acceleration of the collapse of circulation of nearly anything besides minerals, that relied on the main arteries of the *voie nationale*. The important point here is that colonial ordering patterns hinged crucially not only on the extension of infrastructural power alone, but rather on the entanglement of infrastructural and coercive power (as the former presupposed the latter), and the postcolonial moment meant this system could not be upheld.

The internationalization of private infrastructure: the extra-verted excavation economy

For some observers, the fact that infrastructures disintegrated in the chaos at independence vindicated Amílcar Cabral. Since ‘the coherence of the Congolese system was a creation of the metropole; it had to disappear with the colonial system’ (Vander Eycken & Vander Vorst 1967: 418, translation by author). However, despite the radical chaos, the immediate independence period would only serve to radicalize patterns of extraversion set in motion under Belgian colonialism. Rather than a radical break with the past, the Belgians had adopted strategies to safeguard the key nodes in which vital technological infrastructures were concentrated during and just after the Economic Roundtable. To the degree that minerals were both becoming more important to Congo and for western relations to Congo, and that other sectors of Congo’s economy had collapsed, Congo’s ‘international relations [were] becoming more and more a question of mining diplomacy’ (Kanza 1968: 60)—and as everybody was aware, since the Congolese government depended on minerals, these relations were not equal.

The Congolese government did not dare tampering with the mineral rights owned by foreign investors not only because it was ‘financially dependent on these large corporations, and on the U.S., the U.N., and Belgium’, but also, more importantly for purposes of our analysis, because ‘these are Congo’s only available sources for capital and technical assistance necessary to further economic development’ (Wolfe 1963: 162; cf. 1966: 375). With 80% of Belgian technical experts having left (E.E.C. 1963b: 6), we here see the effects of the split effectuated between international holding companies and their Congolese subsidiaries: the Congolese, while having sovereign power over minerals and the possibility to expropriate the fixed assets in Congolese subsidiaries, would not be able to run

the complex technological infrastructures that generated mining revenues—and, consequently, political power.

As ‘Africans cannot themselves eat the ores’ (Wolfe 1967: 16), I want to suggest that the organization of the process of translation mediated by technological infrastructures of these ores constituted the central stake of the technopolitics of the postcolonial moment. Under the agreements made during the immediate pre-independence period, the Congolese state did have shares in mining revenues, but was obliged—by the agreements with individual companies and ushered by donors—to use its shares to buy from the network of mining corporations ‘such things as means of administration and of transportation largely in and out of the mining regions’ (ibid: 17). More and more, then, government dependency on mining and its investment of the funds accrued in maintaining infrastructures to keep mining going amounted to an ‘excavation economy’ dependent on increasingly autonomous large foreign groups (Van der Steen 1977; Willame 1980).

In the aftermath of independence, a corporate network of now private enterprises with interlocking directorates emerged that controlled mining from the Cape to Katanga (Wolfe 1962). What Alvin Wolfe, who published a series of studies of this mining network at the time, described was strikingly similar to the kind of ‘global assemblages’ that are currently heralded as novel formations in the globalized economy:

‘I found the mineral extraction industry of southern Africa to be organized in an intricate social system based more on overlapping membership of a variety of groups than on a bureaucratic centralization of administrative power. The network binds groups that are different both structurally and functionally, some business corporations, some states, some families, in a modern supranational structure that is more than just international. The ties among these entities are such that the boundaries of the system are ambiguous. [...] Union Minière in Katanga is now effectively controlled by the Société Générale de Belgique. The Société Générale shares with De Beers, Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, and the Portuguese state, control of the Diamond Company of Angola. But most of the activity of Société Générale is in Europe, where it links with some of the largest industrial and financial groups in the world.’ (1963: 153 & 159)

This international network held in 1962 mining assets amounting to well over 5 billion dollars (Wolfe 1962: 1).⁴⁵ Important for purposes of this thesis, the internationalization of Congo’s infrastructures of extraversion outside the colonial context also engendered an intensification of international regulatory governance of the capital and interests concerned (cf. Rodney 1973: 176). Thus, rather than

⁴⁵ Amounting to a comparative value of roughly 40 billion in today’s currency, calculation based on <http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/> (last visited 15-12-2013)

making use of public infrastructures susceptible to disintegration and mismanagement under the ‘winds of change’ that were sweeping through Southern Africa, the network of mining groups made use of private, internationalized infrastructures that extended from the Copperbelt to either South Africa or the coast in Angola—an infrastructural grid that, as we have seen in the previous chapter, was already kept open during colonial times because the ‘native’ Congolese infrastructural grid towards Léopoldville and Matadi had never developed the capacity to fully cope with all the bulk of minerals from Katanga (Prévoit 1961: 97-98).

What we then saw emerging after independence was a private, transnationalized infrastructural topography with the sole purpose of exporting Africa’s minerals, in particular those from Katanga and the adjacent Zambian copperbelt. Rather than an absence of state governance, however, Katanga remained a ‘governed interdependence’ (Weiss 1995), that is, the continuous focal point of an entanglement of concerted corporate and—both national and international—governmental action (see Hönke 2013; Wolfe 1966: 365). The involvement of western powers can to some extent be explained with reference to their concern—most notably of the US—with regulating access to strategic minerals in the wake of the breakup of the industrial empire of the Belgian colony (Murphy & Augelli 1993: 76). The importance of Congo’s minerals for the American Cold War effort translated into American involvement with Africa’s regional export corridors, funding the private mining network’s infrastructural efforts from the 1950s onward through its Import-Export Bank. After Congolese independence, the US would increase its participation through the World Bank by either providing low-interest loans or directly funding a host of infrastructural expansion programs undertaken by the mining network (U.S. Department of State 1952; cf. World Bank 1970 for an overview).

To the extent that at the same time the UN, CIA and other branches of government were guiding mercenary forces to organize coercive power in Congo, we see a new entanglement of international efforts targeting, respectively, coercive and infrastructural power in Congo. This pattern should be seen as political ordering efforts to produce a new kind of transnational macro-economic and political stability on the part of western powers and not least the US as they observed that ‘the withdrawal of Western political controls [had] produced potentially unstable situations in the emergent states’ (cited in Gleijeses 1994: 208).

The destruction of much of public infrastructure and the collapse of the agricultural sector would amplify the dependency of the Republic of Congo on revenues generated in those pockets of its territory where infrastructure had remained relatively intact—the internationalized mining enclaves, most notably in Katanga and the administrative transshipment point Léopoldville (Mutambaï 1971). Where other sectors of the Congolese economy had collapsed completely

after independence, mineral export statistics initially showed a remarkable stability (E.E.C. 1963a: 76-77). Belgian companies were able to upkeep their own, now privatized, transport systems and as such, export statistics for plantation products in which foreign companies retained a commercial monopoly continued to look good compared to those of the agricultural sector that had hinged on a 'colonial fit' between state infrastructure and coercion. All in all, while throughout the country 'order is no longer maintained, infrastructure is deteriorating; the interior is isolated', we see that this didn't hold for all spaces within Congo's territory. It hardly affected internationalized nodes where infrastructures of extraversion were still maintained using imported spares and private foreign capital: 'the European private sector, affected as little as it is powerful, overall maintains its position' (Vander Eycken & Vander Vorst 1967: 430, translation by author).

It is important to emphasize that this dependency of the Congolese government on foreign actors for revenues wasn't the product of the postcolonial moment; rather, the moment radicalized a pattern of political-economic ordering set in motion under Belgian colonialism. In this way, the postcolonial disassembly of much of the Belgian colonial state apparatus meant a reconfiguration that in some ways rendered the state less effective—as an extensive apparatus of paternalistic developmentalism—but in others, it became more effective—as a slimmed down, leaner version of an extraverted apparatus that served to focus accumulation of extractive rents through relatively limited circuits of corporate taxation.

Changes to ordering patterns

Yet the extent of infrastructural extraversion of postcolonial Congo is not borne out by political economy alone. A subtler shift in transnational ordering patterns also started taking root in the immediate postcolonial moment, one that is easily overlooked in the Congolese historiography of the period, predominantly of a Marxist leaning. The power of transnational corporations in the postcolonial period in Congo lay not only in their technological capacities to extract and export ores; it equally resided in their infrastructurally mediated 'ability to control organized knowledge' (Depelchin 1992: 10). We have hitherto focused on the infrastructural underpinnings of the extraversion of minerals. But something else partially collapsed and became partially embedded in international networks of power in the postcolonial moment. This was the assemblage of infrastructures of knowledge production in colonial ordering patterns around the indigenous order and the 'economy'. Where the economy and indigenous order were governed through the same colonial governmental apparatus until 1960, the postcolonial

moment would entail a separation of the ordering mechanisms responsible for each.

The 'Congolese economy'

Besides the repercussions for the distribution of capital that the reassembling of economic governance patterns entailed, it also entailed a subtler shift in the locus of where expert knowledge of Congo was produced. Alwin Wolfe was the only one to note this early on:

'The forces that produced statistics indicating such growth were generated and controlled by institutions external to Congo society. The events of 1960, somewhat euphemistically called "the achievement of independence," changed the social and political structure of Congo so markedly as to weaken those forces significantly.' (Wolfe 1966: 377)

In what amounts to a similar political move as the Belgians made during colonial times, the assemblage of international actors that in fact co-constituted the Congolese political economy continued to hold a monopoly over technologies of inscription to produce knowledge of a Congolese 'national economy'. Belgians—still the most important in this regard—at the time held that Belgium was indispensable to Congo 'for the technical aid missions that only Belgium is currently capable of efficiently providing Congo with' (Brion & Moreau 2006: 312, translation by author). In the first decade of independence, of the 80 million USD that Congo receives in public foreign aid, more than half was dedicated to paying for between 2,500 and 4,000 foreign experts engaging in 'technical assistance' (World Bank 1970: iv; cf. Van der Steen 1977: 73 & 87-88). Yet after independence we see a significant shift in which knowledge of the endogenous characteristics and dynamics of specific economic sectors was severed from its links to other sectors and the actors that helped constitute that economy (Depelchin 1992: 119; Wolfe 1963: 164).

This means that if we take the chaotic period just after independence to be part of the prolonged 'postcolonial moment' of Congo, it is possible to locate in this postcolonial moment the birth of a new political ordering pattern that is not to be managed by African states, but rather by international actors. In the same way as the Political and Economic Roundtables constituted the first moment in which it was attempted to break up the colonial apparatus to constitute a separate Congolese national economy in the immediate post-independence years, international efforts were now made to disembody the core of Congo's productive infrastructures from its entanglements to Congolese politics and other sectors of that

economy.⁴⁶ This new approach entailed radical changes for ‘the relation between infrastructure and internationalism, or more broadly, the relation between infrastructure and new forms of post-colonial territoriality’ (Rankin 2009: 71). The fact that the internationalization of governance of Congo’s postcolonial infrastructures became a key concern of international development, was a way of discussing the continuity of western interests in the extraversion of Congolese minerals in technical terms. In effect, discussing the—now private—infrastructure of Congo in such technical terms discursively moved it out of the realm of state sovereignty, which became reduced to questions of maintaining legitimate political order and governing the socio-economic residue from which the mining economy was disembedded.

The ‘indigenous order’

While the indigenous order initially disappeared as an object of government—to resurface as a politicized entity under Mobutu, see below—we observe the emergence of a specific kind of development expertise pertaining to the troubles of the Congolese population. While the disassembly of infrastructures was amplified by the fact that the Belgian administrators and 80% of Belgian technical experts had left (E.E.C. 1963b: 6), after decolonization—both because of the retreat of colonial administrators and the repatriation of Belgian corporate management—‘development’ expertise emerged as a mobile phenomenon that could circulate globally and perch temporarily in Congo and other contexts as a political tool, through corporate consultancy or development institutions.

As Luce Beekmans notes specifically for urban planning in Kinshasa, ‘due to the disintegration of the state machinery in the years after independence many public services and ministries were taken over by foreign technical assistants and external consultants’ (Beekmans 2010: x). While institutionally radically different (private rather than public; or organized in international organizations instead of a ‘domestic’ colonial government), the continued presence of over 1.500 Belgian technical experts acting at a distance on domestic ordering processes formed a continuation of the Belgian ‘colonial planning apparatus’ rather than a departure (ibid: x-xi; cf. Brassinne de la Buissière 2009; Van der Steen 1977: 89). As such, in the postcolonial moment, colonial ordering processes would become further internationalized, and the population governed through the same assemblage of international organizations and donors in which the regulatory framework for Congo’s economy would be acted upon (cf. E.E.C. 1963c: 3). In the process, the

⁴⁶ Mirroring the argument that the ‘economy’ was not really an economy until it was constituted, regulated, and controlled through a set of governance mechanisms distinct from those that govern the population (Mitchell 2002: 82).

colonial object of government of the ‘indigenous order’ diluted and was translated into a much more diffuse set of international development problems.

Section summary

In sum, by 1965, during five years that have often been categorized as ‘chaos’ in Congo’s historiography (Depelchin 1992: 329), we see a profound reassembling of political ordering patterns, in which power arrangements that were internal to the Congolese colonizing apparatus started appearing, in the immediate post-independence years, as external and international (cf. Mitchell 1988: xi-xii). This section has tried to trace the specific moves through which Congolese infrastructure and ordering patterns were internationalized further by dislodging them from the hermetic Belgian colonial apparatus. The organization of both coercive and infrastructural power started to involve a broader range of transnational stakeholders. In this way, international actors deeply involved in the constitution of socio-economic political ordering patterns in Congo became further institutionalized as external to that order.

Mobutu’s Zaïre (1965-1997)

Introduction

‘We, unfortunately, have found our Congolese train in a bad shape. But for us, it was even worse than that. It was not because of the bad state of the railroad system, or that the (operator) was drunk or the wagons were not fixed, but in our 1965’s train, everything was broken into pieces, we had to put these different parts together to be able to ride this train again.’ — Mobutu, 1971⁴⁷

Mobutu took over a Congolese state apparatus rambling both in terms of coercive and infrastructural power. Regarding the latter, in 1965 Congo knew a generalized disassembly of public infrastructures, and the remaining infrastructure was dependent on international actors for maintenance and on the internationalized economic activity passing through these infrastructural conduits. Regarding the former, Mobutu was actively put in place by Western international backers and when he took over Congo his hold on power still depended on international mercenary forces. Much of Mobutu’s subsequent autarchic policies can be seen as efforts to at least partially reassert control over a thoroughly extraverted political and economic order. Yet, as we will see, while his progressive nationalization agenda gave the appearance of radically subverting extraverted ordering patterns,

⁴⁷ Cited in (Lumumba-Kasongo 1992: 38)

in practice, extraversion remained consistently woven through political ordering patterns in Zaïre.

Infrastructural disassembly

‘Zaïre’s most pressing transport problem, and indeed one of the most pressing national problems, is to provide a reliable means of transport between the mineral-producing Shaba region in the south-east and deep-water port facilities for both the export and import of the mining industry’s requirements.’ —World Bank (1979: 4)

As is evident from the previous section, infrastructure proved critical for Congo, not only given the size of the country but also because of the extraverted structure of its excavation economy. Within the generalized disassembly of infrastructure that Mobutu ‘inherited’, what particularly preoccupied him was maintaining and restoring the *voie nationale*, the main infrastructural grid for the exporting of minerals; he left the rest of the transport infrastructure to progressive dilapidation (Charlier 1993; Lederer 1982).

Given the well-contrived measures of Belgian state and capital, control over critical infrastructures was thoroughly internationalized. As Mobutu realized that public infrastructure companies constituted strategic infrastructure for his economic survival, Mobutu swiftly nationalized the three core transport infrastructure companies.⁴⁸ He stimulated growth much the same way the Belgians had done: by turning copper profits—prices soared during the late 1960s and early 1970s—into infrastructure investments for the extraversion of minerals (World Bank 1970: iii). If the Zairian political economy suffered a path dependency engendered by colonial infrastructures, Mobutu further entrenched this pattern by rolling out vast infrastructure projects to reinforce control over the economic topography of his country (see Willame 1986: 25-26 for a cursory overview). Mega-projects such as the Inga-dam were to provide industrial autonomy and extended domestic infrastructural power (cf. Mommen 1996: 288). For instance, much in line with the development of the colonial state apparatus, the Inga electricity network both constituted a direct line to power Katanga, the center of extraverted accumulation—while ignoring the electrification of the landscape it passed (Van der Steen 1977: 99-100)—and a way for Mobutu to increase, through infrastructural power projection, political control over the rebellious province that held the majority of his revenue sources.

⁴⁸ *Office des Routes* responsible for road construction and maintenance; ONATRA (*Office national des transports*, the reformed version of OTRACO, responsible for river services and ports; and *Office des transports congolais*, responsible for the *voie nationale*) and SNCZ (*Société nationale des chemins de fer du Zaïre*, responsible mainly for rail transports in Katanga and the East).

The late 1960s were a period of great hope, with restoration and expansions of public services through (quite forced) generalized public participation (*'re-troussons les manches'*) in rebuilding the country and keeping its infrastructures in repair. Zaïre's large-scale infrastructure projects, however, would quickly become known as 'white elephants', schemes to reinforce geopolitical ties to western powers and fountains from which its elite could tap money. Rather than significantly improving the infrastructural power of the Zairian state, in most cases, the large infrastructural projects were 'techno-industrial "safaris"' (Willame 1986: 9), representing vast Zairian public spending, huge profits for the international executing partners, and for the regime—yet little public utility would ever be derived from them, mainly because they targeted small slices of what, according to the World Bank, needed to be managed as an interdependent and complementary aggregate infrastructural grid (1979: 6; cf. Beekmans 2010: xii; Mommen 1996: 288). As the years advanced, it started to dawn on international donors that these pharaonic projects actually diverted huge investments from reassembling and maintaining the territory-wide infrastructural grid (Lederer 1980; Leslie 1993: 126; Pourtier 1991: 28).

Faced with rising popular discontent, in the 1970s, Mobutu, under the header of 'zairianisation',⁴⁹ nationalized Zaïre's economic infrastructure and redistributed between 1.500 and 2.000 enterprises (Callaghy 1983: 70) amongst his peers. Lacking any corporate management experience, they sold off much of the material assets and lived on easy rents generated by steadily disassembling 'state' enterprises Lumumba-Kasongo 1992: 41). Infrastructure parastatals responsible for the *voie nationale* and other main arteries steadily turned into sources of plundering for the consistent excess of underpaid functionaries (Charlier 1993; Lederer 1977; Vanthemse 2012: 205).⁵⁰ When copper prices plummeted in 1974 and it was time to make up the balance of the aggregate Zairian economic infrastructure, it became obvious: the infrastructural 'foundations of economic prosperity for (...) Zaïre had crumbled' (Fairhead 1992: 18). In response, Mobutu initiated the 'retrocession' from 1975, which would allow former foreign owners to gain back a 60% stake in equity of the expropriated enterprises. Having been held by incapable Zairians for three years, the former owners received infrastructurally depleted hulls of the former companies back (now called '*sociétés ex-ex-zairoises*')—the Zairians in most cases had stripped them bare by selling off fixed assets (Moreau 2010: 11).

⁴⁹ November 30 1973; followed by the 'radicalization' of December 1974, cf. Schatzberg 1980.

⁵⁰ Zairians jokingly started calling the Office des Routes 'office des trous', and to illustrate that air transport—a possible way to bypass horizontal infrastructural dilapidation—was also in shambles, the national airline Air Zaïre has become 'air peut-être' (Leslie 1993: 127; Pourtier 1991: 24).

Yet it is important to attenuate the impact this misadventure would have on extraverted ordering patterns. First, even at the height of zairianization, expat technical staff remained firmly in place in key industries such as Gécamines to keep them running, and foreign corporations would continue to be used for everything from prospecting to audits and construction (Van der Steen 1977: 91ff; Willame 1980: 14). Second, it is to be remembered that since the privatization and internationalization of Congo's economic infrastructure on the eve of independence, most enterprises had maintained a careful policy of disinvestment in Zaïre, which meant that the companies that were appropriated were only the local subsidiaries of multinationals, containing amortized—and often antiquated—fixed assets and Zairian labor (Peemans 1980: 281). That is, given the remarkable feat of privatization and internationalization of capital, expertise and related technological infrastructures in their non-Congolese holdings, relatively little of value had actually ended up in Congolese hands. This means that zairianization had the largest impact on Zairian employees of disintegrating companies and smaller expat businesses—the proverbial Greek and Portuguese shop- and restaurant-owners—who depended on the Zairian fixes assets that had by now been looted. Those, in turn, were pivotal for the everyday lives of ordinary Zairians. Third, the World Bank and foreign—many Belgian and French—corporations continued to play a major role in developing and maintaining the critical infrastructure of extraversion of Zaïre (Lumumba-Kasongo 1992: 44-45), meaning that while colonial infrastructure progressively eroded during zairianization, some key corridors of connectivity remained.

The archipelagic topography of the Mobutu state

The collapse of all infrastructural power outside the privatized and transnationalized grid, compounded by international fiscal pressures, meant that the Zairian state deinstitutionalized after zairianization (de Villers 2005: 49) and 'progressively concentrated its capacity in enclaves' (Nest 2002b: 88) around 'centers of accumulation' (Reno 1997: 40, cf. Clark 1998: 3; Pech 2000: 129). Nest (2002a,b) posits that the political ordering efforts of the Zairian archipelagic state focused around three types of enclaves: mining, transport, and commerce—where, as the previous section already suggested, infrastructural power was spatially concentrated. Often, the three were interwoven and contingent on the underlying premise of the presence of infrastructures: for without transport no mining nor commerce, and without infrastructure, no bulk transport. Therefore, while Mbuji-Mayi and Lubumbashi were both mining centers, they were also commerce and transport hubs where transnational non-state actors were concentrated (MIBA in Mbuji-Mayi and Gécamines in Lubumbashi). Kinshasa—as Léopoldville was called after 1966—formed a special case for it concerned both a transshipment

point and the center of formal power (Lagae, Beekmans & Boone 2010: 3). So how was the Zairian state apparatus woven through this infrastructural topography?

What is important for the purposes of this chapter is that the topography of infrastructural power projection under Mobutu in large part treaded the path beaten out by the extraverted colonial infrastructural topography. Just as where the Belgian colonial state had representatives detached in companies (Jewsiewicki 1979a: 560, see previous chapter), so, too, Mobutu cronies were placed on the governing boards and management of multinational enterprises that were key sources of revenue. Through such mechanisms, the head of state became the privileged mediator between the economic resources of the country and those outside it interested in them (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1984: 101). The mechanism of control of the Zairian politico-economic apparatus was then strikingly similar to the Belgian colonial apparatus, not least for its focus on the governance of extraversion, i.e., exploiting pivotal externalized centers of power and accumulation (cf. Peemans 1975: 162).

While this echoed the topography of Belgian colonialism, in contrast to the colonial organization of power, the topography of transnationalized infrastructural networks in Zaïre was not synonymous with the extension of Mobutu's centralized power. Where in colonial times the extraversion of the colonial administration in Léopoldville had to an important extent been infrastructurally constructed, Mobutu's role as an obligatory passage point seems to have been more 'socially' constructed. Overall, the elite withdrew into a pattern of predation through a few central institutions: the central bank, Gécamines and the security organs (De Villers 2005: 51)—next to air cargo companies, pivotal considering the dilapidated infrastructure (Reno 1997: 40). In effect, continued functioning of the mining sector depended exclusively on expatriate technical expertise (cf. Watanabe 1972). Under the Zairian boards of directors was a layer of foreign technical experts that kept the corporations running—in 1972, a stunning 8.900 non-African technical staff was deployed in Zaïre in this way (Van der Steen 1977: 90). Willame estimates that in 1970 Belgians still formed the core of this system, controlling between 40-42% of private enterprise in Zaïre, down from 55% in 1958 (1980: 6).

While the collapsed infrastructure and Mobutu's strangling import 'taxes' and regulations meant that equipment was hardly available, Mobutu 'took steps to make sure that...vital (mining) concerns could import needed capital equipment... even when such equipment was difficult to get for other purposes' (Clark 1998: 116, cited in Nest 2002a: 39). Yet this meant, again, that any such investment by production firms took the form of importing products and services rather than increasing capacity to produce them locally. If they did import technologies necessary for the exploitation of minerals or other primary resources,

corporations preferred to avoid the risks associated with direct investment by having the international holding *selling* technologies—overpriced through debt, amortization and unequal exchange rates—to the Zairian subsidiary (Willame 1986: 16). In the 1960s and 1970s, around 90% of technologies in Zaïre was imported, constituting 30% of total imports. Van der Steen shows that bilateral and multilateral donors deployed the same mechanisms through conditions attached to aid that goods, technical assistance, logistical transport and technologies paid for by aid money needed to be bought from the donor countries at above-market prices (1977: 77-79).

The aggregate pattern that I attempt to sketch out here shows a substantial continuity with colonial times: ‘to informed Zairians it appeared that colonialism had returned and Zaïre was once again being run by foreigners’ (Leslie 1993: 118). This meant that *le mal zairois*—so frequently attributed to its incarnation in the persona of Mobutu—can also be analyzed as a political ordering pattern located in the specific association between the Zairian elite and international actors—an association mediated by the technopolitics of infrastructural extraversion.

New topographical (dis)ordering patterns

The collapse of infrastructural power throughout the Zairian territory gave rise to a cascading series of socio-political and economic disconnections and reconnections that can somewhat cryptically be called the ‘archipelization’ of political order (Pourtier 2009: 36). First, we witness a radicalization of the disconnection—already set in during Belgian colonialism—between, on the one hand, the topography of internationalized infrastructures of extraversion and the disconnected swaths of rural Zaïre. The formal presence of the state (in terms of the collection of rents and the concentration of security forces) in enclaves punctuated what was during colonial times considered *l’Afrique inutile* (cf. Reno 1997: 40). As the World Bank observed (1991: 9):

‘the official transport market and its logistics and organization exist only in parts of Zaïre, mainly in the areas surrounding the major centers. They are in short supply in the more distant regions, each of which fends for itself. Zaïre does not comprise a single economic unit: it is made up of regional entities that are for most part independent of Kinshasa and each other. Each of these regions operates its transport facilities within its own regional setting, and pays little attention to statistics, policies, and official prices.’

While this quote suggests a direct link between disintegration of the Zairian ‘economy’ and infrastructural disassembly, it can be understood as a dual, overlapping, movement, of, on the one hand, the radicalization of the colonial dis-

connect between the topographies of *l'Afrique utile* and *l'Afrique inutile* described in the previous chapter and, on the other, the birth of the critical infrastructure of extraversion as a distinct, international, object of government, disembedded and progressively disconnected from its linkages to smaller infrastructural arteries into Zaïre's rural areas.⁵¹ As such, the main victim of the destruction of infrastructures was the Congolese population.

Outside of the transnationalized hubs of privilege, infrastructure disassembly combined with the perception of an oppressive state had given rise to sophisticated coping strategies, situated against or in relation to the infrastructural topography of extraversion and state coercion. It comprised, for example, withdrawal from areas where the state had infrastructural reach (Fairhead 1992: 21; Schatzberg 2012: 119). The informalization of the economy took on such dimensions that by the 1990s it was estimated that 90% of the Zairian economy was informal (MacGaffey 1991; cf. Biaya 1999).

The withering of infrastructural power led to the formation of a series of novel regional associations. As the *voie nationale* disassembled, we observe an accelerating centrifugal effect, with the west of the country pulled towards the Pacific, because of the remaining infrastructural connections, and east facing the Indian Ocean and East African influence sphere. Especially the latter had become virtually independent of Kinshasa as a result of infrastructure disintegration. No wonder that in the east, pre-colonial trade network routes to Uganda, Rwanda and Sudan were revitalized as contraband routes in the flourishing informal economy. In particular, the transport corridors between Congo's east and the Indian Ocean took on pivotal significance for economic life in much of the eastern parts of the country. Thus, the rationalization of infrastructure development through structural adjustment efforts in Zaïre to a significant degree engendered the internationalization of the informal—and illicit—economy (cf. Leslie 1993: 130) along new transport corridors outside of the purview of the Zairian state.

Yet besides economic survival and the formation of new economic associations and the revival of older trade networks, decentralization engendered by infrastructural collapse also meant the formation of new political ordering patterns. As Schatzberg observes for the 80s and 90s, 'according to a very old pattern, when the central state's effective reach narrowed and withdrew from the hinterland, there arose in the provinces a series of regional autonomies that took more and more effective power unto themselves' (Schatzberg 2012: 119). While there had always been spaces where the Zairian state had no hold, the progressive

⁵¹ Yet the disconnect was never total. The extractive enclaves drew vast populations that fled either conflict or economic malaise elsewhere; and although they concentrated economic activity and government presence for purposes of revenue extraction, they depended on informal interaction with expansive regional hinterlands (Nest 2002b: 88-89; Willame 1997).

destruction of state infrastructural power in eastern Zaïre would ultimately facilitate the rise to power of transnational political forces such as that of Laurent-Désiré Kabila (Reno 1997: 40). It was thus in the extended pockets where Zairian state infrastructural power crumbled that political-economic networks would thrive that set the stage for the conflicts in the 1990s.

It is important to note, in sum, that the resultant topography did not form a departure from colonial spatial ordering patterns but rather their radicalization (Pourtier 1991: 26): the Belgian infrastructural topography equally constituted a river delta linking, mainly, the copper mines of Katanga and other enclaved resource economies—by some geographical accident all peripheral—to the transshipment point of Léopoldville. Where the Belgian infrastructural grid forced accumulation to pass through the obligatory passage points of Kinshasa and Brussels, the extraversion of productive enclaves was further diluted in Zaïre: as these enclaves are located on the fringes of Zaïre's borders, as we have seen, most multinationals organized imports and exports through the infrastructural grids of neighboring countries. Yet even the relative emphasis on these different infrastructural lines of flight does not discount the fact that those were already central conduits of economic extraversion under Belgian colonialism. Thus, to the extent that the extraverted political economy of Mobutu's Zaïre was organized through the infrastructural grid put in place under colonial rule, this path dependency means we can then say that the infrastructural topography of extraversion and political order under Mobutu is thoroughly post-colonial.

Coercive power: *le pouvoir se mange entier*⁵²

Arguably, Mobutu's longevity hinged not only on his safeguarding of the critical infrastructures of economic extraversion, but also on his control over coercive power. Around 1970, Zaïre had around 20,000 gendarmes, responsible for general public order and security (Rosenblum 1990: 205 & 209; cf. Nlandu Mayamba 2012: 36). Yet just as Mobutu considered the independence of economic actors in his country a potential threat (see above), he kept the army and gendarmerie weak through a proliferation of special security forces and shifting of people occupying important posts (Callaghy 1983: 77; Eriksen 2009: 655). Just as with infrastructures, rather than maintaining and improving existing ones, Mobutu preferred to start new infrastructure projects and created new, parallel security forces and chains of command in order to retain power through a 'divide and rule' strategy. This was in part to prevent any officer from consolidating power (Edmond 2001: 73; Rosenblum 1990: 207). Mobutu complemented the Gendarmerie Nationale, among others, with the *Garde Civile*, the *Service National d'Intelligence et de Protection* (SNIP, the postcolonial version of the colonial *Sûreté*)

⁵² 'Power is eaten whole', Congolese proverb (cited in Schatzberg 1993: 450).

and the *Service d'Action et de Renseignements Militaires* (SARM) (cf. Ndjate Omanyondo N'Koy 2007: 173ff & Ndaywel è Nziem 1998: 422 for an overview). Thus, as in Belgian Congo, governance in the Mobutu period was characterized by a combination of an overlapping of security functions and a lack of functional diversification with respect to security institutions.

According to some, the profusion of security institutions meant that Mobutu had developed a perfect synoptic disciplinary apparatus that permeated society to its grassroots through neopatrimonial mechanisms (Schatzberg 1982; Shaw 1984: 84). However, the continuous reshuffling and reassembling of the state apparatus—the security branches specifically but the rest as well—meant that in Zaïre, as under the Free State, coercive power was both omnipresent and consistently weak (cf. Fairhead 1992: 20), in part because of the lack of infrastructural power. More generally, in response to the gradual material disassembly of the state, the number of state representatives proliferated, to the extent that by the 1990s it was estimated that up to 1.000.000 state functionaries made up Zaïre's baroque bureaucracy (Englebert 2002: 591; Meni 2000: 13). However, these will remain estimates, as there were hardly any technologies of inscription to monitor and account for them. As a result, nobody knew which and how many individuals constituted this choreography of bureaucrats and security forces, nor would it have been possible to keep track of them. The fact that security forces under Mobutu were hardly—if ever—paid, means that coercive power was, in a way, privatized: just as during the Free State, those exercising office in security deployed that office for private accumulation, or, to put it more sympathetically, to survive. Also mirroring the Free State, the abuses by security forces during the Second Republic were noteworthy and security forces were perceived as representatives of an alien political order (Callaghy 1984: 289).

Another important aspect of security governance in Zaïre is that the organization of coercive power was highly contingent on external support (Callaghy 1983: 66). It is only to be remembered that Mobutu's coup was made possible by mercenaries (as discussed earlier in this chapter), which Mobutu maintained to discipline the army and to protect vital installations and plantations (Clarke 1968: 68). While foreign military aid and 'technical experts' had from the outset been part of the fabric of Mobutu's coercive apparatus—with, most notably, the CIA providing training to Mobutu's special forces well into the 1970s (Weissman 1979: 273-275)—internationalization of the organization of coercive power in Zaïre dramatically increased during and after the two Shaba Wars. The Shaba Wars hinged on the invasion of a combination of Angolan MPLA and former Katanga Gendarmes (known as *Les Tigres Katangais*). Mobutu actively internationalized the first Shaba war—framing it as a Soviet threat—in order to gain western military assistance and regime support (Kabwit 1979; Odom 1993). Sig-

nificantly, this consisted largely of technical support: logistics, weaponry, and communication systems to organize coercive power. The Shaba—as the Katanga province was called from 1971—incidents in 1977 and 1978 proved, both to Mobutu and the international community, that Zaïre could not autonomously organize coercive power, requiring in both cases international military intervention to maintain the status quo of Mobutu's reign (Leslie 1993: 139; Schatzberg 1989). Over the years, a number of Western countries would provide Mobutu with arms shipments, logistical support and military training. In this way, the extraversion of infrastructural power was consequently mirrored by, and interwoven with, the extraversion of coercive power. To illustrate, support by the French and others was often part of larger trade agreements involving Zaïre commissioning highly expensive infrastructure projects with countries that supported him militarily (cf. McNulty 1999: 62).

Securing critical infrastructure

Yet Mobutu made sure that the accelerating disorganization of security forces would not affect the critical infrastructure of extraversion that was central to his revenues. Faced with the material destruction of infrastructural power that entailed partial deinstitutionalization of the Zairian state, Mobutu focused loyal security forces in the extractive enclaves on which his revenues depended. If mining constituted roughly 80% of both exports and state budget in the 1970s (Huybrechts & Van der Steen 1980: 209-210), it is also there that Mobutu's security forces concentrated, in enclaves of productivity and slimmed-down infrastructural grids, owned and maintained largely by multinational enterprises, through which mineral exports were governed and exported (cf. Leslie 1993: 127; World Bank 1991: 9). While Zairian state actors close to the elite were disproportionately present in the internationalized enclaves on which the country's extraverted economy depended, their presence was not of the same kind as that of Belgian colonial administrators in mining enclaves. As Nest observes with regards to the capacity of state agents to accrue revenues in this period, 'it made more sense for them to focus their efforts and the bureaucracy's capacity in areas where there were profitable businesses and opportunities to tax commerce, such as ports-of-entry.' (2002a: 30). In the late 1970s, the overall topography of state taxation and effective coercion was concentrated along the pathways carved out by internationalized infrastructures (cf. Global Witness 2004: 8; Newbury 2012: 134).

In effect, from the moment Mobutu grabbed power we see an intensification of activity of surveillance organs, particularly around the powerful elites who benefitted from the current situation, but also constituting a linkage of nominal control between the regime and the extraverted 'zones of opportunity' (Bézy,

Peemans & Wautelet 1981: 67). In particular with reference to the security of the critical infrastructure of extraversion, he created special police forces for foreign companies and strategic (mining) assets, both as a way to guard strategic assets and as a way to control them and spy on them. As such, the mining police (*police minière*) was created as a tool specifically to secure the mining parastatals *Société minière de Kilo-Moto* (SOKIMO) and *Société Minière de Bakwanga* (MIBA) (Bedidjo 2006). The most important security institution in strategic nodes was the well-paid, trained and armed *Division Spéciale Présidentielle* (DSP), made up of foreigners and soldiers of Mobutu's own ethnicity (Rosenblum 1990: 207). CADR (*Corps des activistes pour la défense de la révolution*) was also deployed around critical places (mining enterprises, but equally sites of potential resistance such as universities) to observe not only threats emanating from the outside, but also from the inside (Edmond 2001: 7). CADR was complemented around critical state enterprises by yet other special *gardes industrielles* resembling the mining police (Rosenblum 1990: 207). The chain of command of these special forces bypassed that of the police and regular armed forces—which gradually stopped receiving pay or training all but in name—in favor of personalized rule over critical infrastructure.

In continuity with Belgian times, Congo's *effective* security forces were distributed unevenly and used to secure a political-economic pattern serving private goals. As we will explore in chapter 6, like private security companies now, some of those services were not allowed to carry arms and thus still had to consistently rely on deployment of the gendarme or *Forces Armées Zaïroises* (FAZ) (Edmond 2001: 74). As such, the critical infrastructure of extraversion was, in Zaïre, guarded by varying 'assemblages' of security forces, mirroring—as we will see—contemporary topographies of coercive power.

Yet, ultimately, the consistent lack of payment of the ever-expanding security forces and the continuous restructuring by Mobutu personally to counter possible coups, gradually tore Zaïre's security forces apart, later forming the context for the rise of private security companies in the post-Mobutu era. Indeed, already in the late 1980s, we see the first addition of foreign-organized private security companies to the security assemblages around the critical infrastructure of extraversion. It seems the first instance was when, to counter the massive theft of diamonds by employees and security personnel of MIBA, De Beers' subsidiary Britmond (British Zaïre Diamond Distributors) organized a private security firm (Amnesty International 2002b: 8).

Political ordering patterns: nationalization and extraversion

So how did the transformation of the short-lived Republic of Congo into Zaïre reflect on the principal political ordering patterns inherited from Belgian colonial

rule? As we have seen, colonial rule revolved around two principle political ordering patterns: the ‘colonial economy’ (a euphemism for the extraction economy) and the ‘indigenous order’. I follow Bézy, Peemans and Wautelet, who argue that despite the vast changes associated with independence and the development of the Zairian state, the fundamental characteristic of these ordering processes is one of marked continuity. They point out that the explicit agenda of economic ‘modernization’ through the state, which was mixed with the policy of cultural authenticity for the people, in effect constituted a continuation of the dual colonial policy of economic exploitation and ‘indigenous order’ (1981: 66).

The Zairian population: authenticity

Mobutu attempted to both increase his popularity with and power over what had been the colonial ‘indigenous order’ and remove the western mirror from the way in which Congolese perceived themselves (White 2006: 43). His assertion of power first of all meant that the development organizations that had played a significant role during the 1960-1965 period would be diverted away from the Zairian population. In Zaïre, the indigenous order was radically reassembled by appealing to ‘authentic’ pre-colonial notions of the self. In a policy called ‘authenticité’ in 1966, this appropriation started through discursive construction by giving cities an African name but also included the removal of symbolic colonial infrastructures (statues, monuments, etc.), physically effacing names of colonial heroes like Stanley (Lumumba-Kasongo 1992: 38-39). Authenticité meant appealing to authentic cultural identity markers rather than those exogenously imposed by colonialism and thus also entailed resistance against Christian churches that had, during colonial times, played a central role in the construction and governance of the ‘indigenous order’ (cf. Kakama 1983). In 1971, the country was renamed Zaïre and the *Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution* (MPR) banned Christian names (Badye 1984). The physical demonstration of colonial power—a ritualized way of colonial ordering, see previous chapter—was now complemented by performative acts of Zairian *animation*.

Where Belgian production of the ‘indigenous order’ had hinged to a significant degree on the elaborate inscription of that objectification in, for example, demographic censuses and public health statistics, because of the receding infrastructures of rule, state officials and sociologists could no longer reach all localities (Pourtier 1993: 58). In addition, effectuating such research, more generally, drastically increased in costs and duration. By way of illustration, the last comprehensive population census took place in 1984 (Englebert 2002). Authenticité was mainly effectuated through cultural technologies of power—playing out at the level of identity politics, discourse, and cultural performance, circulating through radios and television circuits (White 2006)—while being less mediated

by technologies of inscription that ‘extracted’ from, and assembled information on, the aggregate population. Yet what authenticity shared with colonial expertise was that it constituted an apparatus of domination, and not of political representation (Badye 1984: 109-110).

Authenticité was the decolonization of the indigenous order through the reinscription of subtle adaptations of ancestral values and motives in a politically mediated apparatus of subjectivity production, one in which the idea of Mobutu played the role of central mediator of authority and the final judge of authenticity. In that way, ‘the cultural space of Mobutu showed itself [to be] an authoritarian space’ (Kavwahirehi 2006: 128, translation by author). Yet each time the population seemed to see through the authentic veil that covered Mobutu’s kleptocracy, the revolution was radicalized (White 2006: 52).

The Zairian economy: extraverted extraction

Ever since Mobutu took power, international actors had been involved in economic governance. Because Zaïre had no in-house expertise, it had to rely on international support in stabilizing the economic object of government, a former Belgian administrators were now ‘development experts’ (cf. Hodge 2010). Progressively, extraverted economic governance in Zaïre plays out through parallel yet interwoven circuits of mineral resource extraction and internationalized macroeconomic governance, corresponding roughly to the internationalization of logistical techniques and technologies of inscription, respectively.

In his many discourses, Mobutu presented zairianization as the spilling over of the logic of (re)appropriation underpinning authenticity from the cultural into the economic realm. Yet where governance of the colonial ‘indigenous order’ underwent radical nationalization under Mobutu, the locus of governance of the Congolese economy was increasingly internationalized. Whereas Zaïre disposed of vast mineral wealth in its soil, under Mobutu the regime hardly developed the logistical techniques—or socio-technological infrastructural capacity—to translate these subsoil compounds into monetary gain and thus political clout (cf. Mitchell 2011). This means that the technological process of translation of subsoil minerals into money was entirely mediated by expatriate subcontractors and highly paid technical consultants, working with foreign equipment imported over privatized infrastructures so that hardly any of the value-added of the extraction process permeated the Zairian population (Depelchin 1992: 177; Van der Steen 1977). Gran described the socio-technological construction of this economic extraversion as ‘exocentric growth’: ‘foreign capital, disadvantaged on the surface, controls so much of the technology, production inputs, senior personnel decisions, marketing arrangements and other elements as to render largely meaningless the state participation’ (Gran 1978: 12). While Zairian elites appro-

appropriated crude rents resulting from formal state ownership or shares in exploitations, they did not reveal themselves to be interested in shifting the fundamental socio-technical construction of political and economic ordering patterns.

Besides dependency of resource extraction on international logistical techniques, the same held for the technologies of inscription through which the aggregate Zairian economy was ordered. From roughly the 1970s onwards, the Zairian government had great difficulty in collecting statistical data on the aggregate of economic activity, rendering it difficult to govern ‘the economy’ from a distance in centers of calculation. As Iyenda puts it: ‘the statistical sector is poorly financed, data from the government are often weak and lack substance or accuracy, since major activities in the country are unrecorded’ (2006: 109; cf. Petit & Trefon 2006: 10).

As the national bank and other institutions failed to produce reliable statistics, western donors, the World Bank and the IMF started to get involved in the governmental activity of mapping the object of government of the Zairian economy in the 1970s. Where, as we have seen, in the first decade of independence technical economic expertise added up to about USD 40 million a year, under Mobutu foreign economic expertise only became more important (World Bank 1970: iv). In 1967, for example, the IMF assisted Mobutu with an economic stabilization program targeting currency devaluation and exchange controls (World Bank 1970: ii). Later, the ‘Plan Mobutu’—while veiled in a nationalist discourse—entailed a more intimate involvement of international investors in the stabilization of the Zairian economy through multilateral institutions (Willame 1980: 10). What they put on the table was a wide range of technologies of inscription, organized in separate institutions and through technical assistance teams in key posts of the Bank of Zaïre and Finance Ministry.

The result of these external efforts to map the Zairian economy was that by the late 1970s, international actors realized that Mobutu’s inability to repay debts—by now totaling nearly a billion USD—was structural rather than conjectural. Individual donors combined in the Club of Paris and consulted with the IMF and World Bank to devise a multi-year ‘stabilization’ program, thus increasing formal participation of international experts in management of the Zairian ‘national’ economy (cf. Van der Steen 1977).

‘Zaire’s economy’, in other words, progressively referred to as an internationally constituted object of governance, reflecting the priorities and formulations of those in international financial institutions. This means that—as an indirect result of Zaïre’s colossal debt—many crucial decisions involving Zaïre’s macro-economic and monetary policy were transposed to the boardrooms of international centers of calculation, mainly located in the United States and Belgium. What we see with the increasing number of international actors involved in

Zaïre's economy was its deepening extraversion. While arguably the Belgian colonial administration had a monopoly over the extraverted constitution and stabilization of colonial objects of government, the multilateralization of economic governance in Zaïre means that the economy presented itself as external, objective, to any of the governance actors involved individually—yet this does not discount that they were deeply involved in the politics of its constitution.

As a result of such efforts and a host of geopolitical moves, in 1984 Zaïre was called a 'model pupil' of the IMF and World Bank, and was subject to the most comprehensive international reform programs attempted in Africa (Leslie 1993: 118-119). This again meant a vast increase of the number of highly paid expats in Kinshasa. In the 1990s, there were an estimated 13,000 Belgians alone in Zaïre (Pourtier 1993: 43) working 'particularly in aid programs and agencies' (Lumumba-Kasongo 1992: 30). If this number is contrasted with the 8,000 Belgians that were formally attached to colonial administration on the eve of independence (World Bank 1957b: 4) then it seems understandable that to 'many informed Zairians', as Leslie puts it, 'Expatriate experts who had a mandate to regulate government spending appeared to be another version of the Force Publique' (1993: 118).

Yet with accelerating infrastructural dilapidation in the 1990s, even international donors had difficulty maintaining a grip on the increasingly slippery and physically fragmented object of government of the Zairian economy; it became apparent that their capacity to act on it from a distance was severely curtailed. As one World Bank report puts it in 1991 (p. 15): 'There is a Zairian economic reality: distances, intermediate reloading, chaotic border links, low transport volumes, anemic fiscal revenue, underpaid public servants, etc.' Where during colonial rule the indigenous order and the extractive economy were spatially segregated through a colonial apparatus of rule, as a result of infrastructural disassembly this spatial segregation started to disassemble, with the lines blurring between subsistence economies, artisanal mining, state involvement and illicit accumulation.

Infrastructures as a novel object of government

As hinted at throughout this chapter, technological infrastructures formed a key stake in the international relations of and in Zaïre: core governance processes in Zaïre were externally ordered. I have tried to show how this durable pattern was contingent on the physical arrangements that underpin and stabilize networks and flows out of the country rather than facilitating domestic connections. To the extent that these infrastructures in Zaïre formed a key concern of international actors, over the years we see the gradual birth of infrastructure as an internationalized object of governance, disembedded from its connections to local socio-

political dynamics, pertaining, rather, to the realm of expertise of international development organizations (cf. Rankin 2009).

From the 1970s, western donors and the World Bank start to show an increasing interest in funding efforts to improve Zaïre's infrastructure—translating into dozens of different projects since 1975 (Fairhead 1992: 20; Leslie 1993: 128; see bibliography). The internationalization of Zaïre's financial government, discussed in the above section, entailed concerted pressure on Mobutu to maintain the *voie nationale*, the main export route from Shaba (Leslie 1987: 103). Donors singularly funded projects aimed at rehabilitating these infrastructural arteries to boost mineral exports, from the perspective that this might enable Zaïre to start repaying its debts. They took *de facto* ownership of the maintenance and development of key infrastructural arteries: any infrastructure development project in this period was executed by foreign experts through 'technical assistance' projects, and technical experts were detached at the management level of Zaïre's transport companies (World Bank 1970: iii; 1981: 6). These international infrastructure governance assemblages again defied the public/private divide: the World Bank funded development projects prepared and implemented through (mostly Belgian owned) foreign corporations in Congo (Gran 1978: 14). Rankin observes that the birth of infrastructure as an internationalized object of government was tightly linked with the internationalization of postcolonial economies within international political ordering patterns. As he writes:

'I want to suggest that the close link between the modern category of infrastructure and international debates about development should not be taken as a coincidence. Instead, I would say that infrastructure only makes sense as part of the new international system created in the middle of the twentieth century' (2009: 71).

And indeed, international donors saw Zaïre's infrastructure as part of an interlocking and complementary grid that was not necessarily confined to Zaïre's borders, but also comprised alternative continental export routes (e.g. World Bank 1979), all with the purpose to reembed Zaïres minerals in an international economic and political ordering pattern.

Yet many of the international infrastructure development programs turned out to be Promethean, ending up unfinished and adding to Zaïre's debt (Willame 1986: 24). Structural adjustment programs in the 1980s, unsurprisingly, aimed at slimming down the Zairian public infrastructure companies that had become money drains in an effort to render them competitive and functional (Pourtier 1991: 29). However, in practice they destroyed the last mechanisms of public service delivery. The international focus on the main infrastructural arteries of extraversion meant that, at the time, the international donors involved paid little

attention to the indirect effects of faltering transport infrastructures on famines and even drastically lowering life expectations in rural areas (Pourtier 1993: 57).

The aggregate picture, then, is one in which internationalized intervention in infrastructure governance in Congo only nominally kept the main arteries of Zaïre's infrastructure functioning—just enough so that mineral exports could continue—while Zaïre accrued increasing public debt and the international actors involved made vast profits. Additionally, the pattern of internationalization of infrastructure, as Rankin suggests, seemed tied into efforts to constitute a pattern of continuing international control over key political ordering processes in independent Zaïre.

Chapter summary

This chapter attempted to explore how coercive power entangled in political ordering efforts in postcolonial Congo/Zaïre that entrenched the progressive extraversion of key political ordering patterns: the Zairian economy and, progressively, infrastructure. The postcolonial period would prove to be one in which the stability of the political ordering patterns created and stabilized by the Belgian projection of infrastructural and coercive power faltered as soon as the latter did. Where the economy and indigenous order had been governed through an entangled colonial apparatus until 1960, the postcolonial moment would entail a separation of these political ordering mechanisms—with the independent Congolese state having sovereign control over coercive power and the responsibility to govern the population, and the internationalized Belgian corporations retaining control over privatized infrastructural power in the Congolese territory. Decolonization meant the transnational mining industry had to reorganize, separating the extractive apparatus from the now independent political one.

While Congolese/Zairians are often blamed for the post-1960 deliquescence of infrastructure, the first section of the chapter has tried to emphasize the pivotal importance of the specific policies adopted by the Belgian colonial administration in the prolonged 'postcolonial moment' that surrounded Congo's independence in 1960. In fact, by the time that Congo became independent, much of the infrastructural power in the country had already been reembedded in international governance networks through a combination of amortization and the siphoning off of Congo's infrastructural power into international holding companies. While Mobutu ostensibly attempted to regain control over key political ordering processes in the 1970s by nationalizing the assets concerned, in practice, the governance of key infrastructures—the backbone of the extraverted mining economy—remained firmly lodged in transnationalized networks of power.

CHAPTER 5

When it comes to coercive power, we saw the chaos in the post-independence years receding when Mobutu grabbed power, yet within decades, the proliferation of (unpaid) security services equaled a *de facto* generalized privatization of security. Yet Mobutu was, until the 1990s, careful to retain a strong security apparatus around the critical infrastructure of extraversion, meaning that the aggregate pattern of political ordering showed remarkable continuities with colonial times. The fact that not even Mobutu's special security forces could maintain security for these critical infrastructures in the 90s would augur the rise of private security companies, which forms the subject of the next chapter.

6

Another balkanization of Congo? The contemporary topography of private security in the DRC

‘Avant moi le chaos, après moi le déluge’ —Mobutu⁵³

Introduction

It is often said in Congo that the one thing Mobutu did well, was conveying a sense that Zaïre’s population was first and foremost *Zairois* by continually transplanting parts of its population (mostly civil servants and officers in security services) away from their indigenous spheres; imposing Lingala as an obligatory passage point for all Congolese to communicate; and imposing a range of other dispositions that somewhat stemmed and stabilized identity conflicts. After Mobutu’s demise, and in line with the broader waning of the enforcement of sovereign borders after the Cold War, both Congo’s physical and cultural integrity became violated. This gave rise to the ‘balkanization’ thesis, which continues to frame Congolese political and popular understandings. It figures in the government’s 2006 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (RDC 2006: 29), and one Kinshasa newspaper (*Le Potentiel*) is even subtitled *contre la balkanisation de la RDC*.⁵⁴ While the ‘balkanization-thesis’ can be traced back to the discursive construction of a historically rooted Hamitic drive for geopolitical expansion on part of the

⁵³ ‘Chaos before me, after me the downfall’

⁵⁴ ‘Against the balkanization of the DRC!’

Rwandese,⁵⁵ in a wider context, balkanization is used to describe a combination of efforts by external powers to divide a country for political-economic reasons often invoked in Congo regarding an alliance of western powers using Rwanda and Uganda by proxy to keep Congo strategically divided to facilitate resource plunder (Abadie, Deneault & Sacher 1998).

Underpinning the ‘balkanization’ thesis—which in its simplest version refers to a ‘divide and rule’ strategy of breaking up a country or region into smaller mutually hostile groups or states—is a classical understanding of political order, a territorial understanding of Congolese sovereignty that correlates political order with control exercised by the state apparatus over strategic ordering processes within a defined two-dimensional space. However, I want to suggest that the narrow focus on security, neighboring states and their rebel proxies perhaps distracts from another *de facto* territorial carving up of their country, one with potentially much more far-reaching implications for the allocation of benefits from Congo’s mineral wealth.

This thesis has thus far shown the historical continuity of political ordering patterns put in place under Belgian colonial rule in which wealth and power were spatially concentrated and asymmetrically held by networks of international actors. While arguably the struggle to end colonial rule exactly revolved around the stake to end such transnationalized asymmetries of power, Mobutu’s rule only deepened the extraversion of ordering patterns involving infrastructural and coercive power. In effect, the formal political economy of Mobutu’s Zaïre entailed a narrowing of the topography of critical infrastructures of mineral exports run by a network of multinationals and secured by special forces loyal to the presidency.

The following chapter explores how, while the players changed, this pattern is still very much in place. It does so with a focus on the contemporary privatization of both infrastructure development and security governance—the two central analytical components of political ordering mechanisms throughout this thesis. It is interesting to look at privatization as a venue into contemporary political order in Congo because reconfigurations of the public-private divide has formed a central site of struggle over the control of wealth and accumulation in recent African history (e.g. Hibou 2004). This is particularly so as privatization can be seen as a pivotal mechanism to construe ‘domestic’ governance processes as external to political order.

This chapter introduces the private security sector in the DRC and contextualizes its emergence within, on the one hand, the demise of Mobutu and the ensu-

⁵⁵ Mirrored, in the Kivus and Rwanda, by the idea that historically, the Kivus were part of a Tutsi kingdom (cf. Huenig 2013). As I observed frequently, in Rwandese government circles it is indeed common to joke that Congo is simply ‘too big’ to govern.

ing struggle for power during Congo Wars (1997-1998 and 1998-2003) and, on the other, broader shifts in the entanglements of international actors to infrastructural governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It explores the spatial organization of private security as a way to show how political order in the DRC is in effect 'balkanized' through the privatization and internationalization of the intertwining of infrastructural and coercive power which constitutes the core of the formal political economy in the DRC. The following two chapters explore how private security companies co-constitute political order in relation to the two specific governance processes of industrial mining and humanitarian governance.

The chapter proceeds as follows. It first provides a broad overview of the private security sector in the DRC, to subsequently discuss the relevance of private security companies in light of their linkages to specific international governance processes in the DRC: first industrial mining, then humanitarian governance. I next explore how the significance of this entanglement can be better understood by bringing into view the pivotal role that the infrastructural power that these actors project plays in determining this spatialization of private security. Indeed, the contemporary topography of private security in the DRC, I attempt to show, is profoundly postcolonial in the sense that it follows the pathways of extraverted political ordering carved out by infrastructural path dependence engendered by colonialism and deliquescence under Mobutu. If infrastructures are not politically neutral but rather pivotal expressions of, and conduits for, the capacity to project power over distances, this chapter draws attention to a 'double privatization' of key mechanisms in the co-constitution of political ordering patterns in the DRC: infrastructure privatization compounded with the privatization of infrastructure protection. However, a concluding section points to some of the ways in which this disembedding through privatization, rather than leading to disconnection from broader political ordering processes in Congo, paradoxically hinges on thorough entanglement with conflictual socio-political and economic actors. As such, this chapter explores the broad ways in which the privatization of security ties into the co-constitution of political ordering and disordering patterns in the DRC and sets the stage for the subsequent in-depth chapters.

The Congolese private security sector at large

There are currently around one hundred private security companies (locally called *sociétés de gardiennage*) in the DRC, employing over 30,000 security personnel.⁵⁶ Manned security, or ‘static guarding’ through the physical presence of human guards, is by far the most important service offered, to the extent that security consultancy, electronic security and cash-in-transit are negligible (constituting together only about 5% of total activities).⁵⁷ These five percent include military advisory and training, a range of high-value contracts for the US Department of Defense (DoD), working to implement Security Sector Reform (SSR) and anti-Koni operations with the *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC, Congolese Armed Forces).⁵⁸ Employment in the USD 60 million⁵⁹ sector is growing at an estimated rate of 5% or with 1,500 guards, annually.⁶⁰ Concomitantly, despite on-going consolidation in the sector through merger and acquisition, the number of private security companies rose from 35-45 in 2007 (De Goede 2008: 43) to around 70 in 2009 (Kasongo 2009) and to over one hundred in 2012. As in other African countries (Abrahamsen & Williams 2005a, 2005b, 2005c; Gumedze 2008), the private security sector is dominated by a number of larger firms, often with expatriate management and/or ownership, existing side-by-side with a large number of smaller, national—and often only partly formalized—security companies.

The result of over 60 interviews conducted for this thesis, Table 1 below presents a comprehensive overview of the contemporary private security sector in Congo. As the table reveals, two companies (G4S and Delta Protection) together make up 33% of the Congolese private security sector, while 10 large companies make up roughly 70% of the market. It is important to note that this table provides a snapshot for 2013 and that numbers of guards per company shift constantly as major clients change contracts.

The table also indicates PSC coverage—a not unimportant issue given the sheer size of the DRC. Reflecting the fact that the DRC has no national transport grid, private security companies often limit their services to either the western (mainly Kinshasa, Boma and Matadi) or the Eastern part of the country. A Bel-

⁵⁶ Estimates however vary according to measurement methods, reaching as low as 17,500, yet such measurements seem to correspond roughly to the number of larger—‘above the board’—PSC.

⁵⁷ Source: interview PSC manager, Kinshasa, 2011

⁵⁸ This seems a relatively new phenomenon: De Goede did not find such security services in 2007 (De Goede, 2008: 36).

⁵⁹ Source: 2011 estimate by DRC PSC management triangulated with other PSC.

⁶⁰ Source: interview PSC manager Kinshasa, 2011. This correlates with an extrapolation of current figures back into history: De Goede estimated the total PSC population in the DRC at 25,000 in 2007 (2008: 42).

gian director of a private security company that is only active in Kinshasa and Bas-Congo, explains: ‘given that the context is so different in Kinshasa from Eastern Congo, any organization needs two country managers: one for the west, and one for the east, which is commercially and politically oriented not towards Kinshasa, but much more towards its Eastern neighbors.’⁶¹ As a result, in Eastern Congo, a different range of PSC dominates the market than in Kinshasa: for instance the Kenyan PSCs KK Security and Warrior Security and the Ugandan Top S.I.G, reflecting regional cultural, economic and geopolitical influence spheres.

Table 1. Overview of the private security sector in the DRC in 2013

Name company	Employees	Approximate market share (in static security)	First active in Congo	Relations to State Security	Deployment
ASCO	900	3%	2000	PNC	Country wide
Bras Security	2000	7%		PNC/ANR	Katanga
Delta Protection	5000	17%	2000	PIR	Country wide
Graben Security	1200	4%	2003	PNC	Eastern Congo
GSA	950	4%	2008	OPJ	Country wide
G4S	5000	17%	2001	PNC	Country wide
HDW	900	3%	1994	PNC	Kivu provinces
Magenya Protection	1500	5%	1993	PNC	Kinshasa
New Escokin	1500	5%	1987	PNC	Kinshasa
Top SIG	820	3%	2009	PNC/FARDC	Eastern Congo
Total	19.770	68%			

Source: data compiled by author.

As indicated, PSC provide the gamut of services but most important is static or manned guarding. This means that PSC guards—clad in uniforms that seem to mimic sometimes those of the Congolese police, sometimes of the army, or even the UN—are located at the gates of the compounds that punctuate the Congolese landscape. They are organized in teams that have a site supervisor—for larger clients—or a supervisor for a certain part of town. As PSC are by law not allowed to carry weapons in the DRC, armed police are often hired to back up the private security arrangements with coercive power. In practice, private security arrangements have agents of public order folded into them, unsettling the accuracy of the predicate ‘private’ for these arrangements. Most PSC also sport a rapid intervention team: a jeep with military-style open-air seats mounted on the back

⁶¹ Interview PSC manager Kinshasa 2012. This holds not only for PSC. The brewery Bralima, one of Congo’s largest active corporations (fully owned by the Heineken Group), has one security manager for Kinshasa, and another one for Congo, Rwanda and Burundi (source: interviews, Kinshasa & Goma, 2012).

for a number of specially trained guards and armed police, ready to be dispatched to security incidents. In non-urban settings, PSC and Congolese police-for-hire usually accompany corporate vehicles moving between offices and operational sites. As a rule, management is expatriate, both reflecting ownership structures and because white staff are considered more representative towards potential clients. Part of the service by PSC management for their clients appears to be informal risk analysis and the larger PSC also provide an evacuation service for when ‘things go wrong’.⁶² Thus, besides claiming to provide well-trained security guards that don’t sleep or steal, private security companies also sell guarantees that they will ‘get their clients out in time’, as the same security manager argued.

So how do private security companies co-constitute political order in the DRC? As we have seen in chapter two, when set against the ideal of a state monopoly of violence, the addition of 30.000 private security guards to the already complex choreography of state and non-state security actors in Congo seems only to add to disorder. The rise of the private security sector, from this perspective, is often embedded in narratives in which ‘a political history of Congo is also a history of mercenarism in Africa’ (Pech 2000: 121; cf. Cornwell 1999). Such assertions hinge on a historical narrative weaving together the recurring instances in which mercenary networks were involved in protecting or destabilizing the status quo in the country (Chatterjee 1997). However, the rise of the private security sector is at once less ‘spectacular’—to the extent that mercenarism is romanticized—and less *ad-hoc* than a focus on mercenaries would suggest. Rather, I want to argue that the rise of the private security sector in the DRC is more fundamentally entangled with political order. Its emergence, I suggest in the following, concerns the transformation of the temporary and exceptional provision of security to critical international governance processes—a practice associated with mercenaries and Mobutu’s paramilitary security forces as we have seen in previous chapters—into a state-regulated and everyday practice, roughly in the decade between 1990 and 2000. This transformation can be divided up into three distinct if somewhat overlapping episodes: the first comprising the appearance of the initial PSC in the early 90s; the second comprising the interruption of this pattern by the First Congo War and the demise of Mobutu; and the third corresponding roughly to the Second Congo War.

⁶² Source: interviews with PSC management, Kigali, 2011.

The rise of the private security sector in the DRC

The emergence of private security in the DRC (1990-1997): securing international business

Private security companies made their first appearance in Congo when it was (only barely) still Zaïre in the context of the turmoil of the demise of Mobutu's power. Just as where Mobutu's Zaïre was born in part from Cold-War geopolitical dynamics, so the end of Mobutu's rule should be considered as firmly lodged within the geopolitical context of the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War meant the swift withdrawal of Western governmental support for Mobutu, and hence a drying up of his political legitimacy and financial resources (Commission Lutundula 2006: 4). After development agencies' offices were raided during the 1993 riots and the Zaïre government defaulted on debt service, the country was placed internationally on 'non-accrual status' on November 15, 1993, meaning a full stop to all bilateral and multilateral funding (World Bank 1995). This made Mobutu's central preoccupation over the last decades—remaining in power while resources declined—even more acute, and it became clear in the 1990s that he failed to keep up earlier rates of pay to key figures in his patronage network (Reno 1997: 48). It was evident that the situation in which the presidency consumed 80% of government expenditure could not last long (McCalpin 2002: 43).

What this entailed was a process of disordering and reordering that, as indicated in the previous chapter, was subject to intense centrifugal forces because of infrastructural dilapidation and involved Mobutu's gradual demise as sole mediator of external power relations. Mobutu could not uphold the ordering pattern in which his special forces protected the infrastructural nodes where expats generated revenues, and eastern provinces—particularly the Kivus—informally integrated more firmly into East Africa's economic and political sphere (Musila 2009: 2).

Interviews I conducted with those involved in setting up Congo's first private security company indicate that the expat community—limited as it was by the 90s—felt increasingly unsure about Mobutu's capacity to guarantee their property rights and security, which he had hitherto done by deploying special forces around expat premises.⁶³ The soldiers initially rioted at their military bases but quickly started leaving them and during the pillages of 1991 and 1993, military and civilians alike looted Kinshasa and other big towns, leaving much infrastruc-

⁶³ Source: interview with PSC CEO, London, 2011, and PSC manager, Kinshasa, 2012

ture destroyed in their wake. From guards of the established order and the role of foreigners therein, the Zairian security forces turned into the largest threat to that order (Amnesty International 1997), and just as had occurred at the end of Belgian colonial rule, the ensuing turbulence made foreigners and their assets ready targets for looting and destruction.

It is within this context that the formal private security sector first surged in Zaïre. Because there were few expats left, there was only a very restricted market for private security companies, concentrated mainly around the remaining critical sources of revenue for the flailing Mobutu regime: embassies and corporate offices in Kinshasa, the copper mines of Shaba/Katanga and the diamond mines in Kasai. The first private security company in Congo (then Zaïre) was started by Belgian entrepreneur Philippe de Moerloose in 1984. DSA (Defense Systems Africa) started out by offering guarding services to select embassies and diplomatic residences in Kinshasa, and after 1991 also to other companies related to De Moerloose's business empire, famous for the fortunes made with Demimpex, his car exporter (De Goede 2008: 44; cf. Halloy, 2007). The second PSC was Escokin (*Entreprise de Service et de Commerce de Kinshasa*), which arose in 1987 as the internal logistics and security department for Mobil Oil (Le Potentiel 2011) and would only gradually provide guarding and logistics to other clients such as General Motors, Chevron, and other American corporations then still active in Zaïre. DSA and Escokin would remain the only two formal private security companies until in 1992 the American Jonathan Garrett introduced DSL (Defense Systems Limited) to Zaïre.⁶⁴ DSL initially provided security to De Beers in Mbuji-Mayi and to the American embassy through a subsidiary (USDS, US Defense Systems), later providing security for a broader section of expatriate-run businesses. De Moerloose would in the early 1990s create another PSC, branched off from DSA, especially to provide 'technical assistance' to the diamond mining venture in which he had shares (Renauld 2005: 14).

Private security companies thus first appeared around expatriates and most notably the mining sector. The only previous study that provides an empirical mapping of the private security sector in the DRC confirms this: according to De Goede, private security companies concentrate around the mining sector because

⁶⁴ DSL was founded in 1981 by Alistair Morrison, a former SAS officer (Vines, 1999: 134). As such, it was one of the earliest transnational private security companies in the world. DSL was the second PSC founded by former British Special Forces, after ControlRisks, which had been founded around 1975. During its early years, it had hitherto been deployed to protect oil installations across the African continent and, for instance, also guarded diamond companies during Angola's civil war. According to Christopher Beese (interview in 2011), who worked for DSL at the time, the kind of services DSL offered concerned advice and mediation between clients (mostly extractive industries) and host-state security forces. However, according to other sources, DSL was involved in human rights violations in Colombia (Gillard & Jones 1997; Singer 2003: 221); the most radical allegation is that DSL was involved in an attempted assassination on Museveni in 1986 (Mukwaya 2003: 10).

‘it is the most important industrial sector in the country’ (de Goede 2008: 37). To illustrate with an example that will be explored in-depth in the next chapter, in Province Orientale, there are over 1.000 private security guards deployed, most of whom indeed concentrate around industrial mining companies. As of 2013, there is not a single extractive company in that province that does not make use of private security.

Interruption (1996-1997)

The First Congo War (1996-1997) stands out as a separate episode during the post-Cold War growth of Congo’s private security sector. This is not the place to narrate in detail the complexities of the Congo Wars and indeed many excellent accounts have recently come off press (Lemarchand 2009; Ngolet 2011; Stearns 2011; Turner 2007). In summary, the conflict can be attributed to the effects of, in the first war, a Rwanda-sponsored takeover of power by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Interestingly, L.D. Kabila played a role in both the 1964/1965 and the 1996/1997 rebellions—albeit a very different one (Verhaegen 1997: 11). The Second Congo War can be attributed to the Ugandan and Rwandese contestation of L.D. Kabila’s efforts to extricate himself politically from his foreign backers, a move necessary if he were to muster up domestic support. Kabila senior—often known as *M’zee* Kabila—ended up paying with his life. The takeover of power by his alleged son J. Kabila, who equally retains strong ties to the East and received his political training in the fold of Rwandese power, represents a continuously uncomfortable political compromise.

For the purposes of this section, it is important to emphasize the degree to which the Congo conflict was transnationalized. The first Congo War revolved around a struggle for power between Mobutu and his *Forces Armées Zaïroises* (FAZ) and the ADFL (*Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Congo*) with their appointed political front man *M’zee* Kabila. The direct trigger for the onset of the war was international: the spilling over of the post-genocide Rwandan conflict—in the form of Hutu refugees followed by the Tutsi-led ADFL rebel movement—into the tensions that were already present in the Congolese territory (Stearns 2012b: 28). Kabila came to Rwanda and Katanga from where he witnessed the Rwandese-led rebel movement overtake and ‘liberate’ Zaïre, city by city, on foot. Therefore, territorial conquering of political control hinged crucially on the direct intervention of external actors. Thus, rather than becoming unplugged from global associations and imploding, as some observers argue, ‘Zaïre was born in the international arena, and it has remained there’ (Callaghy 1983: 61).

Just as in the extended ‘postcolonial moment’ (see previous chapter), government troops looted and fled rather than withstanding invading rebels. This

has much to do with the fact that morale in the FAZ was low: the army had consisted of around 70.000 FAZ in the 1980s and salaried forces—although in practice not paid—had declined to a mere 20.000 due to Mobutu’s policy of ‘decentralization’ (Reno 1997: 48).

Abandoned by its French, Belgian and American supporters after the 1990 Lubumbashi university scandal and the Kinshasa pillages a few years later, the clique around Mobutu decided to contract mercenaries when the ADFL had managed to occupy the strategic gold hub of Bunia as part of their ‘liberation’ (Pech 2000: 127). In December 1996 it was finally decided that the Belgian Christian Tavernier would head a 280-strong multinational mercenary force called the *légion blanche* (‘white legion’), composed of, among others, Serbs, Croats, Russians, Poles, Chechnyans, Belgians, Italians, and French. The force was deployed to protect what was left of Mobutu’s power base against the ADFL (Amnesty International 1997: 2; Pech 2000: 133-134). The mercenaries attempted to defend Kisangani from the advancing Rwandese, but their defeat in March 1997 made it clear that without substantial western backing (as had been the case in the 1960s), Mobutu’s demise was not preventable by a small mercenary force.

This episode is often framed as part of a larger outburst of mercenary activity in Africa in the 1990s, involving the South African Executive Outcomes and its offshoot Sandline International,⁶⁵ which aimed to profit financially from the chaotic ‘new wars’ that swept across Africa after Cold War support for many authoritarian regimes waned, allowing those struggles to dissolve into resource-driven fights for power (Kaldor 1999; Peleman 2000: 161-162). Yet within a national context, the mercenary episode of 96-97 in Congo can be considered an outlier rather than part of the growth of the private security sector in the DRC, because it concerned mercenaries (not organized in a formally registered company) employed by a political regime rather than foreign (commercial) interests.

Consolidation of the private security sector (1998-2003): securing the ‘international community’

The picture that arises from the early emergence of the private security sector in Zaïre confirms the emphasis in the literature on transnational corporations—and particularly mining—as constituting the core of the topography of private security in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Cilliers 1999; Ferguson 2005; Hönke 2010). However, it is important to emphasize that the workings of global capital are not sufficient to explain the topography of private security companies in the DRC. Private security companies would also come to be concentrated around international actors who define themselves explicitly as non-profit: the NGO’s and IO’s that

⁶⁵ Cf. (Singer 2003: 104ff) for a detailed overview.

engage in the specter of disaster relief, humanitarian aid, and other development activities.

The addition of humanitarian actors to the topography of private security can be situated in the consolidation of the private security sector that roughly corresponds with the onset of the second Congo War, or, more specifically, with the formulation in 1997, by the L.D. Kabila regime, of the first regulatory disposition specifically targeting private security services.⁶⁶ This formed the legal framework that would compound the surge in private security companies with the arrival of MONUC in 1999 (Kasongo 2009: 9-11).

When MONUC (Mission of the United Nations in the Congo) was launched in 1999 after the Lusaka agreement, the UN would from the very start secure its premises and staff ('force protection') through a combination of MONUC Police (sourced from UN peacekeepers) on the one hand, and PSC supported by armed Congolese National Police (PNC) on the other.⁶⁷ Yet the use of private security by MONUC doesn't stand by itself. Literature on humanitarian security notes an increasing reliance by the UN and other large aid organizations on private security companies since the 1990s (Bruderlein & Gassmann 2006; Cockayne 2006; Perrin 2008; Pingeot 2012; Stoddard, Harmer, & DiDomenico 2009). Throughout the 90s, the UN had increasing difficulties staffing its ambitious missions, both in financial terms and in terms of human resources (Pingeot 2012: 22). This was due in part to a loss of interest in missions and a concomitant military downsizing after the end of the Cold War, which, in turn, also led to a surge in the availability of military trained personnel (Lock 1999). This has entailed since the early 90s that the UN would steadily outsource more and more tasks to private security companies and logistical subcontractors. As one of the first such contracts, it hired DSL in the former Yugoslavia as early as 1992, for a range of services that would employ at its height, 430 DSL staff in 1995 (Østensen 2011: 16-17; Vines 1999: 134).

Interestingly, from the start, the Kabila regime took special attention to create a police force that was deployed around expatriate businesses and other strategic sites in the east. According to someone involved in the process, the creation of the Congolese police so early on was urged by the concern to provide static, non-military security for selected strategic sites.⁶⁸ It was at first an *ad-hoc* arrangement to supply foreign businesses with for-fee police protection, but would quickly become more institutionalized. The Rwandese, for their part, deployed their paramilitary private security company Intersec around strategic Rwandese sites in the Congolese territory. Therefore, some measure of private security—

⁶⁶ L'Arrêté ministériel 006/97 du 9 juillet 1997, followed by l'Arrêté ministériel N°98/008 du 31 mars 1998

⁶⁷ Source: interview UNDSS, Kinshasa 2011

⁶⁸ Interview with security consultant, Kinshasa, 2011

and an armed police force to support it—were already present. Thus, from the start, private security in Congo was lodged within wider public-private security assemblages.

By securing the complex and costly infrastructure that the UN often had to build from scratch in Congo, private security greatly facilitated the UN's work. As will be explored more in depth in chapter 8, serving as a model for not only UN agencies but also the many NGO's and other humanitarian organizations making use of the same infrastructures on the ground, the UN's choice to work with PSC would have a significant impact on the way aid would secure itself in Congo, and, subsequently, entrench security disparities between expats and local populations. In Goma, North Kivu, approximately 80% of the roughly 2,000 private security guards are deployed around the international development community, with most of the rest working for the few industrial mining corporations surviving and a small number for other businesses—the omnipresent mobile phone antennas and beer depots (Schouten 2011b).

The Second Congo War thus meant the initial onset of a pattern that would since stabilize into the contemporary characteristics of Congo's private security sector, namely, its concentration around foreign aid on the one hand and foreign mining on the other. Given the distribution of urban hubs and infrastructure in the country, both types of actors operated by and large on the contested 'central margins' (Raeymaekers 2009) of the vast country, leading to a clustering of private security in those same sites. In both cases we see some of the same individuals that were part of controversial mercenary outfits during the early 90s consolidate their operations into increasingly accepted and standardized security businesses, reflecting a broader shift away from mercenarism in the practice and perception of private security in Sub-Saharan Africa (cf. Abrahamsen & Williams 2011: 125; Chesterman & Lehnardt 2007; Krahmman 2011a). What is particularly striking is that the humanitarian community in Congo deploys the same security strategy of militarized compounds, and often makes use of the services of the same private security companies, as mining companies. To underscore the fact that it is more than a coincidence that both types of international actors deploy private security companies for their operations in Congo, we can point to the broader convergence that Avant & Haufler note in the way that multinational corporations and aid organizations similarly secure their operations 'abroad'. As they put it: 'Although we agree that their missions and motivations are distinct, we are struck by intriguing similarities in their trajectories over the past 20 years in their overseas operations' (2012: 255-256; cf. Branovic 2011: 29).

International governance and critical infrastructures

PSC thus not spread equally throughout the Congolese territory but are rather associated from the start with foreign actors. What this means is that functional diversification between international actors does not explain the prevalence of private security. PSC such as DSL are happy to frame themselves as facilitating the capacity for their clients to operate, irrespective of the nature of clients or the geographical context (Kinsey 2006: 65). This chapter suggests that what perhaps better links the topography of private security companies together is that the sites where PSC concentrate all constitute the ‘construction sites’ of internationalized ordering processes (Schouten 2013a: 554).

What sets these processes apart—whether industrial mining or humanitarian governance—is that their operations all depend crucially on technological infrastructures. Governing aggregate processes—whether mineral extraction or the health of humanitarian populations—cannot be effectuated without technological infrastructures to ‘act from a distance’ across national borders. This chapter suggests that these construction sites that make up the topography of private security in the DRC can to a large extent be mapped onto the presence of modern infrastructures, if we take ‘infrastructure’ to refer to all the physical technologies—whether mundane or highly sophisticated—that both make possible complex governance processes and depend on large capital investments and expert knowledge. ‘Infrastructure’ then comprises all-weather roads but also the technologies that make possible a constant stream of electricity, connectivity, or data management technologies that underpin, for example, statistical inscription of complex governance problems.

What is suggested in this chapter is that in the DRC, high concentrations of technological infrastructures are not ubiquitous but secluded in the ‘construction sites’ of international governance; and because technological infrastructures are core to the operations of international actors in Africa, they form the core ‘referent object’ of private security companies. The implication of this argument is that a map could be drawn of the DRC highlighting the sites where technological infrastructures concentrate—Andrew Barry’s ‘technological zones’ (2006)—and that that map would be a pretty good indicator of where private security companies are likely to concentrate. In light of the broader concern of this thesis, this means that private security companies would hardly constitute a novel articulation of coercive power but rather a shift towards the formally private continuation of formerly ‘public’ mechanisms to secure key political ordering processes in Congo.

The DRC's contemporary infrastructures: uneven and extraverted

'The total road network in DRC is about 152,000 km long but only exists on maps.' (World Bank 2007: 2)

As the previous chapters have shown, infrastructure is, and has arguably always been, central to international political ordering patterns in Congo. The importance of what we now understand as infrastructure for the Belgian colonial enterprise is made clear in the then-prevalent adage 'coloniser, c'est transporter' (Bézy 1957: 91). As was discussed in chapter 4, Belgian colonialism—governing the colony from a distance—hinged crucially on the external imposition and development of a sophisticated infrastructural apparatus making possible the administration of colonial order, the governing of the population at an aggregate level, and exports of crucial minerals. Because colonial policy stipulated that 'the Congolese transport system is uniquely destined to assure the exporting of products' (*ibid*: 78, translation by author), the projection of infrastructural power was not equally spread out but concentrated around expatriate populations, important resources, and vital nodes in the export grid.

As chapter 5 argued, dozens of World Bank funded infrastructure projects did nothing but entrench the extraverted topography of Zaïre's infrastructure. Even more radically, what remained of the colonial infrastructural apparatus in Congo was almost entirely disassembled. While the Belgians left Congo in 1960 as a country hard-wired in terms of infrastructure, Mobutu's rule left much of the material infrastructure of the country disintegrated. Yet while the overall infrastructure in the country is gone and the 'few available means of public or private transport are mobbed', still, Mobutu was able to make sure that 'mining activities account for half of the rail traffic and one-third of the river traffic' (World Bank 1991: 2). With the defaulting of debt and the withdrawal of external financial support, this system fell apart. The retreat of the Mobutist elite as an obligatory passage point mediating between international and domestic political-economic networks meant that individual military-commercial entrepreneurs set up linkages across borders, further propelling the disintegration of Mobutu as a key interlocutor for international sources of revenue and legitimacy (McNulty 1999; Wamba dia Wamba 1997). This hailed in a period where multinational corporations interested in minerals could—or needed to—renegotiate access with individual military entrepreneurs, including those of Mobutu's FAZ.⁶⁹

The two Congo Wars, between 1997 and 2003, entailed the further destruction of what was left of the material infrastructure in the country. Congo—two-

⁶⁹ See (Reno 1997: 48) for an example.

thirds the size of Western Europe—currently only has around 3000 km of paved roads (Bynens & Taylor 2012: 4). According to a recent World Bank report on infrastructure in Congo:

‘The Democratic Republic of the Congo faces what is probably the most daunting infrastructure challenge on the African continent. ... Road and rail infrastructure are in dilapidated condition, and the rail network has fallen into disuse. ... The DRC’s infrastructure backbones have yet to form a national network.’ (Foster & Benitez 2011: 1 & 5)

Often not the result of direct violence, infrastructure is swiftly overtaken by plant growth outside of urban hubs (Commission Lutundula 2006: 4). The Congolese transport infrastructure network once connected the different parts of the country—together with the Belgian-constructed railway and the waterway over the river—today it is nearly impossible to reach Goma from Kinshasa, traversing the great Equatorial rainforest. People have turned to walking with bicycles loaded with goods as the main means of logistics on what used to be the country’s main roads (cf. Minten & Steven 1999). For a Ministry of Mining official a visit to a single mining site to levy taxes can take up to five days on foot through the jungle.⁷⁰ Due to the absence of infrastructures, the Congolese territory is not an integrated national territory—as the World Bank citation above already indicated—but is rather ‘balkanized’. Additionally, the effects of infrastructural disassembly might have been the most lethal aspect of the Congo Wars, as the vast majority of deaths are due to the destruction of health infrastructure and logistics for food supplies (Turner 2007: 3). Thus, what a specialist study calls ‘material violence’ had a larger effect on (excess) mortality among Congolese in the conflict than direct physical violence (Van Herp, Rackley, Parqué & Ford 2003: 152).

The near complete collapse of the infrastructural mediation of political ordering—the capacity to project power and govern from a distance—set the stage for the kind of informally networked ‘state building’ that political and economic entrepreneurs—Kabila comprised—would adopt given these infrastructural constraints (cf. Nest 2002a: 39). That is, as Mobutu before him, Kabila and other elite figures could only accrue wealth by discharging operations involving technological infrastructures to the foreigners who offered the highest benefits. Rather than a total disconnection, the infrastructures in place remained pivotal in the post-Mobutu period. Given that the aggregate infrastructural topography of the DRC still follows the specific, extraverted, pattern imposed during colonial rule, colonial infrastructures still constitute a critical means of economic accumulation for contemporary political regimes in Congo, depending as it does on rentiering of mineral exports (cf. Moore 2004: 306). However, because the infra-

⁷⁰ Source: participation in one such effort, Province Orientale, 2011

structural network of the *voie nationale* that forced mineral exports through the obligatory governmental passage point of Kinshasa to the port of Matadi has disintegrated over the last decade (Foster & Benitez 2011: 10), mineral exports are now effectuated through regional transport corridors that move minerals directly from mining areas to ports across the border—inherently weakening Congolese governmental control and taxation revenues.

The chaos of the Congo Wars meant an opportunity for—often junior—mining firms to try their luck at diamond and gold concessions via connections to regional warlords (Kennes 2000). Just as the postcolonial moment had meant increasing control of opaque transnational networks of private investors over Congo's mineral resources and control over the infrastructures to export those (Wolfe 1962), so, too, did the Congo Wars hail in the involvement of shady networks of offshore investors, and both regional and subnational economic and military entrepreneurs.

Important for the purposes of our analysis, the contracts concluded by Kabila, regional power brokers, and the managers of public mining enterprises during the war years privatized away many key infrastructures in Congo's mining sector. They were mostly joint venture contracts between foreign corporations—speculative off-shore entities with hardly any financial or technical expertise—and the corporate entities that Congolese entrepreneurs created for the occasion. The contracts involved in this mass-dissolution of public enterprises never made mention of any transfer of ownership or repayment for physical assets—infrastructural technologies such as the mining equipment, buildings, and indeed technical specifications of the mining deposits—and which were thereby silently privatized and internationalized away from the Congolese state (Commission Lutundula 2006: 92). In a hurry to accrue profits, the foreign investors made use of the existent infrastructure to exploit—without any feasibility study or government oversight—the easily accessible and concentrated mineral deposits. Often conflicts surged because the same physical deposits had been sold to different investors by different Congolese entrepreneurs.

The reordering of the mineral economy was not entirely bereft of infrastructural conduits. It even increased the centrality of the few remaining infrastructural lines—as during the later Mobutu era—that persisted. For example, the SNCC (*Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer du Congo*) was a pivotal—still partially functioning—infrastructure of extraversion facilitating the often illegal export of Katanga's minerals through the Southern corridor traversing Zambia, Zimbabwe to the port of Durban in South Africa (ibid: 95). Additionally, as Denis Tull puts it (2003: 434), 'RCD simply took charge of the administrative apparatus it found in place', entangling it into its own infrastructure of exploitation, including financial institutions, military logistical support privatized for the occasion

into trucking and airline companies (Koyame & Clark 2002: 210; cf. UN 2001). These logistical chains cross-cut the formal/informal and civil/military divides and built on informal networks from the Mobutu period; Samset (2002) suggests that the war can be interpreted as the *mise-en-place* of politico-economic ordering patterns that would survive the war, exactly by establishing connections to governance networks and patterns that pre-date the war.

Privatization & internationalization of Congo's critical infrastructures

In order to understand the contemporary spatial correlation between private security and infrastructure in the DRC, it is important to look at recent international dynamics in infrastructural governance that work on the country. While, as we have seen, infrastructure in the DRC has always been a matter of foreign capital and control, precipitated by the aggressive dismantling of parastatals under structural adjustment programs in the 1980s, infrastructure development in Congo and elsewhere has become a global market. The main rationale of the increasing privatization and internationalization of infrastructure governance is economic, and the argument is that participation of corporate and developmental partners leads to increasing and more cost-efficient infrastructural development and maintenance (Kerf & Smith 1996). Indeed, the World Bank's message has consistently been to 'manage infrastructure like a business, not a bureaucracy' to spur macroeconomic growth (1994: 2).

Private sector infrastructure investment in Congo is about 200 million USD annually, compared to around 50 million USD in official external finance for infrastructure development (Foster & Benitez 2011: 25). By the end of Congo Wars, the Congolese government and the World Bank recognized that the DRC—while having been split politically during the war—was still split infrastructurally, and engaged in some efforts aimed at the 'physical reunification' of the country (World Bank 2007: 2) through multisectorial programs that essentially envision rebuilding the colonial *voie nationale* (ibid; see Pourtier 2009: 43 for critical discussion). The aggregate tendency is that of public-private partnerships (PPP's) in infrastructure development, ownership and management, whereby the Congolese government is the 'silent partner' because it lacks both expertise and technological means (cf. Zawdie & Langford 2002: 166).⁷¹ A prime example is the recent


⁷¹ This tendency has gone so far that infrastructure development in Africa has become a significant global investment magnet, particularly so since the infrastructure boom in China is slowing down, meaning that vast swaths of global infrastructure funds and Chinese infrastructure developers are now liberated. Africa's dearth of infrastructure makes it an attractive investment opportunity; the fact that such investments are backed up by government participation—often under auspices of international financial institutions—makes it relatively safe investments. See (Foster et al 2009) for discussion.

effort by the Congolese government at reintegrating the country by restoring the *voie nationale* called ‘*Réunification de la RDC par la voie routière*’ (RRR). Incapable to muster the financial resources to put in place such a vast infrastructural development effort itself, the Congolese government invites international donors to fund and build small sections of the overall envisioned transport infrastructure network. Of particular significance is the—still pending—SICOMINES resource-for-infrastructure swap, whereby China rolls out infrastructural export routes in Congo for a value the equivalent of its mineral exports from Congo (cf. Jansson 2013). These efforts all illustrate to which degree Congo’s infrastructure is extraverted and internationalized.

Not covered by the mainstay of studies on infrastructure privatization—which focus on public utility infrastructures—is the fact that large multinationals operating in sub-Saharan Africa—most notably in the extractives sector—rely less on public infrastructures but engage in forms of ‘total logistics’ in which they themselves develop and control private infrastructure assemblages for their entire production or commodity chain (cf. African Union 2011; Debie 2001; Ozawa 2008; Schwartz, Hahn, & Bannon 2004; UNDP 2011). They often do not themselves manage infrastructures but control them through networks of subcontractors, to a large degree because of a rationalization of activities across the board of different international actors entailing insourcing of core activities and outsourcing of support functions (Cancian 2008: 81). Subcontractors run private electricity generators and maintain private roads; build compounds from scratch and often establish internal satellite communication networks (Eifert, Gelb, & Ramachandran 2008).

Infrastructures in Congo are concentrated largely on two axes of the ‘central margins’ (Raeymaekers 2009) of the country: Kinshasa-Matadi in the West, around Goma in the East, and in Katanga in the South-East. Not incidentally, these nodes constitute the critical infrastructure of mineral exports from the country. They are home to large mining companies that maintain their own local infrastructural presence—both in terms of transport connectivity, buildings, energy supply, and telecommunications—and are linked to oceans by three main regional infrastructural arteries: the Northern and Central transport corridors in the East, and the Southern corridor to Durban in South Africa (Foster & Benitez 2011: 14, see Figure 7 below). That is, rather than a national transport network, Congo’s infrastructure starts near the border and continues outwards to ocean ports—a radically extraverted infrastructural topography.

Figure 7. Map of Congo’s regional transport corridors



Source: UN Logistics Cluster 2012

Besides corporations, development organizations—whether IO or NGO—also increasingly bring with them and develop their own infrastructures in order to create ‘humanitarian corridors’ or construct ‘humanitarian space’—infrastructure development figures firmly as the groundwork for comprehensive stabilization missions (Pettit & Beresford 2005). Exemplified by the multidonor I4S stabilization program for the DRC (SSU 2014), official external infrastructure financing in the DRC is lodged within international stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Like foreign corporations, humanitarian organizations have largely adapted to infrastructural absences as a natural condition by structurally providing for their own infrastructure—and bypassing the public (absence of) infrastructure by privatized air travel.

The infrastructural map of Congo thus reveals to a large extent where foreigners are to be found—in and by themselves a proxy for where politically vital formal governance processes are concentrated in Congo. While the main rationale for this tendency is economic, its political significance is vast. The key point I want to derive from this discussion is that as a result of the increasing privatization of infrastructure, infrastructure is no longer exogenous to the operations of international actors in the DRC. Rather, because infrastructure governance is consolidated in international networks, it forms an integral part of the agency of international actors to the extent that it constitutes infrastructural power: a heightened capacity to project power and effectuate governance over a

distance. Technological infrastructures are then not the neutral physical background of governance but an expression of, and conduits for, transnationalized political ordering processes.

Private security companies and critical infrastructure protection

If since the 1980s governance of infrastructures across national borders in Africa became increasingly consolidated within networks of international actors, since the end of the Cold War security governance of those infrastructures has undergone a similar privatization and internationalization. Interviews corroborate that, in fact, the core market PSC aim at accessing in the DRC and the broader subcontinent has come to be constituted by the respective national ‘critical infrastructures’.⁷² Such infrastructures typically comprise sea- and airports, banks, export processing zones, embassies, telecommunications, oil, gas, electricity and core mining installations—key technological zones where government revenue is generated. Security managers explain this consistent focus by pointing out that infrastructure development and maintenance is capital-intensive, indicative of a durable commitment, and therefore involves international and as a consequence more reliable clients—very different, it is often added, from a situation in which infrastructures would be managed by African parastatals.⁷³ While private security companies consider international organizations (governmental and non-governmental) a distinct category of clients, they are quick to emphasize that these are very similar because they also rely on their own infrastructures and are often in charge of critical infrastructure governance.

The securitization of infrastructures has become aggravated by the fact that part of the private security companies operating in the country are global and that means their local security management practices build on ideas and insights from other locations that circulate through the different contexts in which they operate (cf. Hönke 2013). As discussed in chapter 2, the focus on ‘critical infrastructure protection’ among security governance experts itself took a flight in OECD countries after 9/11, when they became aware of both the centrality of technological infrastructures for economic globalization and political order and the entangled fragility of both.

Interviews with security managers of PSC and the transnational corporations that operate in the DRC indicate that the critical infrastructure protection paradigm has permeated their perceptions of, and structures their practices around,

⁷² Source: interview national PSC manager DRC, May 2011.

⁷³ Source: interviews in London, Johannesburg and Kinshasa.

security, even if terrorism is no evident threat. This is in part explainable by the post-9/11 securitization of weak states and volatile environments in Africa in western policy discourses (e.g. Bachmann 2012; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007: 17). Its effect is that PSC have specialized in providing and maintaining valuable, capital intensive, infrastructural assets.⁷⁴ Technological infrastructure is considered to require extra protection and care in the DRC, something circularly reinforced by the constraints intrinsic in the general lack of infrastructure. This both refers to the fact that technologies are thus prone to theft but owners also jealously guard their materials because spare parts and maintenance equipment is both scarce and difficult to import and therefore costly.⁷⁵ Additionally, as one security manager pointed out,⁷⁶ it has historically been exactly this topography, consisting of agglomerations of internationalized infrastructures, that has consistently been targeted during riots throughout Congo's tumultuous history, symbolizing as it does a mix of illegitimate intervention, contested accumulation, and undemocratic political order.

The emphasis on stabilizing infrastructure is so large within the private security sector that, as the CEO of one private security company operating across the subcontinent argued, we should not even call their service 'private security'. This is due to the fact that because PSC in Congo can offer elaborate services such as compound construction and maintenance, intelligence gathering, risk advisory channels and logistical support, long-time industry figures prefer simply calling it 'contracting'.⁷⁷ From that perspective, PSC provide what Sassen (1991) identifies as 'producer services', that is, a mix of logistics and infrastructure protection services that make core business operations in a wide variety of environments possible. PSC are themselves eager to conform to this image. 'In fact', the CEO continues, 'we like to see ourselves as *part* of the critical infrastructure of our clients'. What he emphasizes is that critical infrastructure protection presupposes a merger between logistical and security expertise in intertwining critical support services for operations in volatile environments. This merger is indeed reflected in the architecture of the 'construction sites' of international governance in the DRC and the broader subcontinent. As we will see in subsequent chapters, not only embassies but also humanitarian operation sites and mining camps demonstrate an aggregate tendency towards 'bunkerization' (cf. Appel 2012; Duffield, 2010; Hönke 2013; Pingeot 2012). This is in part explainable by the fact that all types of international actors in the DRC increasingly make use of the same logistical contractors that have gained experience and size during interventions in

⁷⁴ Source: explicit for instance on the PSC OSS's website, now defunct (visited 2010)

⁷⁵ Source: interviews with mining community & logistics experts in Congo, 2010.

⁷⁶ Source: interview with mining security manager in Ituri, Dec. 2010

⁷⁷ Interview PSC CEO, London, April 2011

Afghanistan and Iraq (Delevingne 2008). By using military strategies of bunkerization, as Derek Warby of the PSC G4S Risk Management puts it, PSC

‘provide a secure space in which (clients) feel free and safe to make business-critical decisions. That ‘space’ is both physical and time-defined. We help clients protect their assets – personnel first but also buildings, plant, product, revenue as well as intangibles such as reputation and the timeliness of product delivery.’ (cited in African Review of Business and Technology 2007)

As such, G4S offers clients ‘Integrated Security Services’ that not only comprise clearly security related tasks such as guarding, but also other logistical and maintenance tasks that serve to upkeep the valuable infrastructure for its clients. Another PSC, the Congolese Graben Security, explicitly distinguishes between the ‘social’ security it provides and ‘technical’ security, that is, maintenance of technical systems.⁷⁸ Thus, while (secure) operating space is the main ‘product’ of private security, the ‘referent object’ is the critical infrastructure that allows for the production of that space.

Importantly, the consistent involvement of private security companies in infrastructure protection implies a spatial focus very different from the statist/territorial one, because security concerns scale up from the localized security issues in individual national territories, towards transboundary security of the infrastructural assemblages themselves. As an example that will be explored further in the next chapter, a large mining company in Congo has a spatial vision of security that comprises a logistical chain across a narrow stretch of territory within three countries towards Mombasa in Kenya, and prefers to use one private security company for the entire transport corridor (just as it prefers regional harmonization of regulation and taxation).⁷⁹

While international actors often own and manage key infrastructures in Congo, ‘critical infrastructure’ also remains a political construct, indicating the ‘governed interdependencies’ (Weiss 1995) between governments and large international actors owning or managing critical infrastructures. The two spheres of internationalized activity where PSC concentrate—mining and the humanitarian community—constitute in large part the main ‘formal’ sources of state revenues in the DRC. Katanga is at the heart of the mining economy, which makes up 90% of Congo’s exports and the majority of Congolese tax receipts, and accounts for nearly 15% of Congo’s GDP, or around USD 150 million (Jones 2014).⁸⁰ When it comes to the many gold mining operations in the northeast of the country, there

⁷⁸ Source: interview with CEO and website.

⁷⁹ Source: interview with mining camp manager, Province Orientale, November 2011.

⁸⁰ This figure is highly contestable; much more money circulates in the industrial mining economy, yet is underreported. See, for a stunning example, (Umpula & Amisi 2012).

are currently over USD 3 billion worth of Canadian mining assets alone involved in such technological zones (Abadie, 2011; CCSHC, 2009), and FDI in mining exploration is expanding, accounting for the spectacular 8,5% growth rate of the Congolese economy in 2013 (IMF 2014). These concentrations of capital-intensive technologies reside in spatially bounded entities, such as the mining compounds dispersed through the Equatorial rainforest of Province Orientale.

Half of Congo's annual government budget of around USD 4 billion comes from external assistance,⁸¹ and MONUSCO alone—with its staff concentrated largely in Kinshasa and Goma—is good for USD 1.4 billion for 2013.⁸² MONUSCO is also one of the single largest consumers of private security in the DRC: it employs 1.191 guards, rising to 2.000 if one takes the whole UN.⁸³ As such, PSC concentrate spatially around those spheres of activities involving formal foreign actors and high concentrations of infrastructure and capital. Not incidentally, the deployment of the colonial security force—*Force Publique*—also followed the topography of colonial infrastructures, concentrating around these nodes in the colonial landscape where assemblages of colonial administration, concessionary companies, and technological infrastructures clustered (see Figure 5 on p. 80).

In sum, infrastructure in Congo has become securitized across civil and military, for-profit and non-profit fields of practice. For example, while corporations see the effect of volatility on logistics in terms of a threat to profits and a slow-down in economic globalization (Engelhard & Böhm, 2013: 170), humanitarian organizations see it as a threat to humanitarian space and an impediment to aid delivery (Bruderlein & Gassmann 2006). This has, in effect, entailed the progressive development of integral approaches to infrastructural security of the operations of international actors in the DRC, irrespective of the nature of the actor or, for that matter, the specific security dynamics of the context of operation. To illustrate with an example that will be further explored in the next chapter, the gold mining company AngloGold Ashanti organizes security in Congo according to a regime that is the same for all its sites of operation across the world. In military terms, the securitization of technological infrastructure in the DRC has become elevated from the level of tactics—deployed in a targeted, case-by-case, problem-solving fashion—to the strategic—or structural—level.

If, the argument follows, the topography of private security companies clusters around technological infrastructures that make extraversion possible, then by extension the role of private security companies in relation to the transformation of political order in Congo can be understood as the maintenance of an

⁸¹ CIA Factbook 2012 estimate. Also see (Development Initiatives 2013; Dizolele 2010).

⁸² Source: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/facts.shtml> (last visited 20-1-2014)

⁸³ Source: interview UNDSS, Kinshasa, 2012.

infrastructurally mediated extraverted political ordering patterns. This means analyzing private security companies as part of an assemblage of critical infrastructure security, maintenance and logistics that are increasingly the same for all large western institutional actors in the DRC, irrespective of their functional differentiation. Yet different from the agenda of critical infrastructure protection dominant in OECD countries, which hinges crucially on securing processes considered key to *domestic* political order, private security companies in the DRC secure the critical infrastructure of extraversion—that is, the infrastructures critical for internationalized governance processes, catering to control by networks of international actors and Congolese political elites. What this points to is the progressive disembedding of the DRC’s critical infrastructures from the domestic political order and their reimbedding in an international, privately secured, political order. And rather than covering the whole of the DRC’s territory, this order is circumscribed within the spatial confines of the topography of internationalized ‘construction sites’. As will be explored in subsequent chapters, the most important problem is that this ‘international order’ is locally highly controversial and contested because most Congolese affected by it do not perceive to reap any benefits from the privately secured construction sites of international governance in their territory.

Internationalized ordering through local dis-ordering

The above discussion, based as it is on interviews with security managers and international actors making use of private security, suggests that the privatized topography of infrastructure is a disembedded, discrete, ordering pattern that is detached from the surrounding ‘ungoverned zones’ that make up the volatile environments in Congo. However, my research on the ground suggests that in practice this is not entirely the case. In particular, there are three ways in which these political ordering patterns are thoroughly intertwined with the socio-political fabric of the DRC: weaving ‘public’ security forces into private security arrangements; discharging engagement with rebel movements by subcontracting logistics; and strategizing informal ties of formal private security companies. Taken together, these formal and informal ‘risk management’ strategies allow international actors to maximize leverage and profitability stemming from the high risks involved in operating in Congo, while minimizing accountability. It does this at the same time as it reproduces a distinction between ‘local’ Congolese ‘disordered’ spaces and international actors as external to them who reside in internationalized ‘ordered’ spaces.

Weaving public security forces into private security arrangements

The first way this is achieved has to do with a crucial difference in the role of infrastructure between countries as Congo and OECD countries: critical infrastructure benefits a radically different social group. Where in OECD countries critical infrastructure is critical for a political order in which large segments of society participate in the use of and reliance on these infrastructures, in Congo critical infrastructures cater nearly exclusively to the 'governed interdependence' (Weiss 1995) between the political regime in Kinshasa and private international actors (cf. Schouten 2011b). To the degree that the regime in Kinshasa depends for revenue and legitimacy on international actors' exploitation of these infrastructures, they can be understood as the critical infrastructures of an extraverted political order. Because the regime in Kinshasa and regional civil and military authorities depend on revenues from such extraverted 'pockets of productivity' (Leonard 2008), the formal (and informal) presence of the DRC state is concentrated in and around the topography of critical infrastructures (cf. Nest 2002b). This means that the Congolese government officials attempt to maximize participation in revenue sharing of infrastructural nodes' of productivity through formal and personal relationships, thus attempting to become obligatory passage points for the functioning of transnationalized governance (Kuditschini 2008; cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007; Ramachandran, Gelb, & Shah 2009: 38-39).

This is reflected in the formal institutional governance of critical infrastructures in Congo. Critical infrastructures are not completely privatized but rather formally structured in PPP's; such nodes are not completely privately secured but rather secured by assemblages of private security companies and state security forces. Indeed, in the DRC, 'the private security sector cannot be seen separately from the national security services, especially not in a sector that is of national economic and strategic importance such as the mining industry' (De Goede 2008: 59). Congolese public security forces are also part of security assemblages around critical infrastructures, and surrounding populations are often *a priori* precluded from entering the secured zones containing critical infrastructure. This intertwining of public and private security forces takes different shape in around urban and remote internationalized infrastructures in Congo.

In urban hubs—most notably Kinshasa, Goma, and Lubumbashi—the entanglement of private and public security is institutionalized through the guarding service of the Congolese police (*Police Nationale Congolaise*, PNC). Interviews indicate that in the year 2000, this service consisted of 150 policemen in Kinshasa; a year later it grew to 500 agents, institutionalized in a separate *batallion de*

garde with a separate camp (Camp Mobutu).⁸⁴ In 2001, guarding services of the PNC had already expanded so much that the batallion had grown into a *brigade de garde* of 2000 policemen.⁸⁵ By 2013, in Kinshasa, there are over 8,000 PNC guards in 3 brigades de garde, each headed by a separate general, while North Kivu, for instance, is home to a *batallion de garde* of approximately 600 PNC.⁸⁶ While these guarding sections of the Congolese police are institutionalized in practice, recent versions of the law governing the police do not make mention of this service, leading some—even within the Congolese police—to conclude that this service is in fact unlawful.⁸⁷

In practice, international clients rely on an institutionalized mix of PSC and PNC guards, and PSC need to have ‘special ties’ to particular influential PNC figures to facilitate efficient protection for their clients. For instance, the private security company Delta Protection has French management composed of former French police who were involved in training their ‘own’ section of the nascent PNC, the PIR (*Police d’Intervention Rapide*), which is arguably more disciplined and better equipped than other branches of PNC. As historical ties remain, Delta now has a privileged relation to the PIR, offering their services as a unique selling point in private security contracts.⁸⁸

In the remote mining regions of Province Orientale, where the *brigade de garde* does not formally exist, the intertwining of public and private security around internationalized infrastructures takes a different shape. As will be discussed in the next chapter, from fieldwork and interviews in Province Orientale, it appears there is a structural tendency for mining corporations to maintain a few dozen of armed police just outside of the main premises. Field research indicates that, additionally, some mining corporations have reached a—financially mediated—‘agreement’ with the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) to deploy on strategic locations around the private infrastructural network mining corporations.

This arrangement is most institutionalized in the case of Kibali Goldmines in Haut Uele, where FARDC are stationed around technological infrastructures—both machineries and road networks—throughout the concession, and are integrated into the paramilitary hierarchy of the Israeli-run private security firm that secures Kibali’s operations (Matthysen, Hilgert, Schouten, & Mabolia 2012: 36). The Israeli PSC and logistics company is able to ‘facilitate’ gold mining operations in the northeast of Congo because of direct ties to the high military strata

⁸⁴ Source: interview with security sector consultant, Kinshasa, September 2011

⁸⁵ Source: interview with Brigade de Garde Police commander, Kinshasa, September 2011

⁸⁶ Source: interview with PNC commander, Goma, December 2010

⁸⁷ Source: interviews with police officers, Kinshasa, September 2011

⁸⁸ Source: interviews, Kinshasa 2011.

around president Kabila. In Kinshasa it is common knowledge among security experts which of the national or local private security companies are owned by which army or police general, meaning that much security personnel will be soldiers without uniform. A review of sources indicates the same holds for the MIBA diamond mines where a security apparatus consisting of 300 armed police and 1.000 industrial guards was managed and surveilled by OSS's (Overseas Security Services) approximately 30-60 all expat employees and the ANR (Congolese secret service) (Amnesty International 2002a; 2002b: 8). According to reports, the ruthless approach of OSS—and the significant difference made by their introduction of security technologies such as body scanners (De Goede 2008: 49)—did, however, manage to reduce financial losses substantially (Renauld 2005: 14), reestablishing not only a certain—albeit controversial—distance between the informal and transnational formal mining economies, but also a flow of mineral revenues to the Kabila regime.

In sum, the larger looming issue here is that formal security privatization is a way for Congolese political elites to actually increase their control over pivotal spheres of activities and strategic resources by privatizing economic activities away from political contenders (Schouten 2011b; cf. Hibou 2004: 5; Hönke 2010: 117). NGO and mining operations not only apportion important resources directly to central government (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2009): by laying out infrastructure, they extend political and economic control over territories where the government hitherto had only a weak presence.⁸⁹ In that sense, business and humanitarian space are also political spaces, infrastructurally extending the hand of the state. Echoing observations Abrahamsen and Williams make for other contexts (2011), private security assemblages do not necessarily weaken, but rather reconfigure, political order, reinforcing regime interests in privately secured international investments ('archipelago state formation').

Discharging engagement with rebels by subcontracting logistical chains

The second way in which internationalized ordering patterns are simultaneously disentangled from, and thoroughly entangled with, local political (dis)orders has to do with the subcontracting of logistical chains by western actors in the DRC. As indicated, international actors control transnational logistical chains through networks of subcontractors. In many cases in Congo—particularly for companies relying on 'market access' and thus nation-wide distribution chains for profits—these subcontracting networks mean that ultimately, local entrepreneurs are responsible for high-risk logistical operations in volatile environments. They then

⁸⁹ See (Johnson 2003: 146ff) for the same principle in (South) Sudan.

bear the brunt both of material damages inherent in navigating regions where transport infrastructure is most notable for its absence and of navigating the choreography of checkpoints where different security networks engage in often illicit taxation.

The advantages for multinationals of this strategy of governing by ‘discharge’—by relaying responsibility to other actors (Hönke & Müller 2012; Veit 2010)—are threefold. First, they retain private control over the whole logistical chain. Second, by outsourcing to local contractors, they can ‘squeeze contracts’ as one corporate manager active in Congo put it in an interview,⁹⁰ meaning they can maximize profit for services that do not conform to international labor standards. Third, through subcontracting, they diffuse accountability for engagements that their activities entail with conflict actors. As an example, Heineken’s national subsidiary Bralima structurally paid logistics subcontractors money that these subcontractors needed to pay at rebel checkpoints, thus, in fact, contributing to the sustaining of disordering patterns and human rights abuses in the Eastern Congo (Miklian & Schouten 2013). As another example, many NGOs and humanitarian organizations in Goma hire lofty premises behind thick barb-wired compound walls from local businessmen and -women in order to disentangle from local security threats. Yet it is common knowledge in Goma that many of the premises concerned in prime locations are the property of regional warlords, often acquired to launder money gained through illicit mineral exports (Schouten 2011b).

Strategizing informal ties of formal private security companies

The third way in which the privately secured internationalized infrastructure is thoroughly intertwined with the local socio-political fabric in the DRC is through the private security companies engaged. This is evident if we follow the connections behind their local manifestation as security apparatus represented mainly by badly paid, uniformed, Congolese guards. While most international actors operating regionally as a rule employ transnational private security companies expecting to maintain a distance from local conflict networks, the private security companies that are most effective in volatile environments in Congo are thoroughly entangled with local political and conflict networks. As an example, the private security company Top S.I.G supplies security to Bralima, Soco Oil and other corporate clients operating in the most volatile zones of Congo. It is able to deflect problems for its clients by being entangled in regional conflict networks, in part by having the Congolese Armed Forces on the payroll; hiring different

⁹⁰ Source: interview in Province Orientale, November 2011

commanders of the Congolese Armed Forces in civilian; and by the fact that it is a subsidiary of the Ugandan Saracen, a South African mercenary network tied to Salim Saleh, a general involved in mineral smuggling and half-brother of president Museveni (cf. Kinsey 2006: 29), who has been accused repeatedly by the UN of illicit weapons-for-mineral trade through the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) in the DRC (UN 2001; 2012). The PSC CSS and First Security—see next chapter—have in common that they are respectively owned by individuals close to national political figures and military ones.⁹¹ Such PSC are thus able to create a secure, disconnected, space within which industrial relations of extraction can take place, by virtue of being profoundly *connected* to the many actors that might form security risks to mining operations themselves. A manager of one of the PSC mentioned explains it as follows:

'Our clients don't trust police and FARDC. But they need to be connected, both to community (for reliable information) and to armed forces (for intervention). Because they are operating in a zone rouge, mining clients also need connections to FARDC—it depends on relations: to be able to make a client's life easy, you need to have good relations.'⁹²

Observations of another national PSC manager—linked to particular high-placed generals in Kinshasa—seem to confirm that their unique selling point is their ability to manage relations towards 'unpredictable' local and national authorities.

'If you work in an environment such as this, you can sign your contracts, être en ordre avec les autorités, but then you need to go to the terrain. And there, you find perhaps rebels, perhaps FARDC people who aren't being paid by the authorities, local chiefs, same story. So if you want to work there, you have no choice: you need to be in order with these people. Need to find out what their needs are, and how to negotiate these. You need protection. So that is what we can do. We can manage that, create a good climate. Why choose us? We know all the officials, and we have all the logistical means.'⁹³

The private security sector also attests to the permeability of Congo's national borders by transnational security networks. The subsidiary structure of corporate networks allows Saracen to secure strategic interests of its Ugandan allies across the border into the DRC. More broadly, PSC in Congo are themselves global networks and are as internationalized and politicized as their clients. The Kenyan PSC, KK Security, one of the largest in the eastern DRC, largely employs Kenyan senior staff and secures logistical networks from the port of Mombasa to Congo.

⁹¹ Source: interview with PSC managers, Province Orientale, Dec. 2011

⁹² Source: interview with PSC manager, Kinshasa, 2012

⁹³ Source: Interview with PSC manager, Beni, 2011

The Lebanese-owned Delta Protection run by ‘Colonel’ Alain Timsit, a former French army figure and mercenary, caters mostly for French clients in Congo while ASCO, run by a bilingual Belgian, secures Heineken’s subsidiary Bralima, the Dutch Embassy, and a number of French-speaking clients. G4S, with British and South African management, is popular with Anglophone clients. Within the sector, it is understood that PSC management retain contact with the security and intelligence establishment of their respective embassies and home governments. As such, it is no secret that one PSC’s Israeli management is Mossad-affiliated, while ownership of that PSC is probably affiliated to Rwandese elites. On a regional level, Intersec—the ‘private’ security company of Chrystal Ventures, the holding company of Rwanda’s Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)—put in place armed guards around Rwandan-owned strategic assets in the Congolese territory they occupied. According to its director, Intersec left Congo in 1999,⁹⁴ yet a confidential source in the Rwandese security forces confided that this is only officially so,⁹⁵ and that Intersec still secures Rwandese interests in Bujumbura and Goma.

While present and former military and militiamen are banned by law from working in PSC, at least 15% of PSC guards in the region are estimated to have a background in Congolese rebel groups, a number that nearly doubles for such cities as Bunia, where conflict was ubiquitous at one point (also see Table 4 on p. 200).⁹⁶ For instance, Human Dignity in the World (HDW), originally an NGO involved in refugee camp management, demobilization and reinsertion of ex-combatants, began hiring them out as security guards and was recently forced to register as a PSC.⁹⁷ While employing former rebels constitutes a potential liability, it also guarantees informal ties to active rebel networks, allowing PSC to maintain up-to-date and in conversation with rebel networks.

As one PSC manager explained, by being associated to military hierarchies or the conflict actors that pose the most important threat, PSC can preempt and settle security issues before they reach the gates of the compound—without the client formally knowing.⁹⁸ Because private security companies are *private* subcontractors, lines of accountability and authority become diffused through opaque layers of confidential contracts, regulations, and codes of conduct. The advantage for international clients is that they can *claim* to be disconnected as a legal entity from local conflict networks in volatile environments, but in practice *effective* disconnection and security is only possible by being associated to con-

⁹⁴ Source: Interview, Kigali, 2012

⁹⁵ Source: interview with Rwanda National Police (RNP) commander, Nov. 2012

⁹⁶ Source: interviews conducted in Goma, Bunia, and Mongbwalu in November/December 2010

⁹⁷ Source: interviews with representatives from the respective PSC, Goma, November 2010

⁹⁸ Source: Interview in Goma, September 2012

flict networks in the right way—through powerful local intermediaries.⁹⁹ The goal of the private security managers is to become the exclusive intermediary and therefore obligatory passage point for their international clients; the central spokesperson for disorder in Congo, able to keep international clients behind their walls while they act on behalf of the company in relation to local authorities, whether administrative, traditional, or illicit. This reinforces the construction of international actors as external to what remain ‘difficult to understand’ local socio-political dynamics, reproducing lines of distinction between the local/dangerous and international/ordered. For international actors, this means they can choose to work with international PSC (with the benefit of adherence to global standards) and national ones (with the benefit of embeddedness and smoothed political connections). By being related to the ‘right’ general, clients are shielded from *other* predatory state representatives.¹⁰⁰ Conversely, this pattern—reproduced all over Congo—also allows political elite figures to maintain control over key sources of revenue from a distance (cf. Hönke 2010: 117).

Chapter summary

In sum, this chapter has shown the emergence of an ordering pattern in which the associations between the extraverted organization of coercive and infrastructural power are closer knit than ever in Congolese history. We see a radical privatization of the infrastructural and economic topography in Congo and, later, of the security arrangements around them. Yet the fact that both security and infrastructure were first part of state apparatus and are now private, doesn’t mean they are no longer political. The political topography of private security reveals a problematic spatial concentration of ‘volume’ in terms of infrastructures of rule and accumulation that reinforces a pattern of balkanization not readily perceived by most Congolese. In no way is this configuration now withdrawn from the grip of Congolese politics and subject entirely to the forces of the free market. Rather, having been liberated partially from a particular kind state control in Congo, they are subject to political forces *elsewhere*. The way Congolese elites have managed to have their interests represented by alliances to private actors most perfectly resembles the neoliberal dogma of a government that steers instead of rowing (e.g. Loader 2000). This is due to the deepening formalized privatization of both infrastructural arrangements of international actors in the DRC, and the privatization of security measures surrounding them. However, the privately secured topography of internationalized infrastructures is often thoroughly intertwined

⁹⁹ Source: interview with PSC manager, Kinshasa September 2012. In a similar instance, G4S was accused of using U.S. money to pay Afghan warlords to provide security for US military operations. See (Tiron 2010).

¹⁰⁰ See (Verweijen 2013) for same principle in relations between FARDC and regional commercial elites in the Kivus.

with the conflict and disordering patterns in Congo that the double privatization—of both infrastructure and the security thereof—was meant to disembed these operations from. In effect, international actors govern in Congo through ‘discharge’, engaging in an updated form of indirect rule that was typical for the way the indigenous order was governed through intermediation of the chiefs by the Belgian colonial administration. In both cases, international actors governed through the local socio-political fabric, yet in ways that ultimately allowed them to (plausibly?) deny entanglement with, and responsibility for, the violence and abuses that were entailed by their operations. As such, it reinforces the construction of a pattern wherein international actors appear politically external to the very fabric of Congolese society, economy and politics with which they are so deeply entangled.

Exploring the way in which private security companies co-constitute political order in the DRC in relation to the internationalized governance processes discussed requires taking a closer look at the way the ‘content’ of these processes—international relations of extraction and humanitarian intervention—relate to the externalization of state formation in the DRC. While this chapter has focused on the private security sector in relation to the aggregate distribution of coercive and infrastructural power in the DRC, the next two chapters separately delve into the entanglement of private security companies into two governance processes that have been central to Congolese political order since the Belgian colonial administration: the extractive economy and governance of the population.

7

Private security companies and industrial gold mining in Province Orientale

Introduction

The previous chapter showed how the private security sector has since its inception been linked to the Congolese mining sector. Understanding how private security companies co-constitute political order in Congo due to their involvement in the re-emergent transnational mining industry entails exploring how PSC are imbricated in ordering processes that lodge Congo's mineral wealth within internationalized economies. This thesis has hitherto shown how the way that the Congolese extractive economy has been constituted as part of international governance patterns has historically involved varying entanglements of coercive and infrastructural power. This chapter extrapolates this to the present and aims at exploring how the intertwining of both forms of power entangle in contemporary internationalized processes of re-ordering the Congolese gold mining economy. The point is to inquire how private security companies aid in disentangling gold from an artisanal extractive order, to constitute it as a commodity with attachments to a different circuit of people and technologies at different locations across the globe, in the process redistributing wealth and power. As such, it provides an in-depth exploration of the contemporary rearticulation of a historical pattern that dates back to the time Belgian concessionary companies started mediating the mineral extraction process through technological infrastructures—a process that is also observable in other mining zones of the DRC and with extractive industries in the wider subcontinent (see, for instance, Appel 2012; Ferguson 2006; Hönke 2013; Zalik 2004).

The industrial mining sector in context

The landscape of Province Orientale, which is as big as France, is dominated by Equatorial rainforest, the second largest in the world, alternated to the North and East by savannah. It possessed elaborate infrastructure once, but what used to be its main roads are now often no more than mud paths—there are only 100 km of paved roads, all in or around the provincial capital Kisangani (Congo Initiative 2011: 228). Province Orientale is deeply plugged into the global economy; it lies right in the path of a vast neo-Achaean greenstone belt stretching from Lake Victoria in Tanzania in the southeast to the Central African Republic in the northwest. Corresponding roughly to the Ituri and Haut-Uele districts, the Congolese gold reserves are thought to be the largest untapped ones along the belt, and probably in the world (HRW 2005: 14; Matthysen et al. 2012; cf. Yager 2012).

Colonial gold exploitation started in 1905 first near the colonial post of Kilo and a few years later in the valley of the Moto river in the present-day Haut-Uele district (Bakonzi 1982: 22). This gave rise to the denomination of ‘Kilo-Moto’ for the area and eponymous colonial exploitation company. Exploitation was already declining when Mobutu nationalized SOKIMO (*Société Minière de Kilo-Moto*) in 1966, turning it into OKIMO (*l’Office des mines d’or de Kilo-Moto*) (Fahey 2013: 24). Since Mobutu liberalized the mining sector in 1982, industrial production has ground to a near standstill. However, given technological innovations and rising gold prices on global markets, the goldmines of Kilo-Moto constitute a real potential for profitable industrial mining.

The artisanal gold mining sector

‘Ore’ literally means ‘unwrought metal’ and, according to the Congolese mining law (*Code Minier*), refers to any naturally occurring solid material from which an ‘economically valuable’ mineral can be extracted (RDC 2002: 33). The mining law categorizes the sector along three different modes of exploitation (the process by which unwrought metal becomes ‘worked’), distinguished and taxed differentially based on the degree to which the extraction of ores is mediated by industrial machinery: artisanal mining, small scale mining, and industrial mining.

The mining law reasons that some small deposits are not profitably explored industrially and can therefore be mined artisanally—and imposes a legal restriction on the kind of tools allowed to be used. An estimated 130.000 to 150.000 artisanal miners currently practice gold mining, of which about 10.000 have been involved in the Ituri War (Fahey 2011). This makes artisanal gold mining the most effective—albeit unplanned—large-scale Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) mechanism in the DRC, but also accounts for the pervasive negative association between artisanal miners and ‘conflict minerals’. Artisanal mining forms an economy in which slight advantages in tools makes a


significant difference; yet all leads to small nuggets or gold powder that will travel through many hands to one of the main gold trading hubs at the border—Ariwara, Bunia or Butembo—before being exported illicitly primarily to Kampala, where a few (mainly Indian) gold traders dominate the market (Fahey 2008; UN 2014).

To give an impression of the size of this economy, the NGO IPIS has calculated that an approximate 16 tons of gold is annually produced artisanally and illicitly exported (Matthysen et al. 2012: 58), equaling an approximate value of USD 600 million annually. One representative of the Ministry of Mines in Mambasa put it as follows: ‘here, it is really the mining that causes the circulation of money’.¹⁰¹ Yet the circulation of money resulting from artisanal relations of extraction is not formally tapped into by the accounting techniques of the Ministry of Mines. While regulatory dispositions stipulate that artisanal miners should operate with a license inside designated zones, in practice, the bureaucratic apparatus composed of the mining ministry, SOKIMO and SAESSCAM (*Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small Scale Mining*) do not enforce this, meaning that artisanal mining in Province Orientale is not subject to an aggregate governance mechanism (Fahey 2010). To phrase it in terms employed throughout this dissertation, artisanal gold mining is not an object of government that the Congolese state can act on from a distance. To contextualize, the approximately USD 600 million worth of artisanally mined gold annually exported amounts to four times the total that the DRC government annually receives in mining taxes (Jones 2014).

Yet artisanal mining does constitute some kind of extractive order (Van Puijenbroek & Schouten 2013). Gold mining is profoundly intertwined with the social, political and economic fabric of Province Orientale, and it is a highly dispersed process not bound to any specific site nor concentrated in the hands of few, but rather mediated by hundreds of thousands of artisanal miners, small traders, bureaucratic and political actors. In total, this artisanal mining economy supports approximately half a million people of the province’s population, providing a meager subsistence level income for most, while greater profits are accrued by gold traders in the border trade hubs and their military-political patronage networks (Kabemba 2013: 38).

Figure 8. Map of mining concessions in Province Orientale

¹⁰¹ Source: interview, Mambasa, 2011. The circulation of gold outward also engenders the circulation of consumption goods towards remote sites that would otherwise not have made it into the forest. Soap, salt, cigarettes, batteries and clothes are brought by the same networks of traders that take gold away (cf. Fahey 2008).



Source: Congolese Mining Cadastre dynamic online map of registered concessions (December 2013)

The industrial gold mining sector in Province Orientale

Province Orientale is considered ‘the last frontier’¹⁰² of gold mining in industrial mining circles—one of the last known unexploited gold deposits in the world. As Province Orientale has been relatively calm for a consecutive number of years and the DRC government has progressively liberalized and streamlined governance of the mining sector (Fahey 2010; Mazalto 2010), the province’s landscape is home to a gradually increasing number of mining concessions. The adjacent map (Figure 8), created by the Congolese Mining Cadastre with the help of international partners, shows all formally registered concessions. It shows that rather than a homogenous object, the extraction economy is a heterogeneous assemblage made up of a diverse range of concessions, including for exploration and exploitation, by industrial and small-scale mining entrepreneurs. As Figure 8 reveals, roughly one third of the total surface of Province Orientale is a mining concession of some sort and thus forms part of the assemblage making up the formal extractive economy.¹⁰³ It presents the mining sector as the Congolese government and international actors interested in formalizing the Congolese mining economy ‘see’ extractive order (cf. Scott 1998).

¹⁰² Formulation by camp manager of a mining company in Ituri, Nov. 2011

¹⁰³ The *Code Minier* grants ‘liberty of access for mining prospecting in the whole extension of the national territory’ (RDC 2002: 6).

However, there is a profound disconnect between the extractive order revealed in this map and the actual on-the-ground presence of mining actors. The fact that a license has formally been obtained does not mean an on-the-ground presence: nearly all concessions are either applications or exploration licenses. To complicate matters further, 99% of the artisanal miners do not hold official licenses, meaning that the informal extractive activities of over a hundred thousand miners are not visible on this map. This is highly significant as it constitutes the core of the problem that industrial mining companies face: while they have obtained a formal license to operate from the Congolese government, on the ground, gold is profoundly entangled—not only with the Congolese soil, but also with all sorts of socio-economic and political ordering processes that thoroughly embed gold in the local social fabric of the artisanal—and global—gold economy. That means that their core business activities—i.e. attempts to constitute this gold as an object within a formal extractive order through technologically mediated extraction—have implications that overflow their core business, and probably requires the displacement of thousands of artisanal miners.

While hundreds of companies are registered as concession owners, fieldwork revealed only a very limited presence on the ground of industrial mining companies. As of 2013, the following industrial gold mining companies have a physical presence in Province Orientale (cf. Kabemba 2013: 36):

- *AngloGold Ashanti*, which is involved in the Anglo Kilo Gold (AGK) project on the old concession #40 (Kilo) around Mongbwalu, Ituri (86% AGK, 14% SOKIMO) and is a silent partner in the Kibali Gold venture in the old concession #38 (Moto) around Durba, Haut Uele (AGK 45% Randgold 45% SOKIMO 10%);
- *Auris AG*, an exploration venture by the Swiss Klaus Eckhof (the former director of both Kilo and Moto Goldmines) on the border area between North Kivu and Ituri;
- The Canadian-incorporated exploration company *Kilo Goldmines*, located around Nia-Nia in Mambasa;
- The Canadian *Loncor Resources* is exploring around Nia-Nia in Mambasa, a venture by the owners of Banro;
- *Mwana Africa*, a UK-registered mining company prospecting in Aru for gold, while also investing in diamonds and copper in other provinces;
- *Wanga Mining Company*, a joint venture between Mineral Invest, a Swedish mineral resource development company and SOKIMO with a base camp in Wanga, located near the Kibali Gold concession (Fossberg 2013);

- *Moku-Beverendi*, an exploration venture of controversial investor Dan Gertler together with Klaus Eckhof;
- *Randgold Resources*, a UK-traded exploration company responsible for operations at the Kibali gold project.¹⁰⁴

Figure 9. Map showing international industrial mining companies in Province Orientale



Source: adaptation by author of image from Mineral Invest website

Figure 9 shows the spatial distribution of these companies in the province. The companies involved have a very limited physical presence on-site. This is partly because the goal of international industrial mining companies is exactly to reverse the dynamics inherent in artisanal mining, namely, limiting the number of people sharing in extraction and profits as much as possible by mediating the extraction process through technological infrastructures. A comparison of Figure 9 with maps of mining presence in the same area during colonial times (in Bakonzi 1982: 10 & 11) reveals that industrial mining companies today focus on exactly the same lodes that were previously explored by the Belgians. Current gold mining operations thus reflect the path beaten by mining investments during colonial times (Schouten 2011a: 12): contemporary gold mining operations in Province Orientale and elsewhere tend to be restricted within the pathways carved out by previous—colonial—operations of SOKIMO and other colonial

¹⁰⁴ Finally, there are non-gold extractives such as the Australian-incorporated *Rio Tinto*, which explores iron ore on concessions overlapping with those of Kilo Goldmines and the oil industry, comprising Tony Buckingham's *Heritage Oil* and *Oil of Congo* (a venture by Dan Gertler and family of South African president Zuma), both conducting explorations on the Graben rift, respectively on Lake Albert and the Virunga Park, bordering Uganda.

giants. However, because of the diversification in international infrastructural conduits connecting to gold exploration in Province Orientale, gold is acted upon from a much larger and more diffuse set of distant centers of power than in colonial times. During Belgian colonialism, the colonial administration explicitly configured the infrastructural apparatus to force minerals through a logistical chain to Brussels and the industrial processing plants at Hoboken so that the translation of ores into capital and political resources would be concentrated in the colonial metropole. Of late, the international gold market has undergone vast changes, meaning that apart from a few giants—such as AngloGold Ashanti—few mining corporations internally own the whole commodification chain from exploration to transformation and marketing of gold. Therefore, in most cases, gold mining is a heterogeneous and shifting assemblage in which it is not *a priori* determined in which smelter gold mined in Congo will be purified. Further, while China and India dominate as markets for gold, the marketization of gold is not confined to any preconfigured circuit.¹⁰⁵ Thus, we are witnessing a radical diversification of the internationalized locus of agency in the governance of Congolese gold.

Reordering gold

In order to understand how private security companies co-constitute political ordering patterns in Province Orientale, we first need to take a closer look at the process of gold mining. Industrial mining—the replacement of labor-intensive extraction methods with extraction through capital-intensive machines—is limited in Province Orientale to the extent that only one of the mining ventures mentioned, the Kibali Gold project, has moved into exploitation phase in 2013. This means that the main industrial mining activity currently taking place exploration—on which this chapter therefore focuses primarily.

I propose we can understand exploration as the process through which gold is ontologically extricated from the soil and inscribed as a discrete object for trade on world gold markets (cf. Frederiksen 2013; Scott 2008). It is a highly complex process involving a range of technological inscription devices that determine the size, location, and positioning of gold deposits (O'Callaghan 1993).¹⁰⁶ Gold explo-

¹⁰⁵ Source: interviews with exploration managers, Province Orientale, 2010–2011.

¹⁰⁶ Gold exploration is thus a prime example of a process of what Marxists call commodification and what economic anthropologists call marketization, that is, the constitution of gold as a very specific economic object (cf. Çalişkan & Callon 2009). Instead of 'extracted', it can be said minerals need to be 'disembedded', to echo Karl Polanyi's insistence on the work necessary to remove economic resources from their 'natural' attachments to pre-existent social relations. The semantic resonance goes further: according to Fred Block (2001: xxiv, n.10), Polanyi came up with the concept when researching the history of technology in British industrialization in relation to the extraction of coal, that was 'embedded in the rock walls of the mine' (Cf. Giddens 1990 for additional discussion on 'disembedding').

ration typically starts in Tervuren, Belgium, at the colonial geological archives of the Belgian Africa Museum. There, elaborate maps and production statistics of SOKIMO provide a detailed quantification and qualification of the probable deposits in the DRC. Interviews with geologists in Tervuren indicate that nearly all of the larger gold mining companies now active in Province Orientale have passed through Tervuren over the last decade.¹⁰⁷ A second step concerns a comparison of said maps to the registry of the Congolese *Cadastre Minier* (CaMi) to establish which gold deposits have not yet been registered as concessions. At the same time, more opaque associations need to be established. For one, in order to get a formal contract from the DRC government, mining companies have often to pass through informal gate keepers such as the late Katumba Mwanké (Boisbouvier 2012). While these do not have a high public profile they function as informal obligatory passage points connecting mining companies to key elite figures who can ‘facilitate’ formal contracts.¹⁰⁸

In principle, only now in the process of gold exploration is it necessary to visit the terrain—contrary to artisanal mining, which is not mediated by these forms of abstract knowledge and inscription, and has to start on the ground. It is very likely that artisanal miners occupy the site of exploration but the legal contract between international mining corporations and the DRC state trumps the claims to space by artisanal miners. Upon arrival, industrial miners are armed with legal devices for ‘dis-entangling sub-surface property rights from other claims’ (Majury 2013: 3) that institute power asymmetries *vis-à-vis* artisanal miners.

However, besides wild guesses based on antiquated colonial mappings, it is difficult to speak with accuracy about the gold. Gold coalesces as a mineable object through a systematic mapping of the location, positioning, and size of reefs and lodes.¹⁰⁹ This process is speculative and high-risk as it involves costly technologies of inscription such as mobile drilling equipment, and as such requires a substantial capital investment (see Figure 10).¹¹⁰ Despite their vast practical

¹⁰⁷ Source: interview with geologist at Tervuren, Oct. 2013. However, it is also possible that mining companies forego a visit to Tervuren and engage in prospecting, which concerns the rudimentary search for an indication of a mineral deposit.


¹⁰⁸ Source: interview with Congolese entrepreneur, Nairobi, 2013.

¹⁰⁹ This amounts first to the creation of a geological map of the area and the simultaneous identification of gold mineralization over the concession area by soil sampling. This rudimentary mapping lays the groundwork for the real technological core of the exploration process: a systematic three dimensional sampling of the gold bearing zones to produce a model of the topography of gold reefs within the concession, comprising data on length, depth, width, and grade of the gold-bearing zone. Pre-feasibility also concerns the accessibility of the lode in terms of soil composition.

¹¹⁰ A usual pre-feasibility exploration comprises the removal from the ground of vast amounts of samples. To give an example, AGK has spent years to take around 63.000 core samples out of the ground to map lodes at a number of sites in their concession. AGK sent part of those to South Africa for chemical analysis over a period of a few years. Source: interview with geologists, Ituri, Dec 2010.

knowledge of local gold mining, artisanal miners would understand very little if gold was presented to them as a block model, that is, after it has been translated by an industrial exploration company into an object of governance in the formalized extractive economy.¹¹¹

Figure 10. Model showing phases of industrial mining



Source: 'Life Cycle of a Junior Share', Bent Cook's Exploration Insights 2010

For some exploration companies, generating these vast amounts of technical data is the end-result. Such data represent more reliable information of a gold deposit, calling it into being as an entity potentially tradable on stock exchanges.¹¹² Exploration companies publish their mappings and elaborate descriptions of the results of their sampling online; either to put out shares to raise capital for exploitation of the gold, to speculate through hedging operations, or they put the concession up for sale to interested 'majors', i.e., senior companies specialized in production (see Figure 10 and Kennes 2005; Majury 2013: 2). The fact that the exploration economy hinges crucially on a process of translation mediated by technologies of inscription means that the exploration economy can expand and flourish without any physical minerals actually being removed from the Congolese soil (cf. Mitchell 2011: 139).

¹¹¹ This is illustrated by the fact that when AGK flew vast numbers of core samples out of Mongbwalu, it led to the conviction locally that AGK was already and illegally exporting gold. Source: interviews in Mongbwalu, Nov. 2011.

¹¹² However, the gold deposit is at this point not yet valuable. A deposit is only called 'ore' when the aggregate grade—concentration of gold—of a deposit is higher than the costs associated with mining and processing. A grade below this 'mine cutoff grade' means the deposit is considered 'waste'.

In sum, the process of capitalization of gold ore is essentially a process of qualification mediated by a range of complex technological inscription devices that translate dirt or rock bearing specs of gold invisible to the eye into numbers that are valued within specific centers of calculation; it is by adding technologies of inscription to human relations with gold that exploration companies become credible spokespersons for the aggregate object of gold to a specific audience, one that is not situated locally but in corporate headquarters of investors, banks, and shareholders across the world. Exploration then also involves the redistribution of expertise in Province Orientale engendered by disparities in inscription tools and other devices (cf. Mitchell 2002).

Gold exploration as technological zones

‘One often hears stock phrases citing Zaïre as a major producer of this mineral or that. What is often forgotten is that this is only one aspect of its mineral production. Other aspects include the control of production resources, transport facilities, and processing plant.’ (Depelchin 1992: 177)

As indicated in the previous section, according to the Congolese mining law, the capital-intensive technological infrastructures that mediate the gold mining process make the difference between artisanal and industrial mining. From the perspective of Congolese law, then, the difference between industrial and artisanal modes of extraction is infrastructural and does not reside on a normative level. And indeed, the goal of individuals belonging to the respective analytical categories is the same—turning gold into monetary accumulation by reducing the amount of taxing authorities along the trajectory from ore to global market as much as possible.¹¹³ In the balance between these competing modes of extraction, gold exploration concerns the projection of what has throughout this thesis been called ‘infrastructural power’.

To illustrate, when Kibali Gold started exploitation in 2013, they set in motion a vast assembly of machinery to transform ores into value added. Just to put the huge value of artisanal mining discussed above into perspective, a single industrial goldmine can yield USD 400.000 worth of gold daily (at 8 hours of work) and USD 12 million a month—meaning 4 simultaneous industrial mining pits would generate the same amount of gold (and money) as the whole of the

¹¹³ Just as artisanal miners hide their gold production from SAESSCAM, formal *comptoirs*, and the Ministry of Mines, so industrial mining ventures tend to register investments offshore to reduce Congolese taxes (Commission Lutundula 2006; EITI 2012). Indeed, recently, about \$88 million in missing taxes were pointed out (Hogg 2013). This means artisanal mining is not a different ‘moral economy’ from industrial mining (cf. Grätz 2009).

artisanal mining population of Province Orientale.¹¹⁴ Industrial mining thus means a significant compression of space and time relative to artisanal extraction, implying that vast concentrations of gold are forced through a narrow circuit involving very limited amounts of people—as opposed to the dispersed artisanal mining process, which hinges on vast amounts of labor and intermediaries involved in processing and trade.

Rather than external to such reordering efforts, technological infrastructures that are part of extractive assemblages constitute a central ‘actor’ making this reassembling possible. In continuity with the way in which the mining sector was governed under Mobutu (see chapter 5), in the technological zones of internationalized mining enclaves, ‘[t]o put it in Mann’s (1984) formulation, companies, not the state, exercise a tremendous amount of infrastructural power’ (Appel 2012: 441). Infrastructural power projection is a pivotal part of the international industrial mining sector in Province Orientale. As the Randgold Resources puts it,

‘As a gold mining company, we are frequently the major catalysts behind some vital infrastructure projects in the countries where we operate. These include power stations, roads, electrical lines, water and sanitation. Improved infrastructure provides the necessary foundation to supply our mines as well as driving economic growth for local communities.’ (2011: 83)

Now that Kibali Gold is building its opencast and underground mines, it is importing vast amounts of technological equipment at a rate of 120 trailers a week traveling 1.800 km from the port of Mombasa in Kenya (Le Bec 2013), marking only a slight departure from how Belgian colonial mining at Moto, as it was then called, was logistically organized (Roberts 1986: 549). More than just passive pre-existing ‘things’ that can be taken for granted, logistical technologies are critical infrastructure constantly at the core of concerns of mining companies and without which it would be impossible to assemble and trade gold from a distance. This is reflected in the observation by Kibali mine CEO Mark Bristow that Kibali’s first contribution to Congo’s development was infrastructural: ‘The first (milestone, red.) was to connect this region to the outside world’ (cited in Topf 2011). While framed and governed as a technical process, logistical techniques are a form of technopolitics (Hecht 2011). The equation of ‘connection’ in the above observation by Mark Bristow with connections mediated by western infrastructural apparatuses, is embedded in a logic in which extractive invest-

¹¹⁴ Industrial mining involves processing 600 to 800 tons of ore an hour (or 1.7 million tons a year) at a variable grade (in the DRC hovering on average between 2 or 3 g/t), meaning that an industrial mining operation yields around 1,2 kilograms of gold per hour, at a value of over USD 50.000 per kilo at 18 karats (Source: interview with Kilo Goldmines & Kibali Gold CEO, Ituri, December 2011). Randgold for instance expects to generate USD 24 million worth of gold in the first year of operation. Source: interview director Kibali Gold project, December 2011.

ments are an opportunity for governments of underdeveloped economies to ‘access emerging global networks of production, consumption and information exchange’ (Bridge 2008: 405). Yet it also means that artisanal relations of extraction and subsequent circulation of gold are *not* considered legitimate connections to the global economy, negating the fact that artisanally mined gold in Province Orientale is in fact already highly connected to global markets (cf. Fahey 2008).

Private security and the international relations of gold extraction

Gold exploration is the deployment of infrastructural power to overcome the resistance inherent in the fact that ‘the physical qualities of geological phenomenon pose particular barriers to commodification processes’ (Majury 2013: 1). There are, however, other ways in which industrial mining meets resistance. Gold in Province Orientale is strongly embedded in an artisanal extractive order on which at least a tenth of Province Orientale’s population depends for its livelihood. Given that this is how industrial mining companies first face gold, all mining companies listed above—or the ‘majors’ acquiring exploration rights for the concessions concerned—eventually share the same challenge: how to create an enclave economy in a context where gold is physically radically dispersed and connected to pre-existing social, economic, and political relations. How to freely trade gold on global markets when it is contested and embedded into myriad social and political connections on the ground in Congo? Given the local political economy of artisanal mining outlined before, disentangling gold from these connections to turn it into a global commodity is a challenge at the heart of the work of a mining company in Province Orientale and, as we will see, coercive power is a large part of the answer.

Securing extractive spaces

There are over 1,000 private security guards active in Province Orientale, most of which concentrate around industrial mining companies. As Table 2 shows, PSC form an intricate part of the way in which industrial mining operations are organized in the DRC, with each mining site involving a security apparatus composed of dozens of PSC guards supported by armed police agents at a rate of at least 10:1. Field research at all of these sites indicated that in individual instances this apparatus is extended with uniformed FARDC personnel on-site, as is the case with Kibali Gold and Mineral Invest/Wanga Mining both located in Haut Uele. As

of 2013 there is not a single extractive industry company in Province Orientale that does not make use of private security.¹¹⁵

Table 2. Security arrangements of gold mining companies in Province Orientale for 2011

Mining company	Location base camp	PSC name	Number of PSC guards	PNC	FARDC
Anglo Kilo Gold	Mongbwalu (Ituri)	G4S (Group 4 Securicor)	100	28	-
Kibali Gold	Durba (Haut Uele)	CSM (Congo Service & Maintenance)/Universal Security	154	30	20
Kilo Gold	Adumbi (Mambasa)	CSS (Congo Solution Security)	80	8-10	-
Loncor Resources	Yindi (Mambasa)	First Security	100	12	-
Wanga Mining Co.	Wanga (Haut Uele)	-	-	3	2

Source: data compiled by author through interviews & field research, 2010-2011

So how do private security companies co-constitute the reordering of gold? The centrality of infrastructural technologies for the assembling of gold as a tradable entity means that the main threat to mining operations is often theft of technological infrastructures essential to inscribe gold into the kinds of mobile data that comprise global gold markets. While evoking an image of powerful machines in the jungle, global extractive assemblages are actually very *weak* and vulnerable to interruption (D. Smith 2005: 154) and as such require extra security measures.¹¹⁶ The vast concentration of wealth which needs to physically travel through very destitute areas deemed volatile or unstable entails high risk which make gold mining an exemplary case of modern processes that are subject to a heightened amount of technologically mediated governance efforts both on part of shareholders and government and in terms of security governance (OECD 2011).

Interviews with PSC managers indicate that PSC create a 'space' by disentangling and keeping at bay clients' business processes from actors that could potentially interrupt these processes. If the main difference that sets apart industrial

¹¹⁵ Save for Mineral Invest, for which there are however sufficient reasons to consider it an outlier (see Swedwatch 2012). Furthermore, the fact that MI is planning to raise funds for industrial exploration through dredging alluvial surface gold makes it even a doubtful fit in the category of industrial mining.

¹¹⁶ For instance, Randgold needs to have several alternative routes ready as, along the way, the general director recognizes, many infrastructural or political problems can interrupt the flow of equipment (source: interview in Durba, 2011). Interestingly, gold mining requires less overland transport infrastructure than bulk minerals: because value is concentrated, it can be flown out—provided ores are treated on-site, which however by itself requires the assembling of vast technological chemical treatment plants.

mining from the status quo in Province Orientale (artisanal mining) consists in the mediation of the mining process through advanced infrastructures and logistical techniques, extractive machineries and inscription devices, the core referent object of security companies is constituted by drilling technologies and such digital technologies as remote sensing and computer systems. These technologies communicate back and forth a cycle of decisions and mapping data with far-flung laboratories, headquarters, and subcontractors. As Figure 11 below shows, the inner layer of the security apparatus of AGK clusters around ‘asset protection’ consisting of the ‘product’ and the technological equipment that constitute the infrastructural power making possible the assembling and extraction of gold. While in the developed world such infrastructures are largely taken for granted, they stand out for their scarcity in contexts such as the DRC (Bridge 2007; Schouten 2013a).

Layered security apparatus

‘On our concession now, there’s about a million people, but probably more than that. Probably 60% of these people are all ex militia, and probably they’ve got arms stashes all over the place, they can pick up bombs tomorrow again. So, that is one of the challenges—I call it a challenge, it is not a difficulty, because I think with the right approach you can manage any situation, but making sure you have solid plans in place.’

—Vice President Global Security AngloGold Ashanti¹¹⁷

How do private security companies entangle with the exploration process? AGA’s security strategy for the AGK project amounts to a three-tier spatialization of security, which is used by many other large extractive companies in the DRC with only a slight margin of variation (e.g. Hönke 2010).¹¹⁸ This format, which is roughly replicated in similar ways by other mining companies, can be illustrated with AGK’s Mongbwalu compound. Here we illustrate this three-tier spatialization through AGA’s own description of it (Figure 11 below) and through an image compiled by the author (Figure 12) showing how roles within this arrangement have varied historically.

¹¹⁷ Source: interview, Johannesburg, 2010.

¹¹⁸ This pattern is more broadly characteristic of the extractives sector (Auty 2006; Ferguson 2005; Hönke 2013) and thus visible with other extractives such as oil (Appel 2012; Nitzan & Bichler 1995).

Figure 11. AngloGold Ashanti's security strategy



Source: (AngloGold Ashanti 2012b: 37)


The inner ring of the security apparatus comprises the mining company's own security department. However, as the figure above shows, the first ring of security arrangements is a compound of 'technology vs. manpower'. I use 'apparatus' consciously here to underscore the heavy reliance on the deployment of static infrastructural power as a security strategy. The conspicuous territorial articulations of security arrangements of mining camps form a mimicking of military strategies: material perimeter security through fences, barbed wire, walls and other fortification techniques.

The territorial action of infrastructural security arrangements needs to be backed up by non-territorial action (Sack 1986: 19) and it is in this regard that PSC play a pivotal role: by enforcing through surveillance the physical enclosure of the critical infrastructure that produces added value. In practice, AGK's security manager explained, this amounts to 24/7 patrolling of PSC guards along the perimeter fences of the mining operation.

In the case of AGK, the 'human' component of the inner ring comprises a former French foreign legion Special Forces commander who was taken by AGK from ArmorGroup Site Logistics (AGSL), a private military security company. During the Ituri conflict, the security manager was Mike Faessler, who now runs Oversight Risk Consulting in Colombia. In an interview, Faessler explained that the inner ring comprised the current security manager plus an additional seven expat security staff from Armor Group Secure Logistics (AGSL).¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ Source: interview, 2011

Figure 12. Security staff of AngloGold Ashanti's Mongbwalu camp now (left) and during the Ituri conflict (right).



Source: compiled by author based on interviews 2010-2011

Currently, the French security manager oversees a team of three Nepalese ghurka from G4S Risk Management who act as security supervisors. Because the technological infrastructures involved are so costly, the first priority is to create strict regimes of order and rules within the camp, to avoid theft and breakdown. In practice, this means that PSC guards are often part of the internal setup of the more advanced exploration camps such as AGK and Kibali Gold who structure and monitor the behavior of those involved. As one security manager explained, this is mainly targeted at 'national' staff.¹²⁰

The second ring is made up of 'local security forces' which comprise 'sub-contractors and state security' (Faessler 2010: 18). During fieldwork I discovered that currently the second ring of AGK's security apparatus is made up of some 100 Congolese G4S guards; during the Ituri conflict, it comprised around 20-80 Congolese guards (Godsell 2005: 4). However, the second ring is incomplete without taking into account the non-PSC security forces that are part of AGK's security apparatus. During the Ituri conflict (2004-2005), AGK struck a deal with the armed militia group *Front National Intégrationniste* (FNI) to secure their operations while FNI controlled the Mongbwalu area (CAFOD 2009; CAFOD

¹²⁰ As such, this setup echoes the disciplinary security regime found in mining zones during colonial times (see chapter 4).

2010; Godsell 2005: 5; Kapelus, Hamann, & O’Keefe 2009; Prosansky 2007). Besides guards inside and around the compound, the security apparatuses of mining companies in Province Orientale are currently also complemented by a number of armed Congolese police agents. As Figure 12 above shows, currently there are 26 armed Congolese police guards working under two police commanders who report to the AGK security manager. At the AGK site, a separate office and guard post has been built for the Congolese police at the entry road that leads to AGK’s compound facing AGK’s small community relations office where locals can place inquiries. The police is thus built into the architecture of the enclave of the mining camp as the first barrier of traffic heading to AGK.¹²¹ Organizing the police component in this way is a conscious inscription of the public/private divide through the spatialization of security. This allows clients to argue that the Congolese police is ‘responsible for public security’ while private security is responsible for ‘internal’ security—while the Congolese police is in effect on the payroll and incorporated into the chain of command of the enterprise.

These forces also often deploy as mobile security teams composed of a mix of private security guards and police elements in mining-company supplied vehicles. Rather than a static operation, mining exploration requires daily excursions from the compound to exploration sites where mobile technologies are temporarily deployed. Adding to the sensation of enclavization, staff going on leave are accompanied to the airport in Bunia by a security escort in a company jeep that, according to security protocol, cannot slow down or stop in case of accidents.¹²² Echoing analysis of colonial mining security in chapter 4, it also illustrates how the infrastructure of transnationalized mining operations—with logistical corridors stretching across borders—also precipitate a specific configuration of security ‘superstructure’ along the pathways carved out by the extractive ordering processes.

The importance of the second layer of security ties into the organization of mining work. In general, mining companies try to minimize the expat contingent of operations, outsource nearly everything and squeeze contracts with national subcontractors to the maximum. For instance, many of the thousands of people employed by international mining companies are extremely badly paid national subcontractors.¹²³ Because they are so badly paid, national subcontracting staff doing brute physical work translate into a key liability and thus task for private security companies. PSC are deployed to supervise temporary work camps when, for example, forest is cleared and roads are made to a new exploration site. PSC,

¹²¹ This strategy is more common for enterprises making use of PNC. Heineken’s Congolese subsidiary, Bralima, deploys its PNC in a separate checkpoint outside the Bralima compound in Kinshasa, too (Schouten 2013b).

¹²² Source: security brief at AGK camp, November 2010

¹²³ AGK for instance employs 1.291 people in the DRC (AngloGold Ashanti 2012a).

supported by armed police or soldiers, both need to supervise this labor to avoid theft of valuables and quell potential unrest among workers. In this way, many of the situations engendered by contemporary industrial mining in Province Orientale strongly echo colonial situations with the difference that now responsibility and accountability for ‘primitive labor’ is formally outsourced to subcontractors. This generally passes under the radar of international attention for industrial mining because national subcontractors do not have to conform to international standards that govern international mining firms. However, PSC guards themselves are also securitized according to the same logic. As the former security manager of AGK explained:

‘In terms of security, we keep minimal staff on site. And that goes for staff as well as guards. The more people, the more potential problems. The guards are just window dressing, low quality and underpaid. Yes we have police with guns, that’s dissuasion, but also minimal, because the same gun could be pointed around towards us when we have valuables on-site.’¹²⁴

Thus, the envisioned ratio is that of minimizing the ‘human’ component in relation to the ‘material’ component consisting of security technologies and the mining technologies that form the critical infrastructure of industrial exploration. While the physical enclavization of industrial gold mining—composed as it is of badly paid guards and rudimentary technologies such as fences and barbed wire (cf. Goold, Loader, Thumala 2013)—ultimately has a certain banality to it, the repercussions are vast as will be explored further below.

The third layer of a mining security apparatus is the local population—as Randgold Resources puts it, ‘community relations are probably the single biggest risk factor we face’ (2011: 84). According to one artisanal miner and local civil society representative, ‘the strategy for the mining corporation is to avoid talking to us like we’re going to kill them; instead, they try and supplant our sustainable livelihoods with the empty buildings of schools and homes with corrugated iron roofs’.¹²⁵ The other side of the coin is that local populations are also strategized as the first line of defense: open communication channels with local chiefs are considered a fundamental way to have both acceptance, timely warnings of impending threats, and a way of dealing with petty crime.¹²⁶ Engaging with local populations is a mix of ‘carrots and sticks’, as one security manager put it in an interview: while community relations fall under the responsibilities of a community relations manager who engages in small-scale development programs, security managers receive community relations reports and strategize development pro-

¹²⁴ Source: interview with AGK, Mongbwalu, 2010

¹²⁵ Source: interview CAFOD, Bunia 2011

¹²⁶ Source: interview AGK security manager, Mongbwalu, 2010; cf. (Faessler 2010: 20)

grams according to perceived security needs.¹²⁷ Indeed, as discussed in the previous chapter, many PSC are actually hired because of their informal connections to important regional power-brokers. This means more broadly that community relations are heavily securitized and that any kind of complaint or protest is considered as a security threat to the envisioned extractive order.

This illustrates that the ‘human’ layers of the mining security apparatus correspond with spatial layers and boundaries of interaction and contestation. We can illustrate the complex imbrications of private security with the tensions between artisanal and industrial modes of extraction in the case of the operations of Randgold in Durba.¹²⁸ As industrial mining targets underground lodes and not alluvium, as one mining manager put it, in principle artisanal mining and industrial mining target radically different deposits and as such are not in conflict.¹²⁹ By law, artisanal mining can only be practiced until a depth of 30 meters (RDC 2002: 32), while deeper subsoil mining is reserved for industrial mining. Thus, while they occupy the same space, they legally insert themselves in distinct vertical strata. And, indeed, industrial mining companies often let artisanal miners work freely on their concessions, operating next to compounds and invading industrial exploration sites at night. Yet in more ways than one both modes of extraction uncomfortably rub shoulders.

When a gold mine goes into exploitation phase, infrastructural power projection intensifies, leading to a concomitant scaling up of coercive power arrangements. The continuous activities of heavy machinations in opencast or underground pits means unauthorized personnel needs to be absent as a safety measure. Yet it is understandable that artisanal miners fear the mechanization of what they consider their livelihood as, in practice, this means artisanal miners are disallowed from the site of operations. Randgold’s operations at the old Moto mine entailed the relocation of 14 villages totaling 17.000 people (Randgold 2011) and meant disallowing artisanal miners from entering the most profitable artisanal mining sites in the area (the Doko mine)—echoing the classical Lockean principle of value creation through ‘spatial monopoly’ enforced through strategies of enclosure and dispossession (Bridge 2008: 404; Cicantrell, Smith & Seidman 2005: 4 & 7).

Artisanal miners protested against being forced away from what they see as their right to a sustainable livelihood. A private security guard working for the Kibali mine hit one of the miners, which led to a fight in which one artisanal miner was wounded and another two—one of whom was a child—were killed by Randgold-employed police. In retaliation, disgruntled artisanal miners later

¹²⁷ Source: interviews, Mongbwalu, 2011

¹²⁸ For examples in other provinces of Congo, see (Geenen & Claessens 2013; Geenen & Hönke 2014)

¹²⁹ Source: interview with AGK, Mongbwalu, 2010

destroyed CSM vehicles and killed one police agent employed by the mining company (Kuediasala 2010; Radio Okapi 2010). As a manager of operations confided in an interview in Durba: ‘Such events are highly unfortunate and we cannot permit them, although they are part of the occupational risks when one goes into this business’.¹³⁰ This incident raises concerns around the privatization of *public* security which is extricated from an already weak public Congolese security sector and smoothly integrated into the much more elaborate chains of command of private security apparatuses. Rather than a clear-cut division between two spheres of action, one public (and thus not biased) and another private, private security apparatuses that mediate modes of gold extraction are hybrids that defend a shared interest of the interdependency between the political regime in Kinshasa and transnational industrial mining corporations.¹³¹

Gold exploration, normative regimes, and transnationalized relations of extraction

The previous sections discussed how exploration camps are physically disentangled from their surroundings; this section discusses how these enclaves become entangled in different—globalized—normative regimes that work to legitimate industrial mining operation over artisanal mining. While the spatialization of security and infrastructural power should be seen as essential in the reordering of gold as a global commodity, the work necessary to extricate gold from the artisanal mining economy does not stop here. In fact, reordering gold requires the entanglement of industrial mining into transnational normative regimes and transformations of the Congolese state in its relation to different modes of extraction in the gold mining sector. In relation to the main concern of this thesis, it seems important to investigate not only how PSC co-constitute the way in which Congo is related to and acted upon by international actors but also how international relations of extraction are legitimized by appealing to norms residing on a variety of political scales. This ‘translation’ at the core of industrial relations of extraction is highly contested in the case of gold mining in Province Orientale.

Transnational normative regimes

What technological zones such as airports, nuclear installations, and, indeed, extractive industries all share is that compared to the surrounding landscape they are subject to a heightened amount of formal governance efforts and entangled in

¹³⁰ Source: interview in Durba, November 2011

¹³¹ Similar dynamics are visible throughout the DRC, and already led to conflicts in Katanga, where Hönke observes that ‘selectively enforcing property rights for industrial mining companies has aggravated local social tensions and asymmetries.’ (2010: 121).

ordering processes that extend to actors on the other side of the globe (Barry 2006; Schouten 2011b). This means that complementing strategies of local physical disconnection, exploration companies also rely on other ways of disassociating themselves from what they frame as local disorder, while associating themselves with normative regimes that might legitimate their operations.

Mining companies uphold normative regimes for the spaces they inhabit in the DRC that differ radically from their direct surroundings. As advertised on corporate websites, they conform to strict global standards in terms of conduct and security requirements and international mining companies such as AngloGold Ashanti and international PSC such as G4S claim to uphold strict global normative regimes for their local DRC operations as stipulated in corporate governance strategies (cf. Börzel & Hönke 2011). Randgold proudly mentions no less than 11 different 'global' standards to which it subscribes (Randgold 2011). Connecting to these high-profile UN- or civil society-propelled initiatives to certify extractive industries in volatile environments, lodges them within outreach efforts of multilateral bodies to strategize international business for development in such areas (e.g., United Nations Global Compact 2013). Central to such international development agendas for Congo is the reform of the mining sector—including formalization efforts that entail weeding out informal artisanal mining—as stipulated for instance in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and poverty reduction strategies agreed upon between the Congolese government and the International Financial Institutions (Mazalto 2010: 172-173).

As an example, on the one hand, the consultancy firm that carries out AGK's impact assessment specifically reiterates the UN's observation that minerals form 'the engine of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo' (SRK Consulting 2010: 18; cf. UN 2001, section 215). On the other, AGK associates itself with John Ruggie's Global Compact and other international standards for conduct of foreign companies in Africa. As such, mining companies deploy NGO-certified mapping tools to assess and interact with the context in a way that is endorsed by such international regimes. In turn, these add to the legitimization of the expansion of an industrial extractive order in volatile and underdeveloped regions of Africa (cf. OECD 2006). In the most radical example, Randgold's security guards at the Kibali goldmine received trainings from MONUSCO human rights and child protection officers (2011: 88). By entangling 'superior' normative regimes into the technological mining zones where disproportional profits are accrued, 'the formation of technological zones has become critical to the constitution of a distinction between global/Western political and economic forms and their non-Western others' (Barry 2006: 250, cited in Appel 2012: 451). As such, it is part of the disentangling work to extract international actors from local social,

economic, political and conflict dynamics and reassemble them as external to those dynamics and embedded in an international extractive order.

The current privatization of mining security in Province Orientale is a clear example of the post-Cold War shift from considering self-appointed political entities as prime referent objects to a securitization of specific business processes that represent a move away from the state to actors that operate in governance spaces located simultaneously 'above', 'within' or 'outside' a range of states. It forms part of a larger strategy that James Ferguson has called a 'politics of verticality' (Ferguson 2006) in which transnational mining operations somehow assemble themselves as operating on a level 'above' or 'outside' of the state or local economy. These operations become disassociated and far removed from the corruption and human rights abuses in Province Orientale, as if they were not thoroughly physically rooted there themselves. Such initiatives legitimize further displacement of artisanal mining livelihood strategies by industrial mining that have higher standards of security, human rights, Health, Safety and Environment, etc. In this way, the construction of industrial infrastructures of gold extraction powerfully merge and spatially concentrate technical know-how, geological expertise, and security agency in assemblages that are considered legitimate within transnational liberal regimes. A kind of 'order' thus emerges around those sites that is construed with reference to centers of power and accumulation across borders and which locals have little means to contest. Yet in many conversations with locals this extractive order is contested: they see artisanal mining as a possibility for employment where this would otherwise be absent. They attribute development in mining hubs such as Mongbwalu and Watsa to artisanal mining and conversely see themselves at war (sic) with industrial mining, which they consider an entanglement of corruption, oppressive security governance, and asymmetrical accruing of profits on what they consider their livelihoods.¹³²

Reassembling the Congolese state

Second, the dynamics discussed here can be seen as a particular form of state building: the work to embed Congolese gold in an international extractive order also entails the co-production of a particular 'national' Congolese state. Large-scale investments in mining require state involvement at different levels (Smith 2005: 153-4), and mining companies actively co-constitute this necessary state (cf. Kennes 2005: 168). Mining companies conjure up central government in Congo as the only legitimate interlocutor for negotiations over the modalities of mining operations, while local authorities and other spokespersons for the DRC are engaged either through more one-directional CSR programs or security gov-

¹³² This is further aggravated by the fact that the mining companies do not publish about their activities in local languages (Kabemba 2013: 37).

ernance. The construction of mining infrastructures and operation sites thus also means the extension of this sovereign order—comprising a limited, efficient central government—into places where the Congolese state has hitherto not been present in the same fashion (Ciccantell et al. 2005: 11; cf. Hibou 2004). As a CEO of one of the mining companies in Province Orientale put it:

‘We only deal with central government and follow strictly set rules. It’s slower, but in the end it’s the only way. It’s almost impossible to get a signed paper saying that you are officially allowed something here. But unless you have the central government stamp on it, you’ll enter a long, long way of competing claims involving a lot of envelopes. If you start shoving envelopes, you’ll end up in a mess of competing authorities. And even with central government things are difficult.’¹³³

In order to understand how the reembedding of gold in Province Orientale in an internationalized ordering pattern entails the co-constitution of a transformed Congolese state itself, one can look at the example of SOKIMO. Under pressure of international financial institutions, the parastatal that held the gold concessions in Province Orientale—OKIMO—was privatized in 2010 into the commercial company SOKIMO (Radio Okapi 2010). OKIMO had been responsible for granting artisanal miners exploration rights and artisanal miners were obliged to sell their gold to OKIMO-owned *comptoirs*. International industrial mining corporations—most notably AGK—have since pressured SOKIMO into abandoning this way of governing artisanal mining in order to be able to push out artisanal miners of industrial concessions as the mining corporations prepare to move from exploration to exploitation (IKV Pax Christi & Haki na Amani 2012: 35).

While in practice it had dedicated itself entirely to informal predation on artisanal mining,¹³⁴ SOKIMO’s formal withdrawal from artisanal mining governance has led to great consternation among artisanal miners because it in effect further shifted the balance of legitimacy away from artisanal miner’s claims to gold and towards the claims of industrial mining corporations.¹³⁵ To illustrate, co-constituting a Congolese state open to international investments in the mining sector, but disentangled from artisanal mining, quite literally entails the moving of state representatives. AGK employs representatives of the state-owned conces-

¹³³ Source: interview in Johannesburg, 2010

¹³⁴ While artisanal mining is formally speaking legal in the DRC, it is only so if the mined resources are sold at state *comptoirs*. Yet these *comptoirs* are few and far apart—aggravated because of the lack of infrastructure—and not competitive: they levy an export tax of 2%. Uganda, on the other hand, has relatively good transport infrastructures and charges an export tax on gold of only 0,5% (Fahey 2010). While the DRC thus formally allows artisanal mining, it—consciously?—hasn’t put in place the apparatuses needed to govern artisanal mining. This allowed vast numbers of individual OKIMO representatives to informally collect gold taxes, and the Mining Police created in 2006 only served to assist OKIMO representatives in collecting illicit taxes.

¹³⁵ Source: interviews in Ituri, December 2011

sion holder SOKIMO and houses them inside the confines of AGK's compound.¹³⁶ Thus, constituting a responsible state 'welcoming to investors' entails physically removing representatives of the state from the artisanal mining zones and placing them within the privately secured spaces of international mining corporations. In the case of Mineral Invest, SOKIMO is already strategized in favor of industrial mining as it is re-tooled as the subcontractor responsible for the execution of infrastructure projects that Mineral Invest pays for. Such company-sponsored alternations make SOKIMO more able to 'engage' with industrial mining and thus entails the co-production of a lenient market state. Rather than being an exception, as the report of the Lutundula Commission (2006) established, in Congo more generally, 'public servants appointed on mining sites are taken care of by the private mining operators that they are supposed to control'. Thus, while individual managers of mining enclaves frequently distance themselves from what they denounce as the corruption and failure of the DRC state, they are in fact profoundly entangled with it and actively engage in enclaved state building (cf. Appel 2012: 445; Ciccantrell, Smith, Seidman 2005: 11).

This extraverted state building also pervades the specific entanglement of security forces within these extractive assemblages, which are both part and co-constitutive of a reconfiguration of the boundary between public, local space and private, international space, and assigns corresponding roles to representatives of the Congolese state. The fact that PNC and FARDC contingents of mining security apparatuses are part of the private chain of command of security management of the mining company implies the entanglement of state-carried weapons (as a rule Kalashnikovs)—which PSC are not allowed to carry according to Congolese legislation—into mining security apparatus. This means that while reliance on private security companies purports to constitute a *disconnection* from the Congolese state apparatus—that is deemed venal and unreliable by mining companies—in practice, the private security apparatus of mining companies are hybrids that are only deemed effective if *profoundly entangled* with the Congolese state. To illustrate how this plays out in practice, in the case of Kibali Gold, the private security company CSM (*Congo Service et Maintenance*) is organized in military ranks that translate into different numbers of stars on the epaulets of CSM staff. Just like regular guards need to salute to their superiors, I witnessed police agents saluting to CSM security managers, to make clear what the chain of command is on the Kibali Gold premises. Finally, while 'It is Randgold's policy not to arm any security forces on our mines' (2011: 88), the security apparatus of the Kibali mine is complemented by armed FARDC soldiers who guard infrastructure development and the costly heavy equipment at development sites. For the VP Global Security of one mining company, this is part of how private security allows for

¹³⁶ Source: observations in Mongbwalu, December 2011

the association between the DRC state and mining: through security standards that mining imposes on security practices by the Congolese police, mining companies are able to re-assemble the DRC state into an entity that works in their interest.¹³⁷

From the perspective of the regime in far-flung Kinshasa, the possibility to enclave mineral extraction through technology makes it *easy* and therefore *attractive* to tax. The direct link to central government in combination with a Mining Law that allows negotiation of both tax regimes and depreciation rates over investments made per individual mining contract, makes the DRC state very 'welcome to investors' in mining as the World Bank puts it (AngloGold Ashanti 2009; PWC 2012: 6; World Bank 2008). This allows the Congolese government in Kinshasa to levy high taxes on industrial mining while bypassing local political struggles and negotiations with regional political constituents that do not benefit from industrial mining. As such, rather than a withdrawal of political action, a particular type of Congolese state is built inside the spaces constituted by mining infrastructures that are carved out and disconnected from other modes of governance by private security companies. As a result, most locals do not understand the differences between police and private security, OKIMO, SOKIMO and AGK, seeing this heterogeneous assemblage rather as an undifferentiated block. If this entanglement of state and company in colonial mining assemblages was typified as a '*bloc colonial*' in chapter 4, perhaps the ordering patterns through which minerals are governed have not changed so radically throughout Congo's (post)colonial history.

The enclaved setup of the 'governed interdependencies' (Weiss 1995) between industrial mining and Congolese government elites meets a lot of resistance. AGK recognizes its biggest security challenge to be the relocation of thousands of artisanal miners from some of the planned mining sites. For example, the old Kilo concession is by far the most important in terms of artisanal mining output (Mathysen et al. 2012) and considered the 'lungs of Ituri' by artisanal miners, with estimates of numbers of artisanal miners ranging from a conservative 38.000 to over 150.000.¹³⁸ With representatives of the state-owned concession holder SOKIMO literally on their payroll, AGK hopes to rearrange the relations between humans (in this case, artisanal miners) and nature in such a way within the vast space of their concession as to facilitate their machine-mediated extraction process to start shortly. The consistent presence of rebel groups such as Morgan's Simba around the AGK concession paired with a global 5-fold increase in injury

¹³⁷ Source: interviews in Ituri, November 2011

¹³⁸ First figure from consultancy firm working for AGK (SRK Consulting 2010: iii); second figure from an interview with *chef de cité* of Mongbwalu, November 2011; the most detailed study finds 66.750 in Djugu. See (IKV Pax Christi 2012: 12 n. 14) for detailed discussion of this figure and others.

to AGK's security personnel in Africa since 2009—according to AGK spurred by rising gold prices (AngloGold Ashanti 2012b)—and increasing perceptions of tensions with the artisanal mining community, has increased security efforts at AGK's site. As the security manager of AGK at the time put it:

'We have here 60.000 artisanal miners in our concession, 10.000 of which might be ex-rebels and used to exercise violence. Many of them will have to leave, and while they expect it, we can't employ them. So altogether we have not a goldmine but 6.000 km² of explosive volatility.'¹³⁹

If one considers that artisanal mining has constituted the most effective DDR mechanism in Congo—by offering former members of armed groups a livelihood that resembles their former life sufficiently to continue life without violence—removing this mechanism could indeed cause substantial volatility (Van Puijenbroek & Schouten 2013). In order to deal with this situation, AGK frames the challenges of artisanal mining to industrial mining as a shared security problem for the Congolese government and foreign mining (cf. Perks 2011a).

This example shows that privatization, while normally associated with a *loss* of state control—as privatization moves a given sphere of activities out of the state apparatus—in the DRC it actually helps to fortify the formal linkages between the regime in Kinshasa and capital created in far-flung enclaves. As such, privatization bypasses such mediators as corrupt state officials and de-links natural resources from local populations that would otherwise divert mineral resources away from the state (Schouten 2011b).¹⁴⁰ This state is welcome to international investors, and conforms to how international institutions envision Congolese macro-economic policy in line with debt reduction (World Bank 2011), but unresponsive when it comes to the livelihoods of the mainstay of its population (Fahey 2010; Fairhead 2005). As such, industrial relations of extraction and the private security apparatus that is constitutive of this mode of extraction should be considered as political ordering and de facto extraverted state formation.

Paradoxically, mining companies prefer not to consider the international relations of extraction they construct political, but rather technical. As one mining camp manager explained:

¹³⁹ Source: interview AGK site manager 2011

¹⁴⁰ That said, it appears from interviews with artisanal miners that local state representatives creatively straddle these normative regimes by negotiating these dual roles and retain a predatory role *vis-à-vis* artisanal mining (a steady source of informal income) while also formally condemning artisanal mining and propagating industrial modes of extraction.

‘There is a clear legal framework within which we operate: artisanal miners are illegal in an industrial concession. We follow the law, our work is technical.’¹⁴¹

Yet, as Michel Callon reminds us, what mining engineers consider as *technical* mining assemblages consist ‘of an entanglement of heterogeneous elements that, depending on the situations and points of view, are defined for some as technical and for others as social, political, or economic’ (in Hecht 2009: xi). Part of what makes mining companies successful is their ‘ontological politics’, that is, their unwillingness to negotiate *as political* the way they qualify their context. As one mining manager puts it:

‘Local level politics? At the local level, there is no representative government; we only deal with central government. It’s slower, but in the end it’s the only way. It’s almost impossible to get a signed paper saying that you are officially allowed something here. But unless you have the central government stamp on it, you’ll enter a long, long way of competing claims involving a lot of envelopes. If you start shoving envelopes, you’ll end up in a mess of competing authorities.’¹⁴²

The non-technical and non-material impacts of industrial mining—the developmental predicament of artisanal miners and local populations—are not negotiable concerns as part of the ‘content’ of gold mining, but fall under the ‘community relations’ part of their CSR program for which a separate, limited, budget is allotted. Just as it reinforces lines of distinction between internationalized inside and ‘local’ outsides, artisanal mining and local livelihoods are effaced as legitimate governance concerns. This is of course necessary because in gold mining there *is* no long run: most individual gold mines in Congo are estimated to have a mine life cycle of between 8-20 years with current mining technologies (Azapagic 2004; Ross 2004: 344), leaving behind a territory that provides much less of a livelihood for the local populations (and host state) that are left behind when the machines have gone (Ciccantell et al. 2005: 17).

Chapter summary

This chapter looked at the way in which private security companies co-constitute political order in the DRC through their involvement with transnational mining activities. Specifically, it looked at the way in which international gold mining companies deploy private security companies to secure their operations in Prov-

¹⁴¹ Interview with (new) CSR manager AGK, Mongbwalu, 2011. This echoes the longer-standing historical stance of mining companies in Central and Southern Africa. Indeed, as Alvin Wolfe observed in 1966, ‘Union Miniere in Congo, even while financing Katanga’s secession, claimed to avoid political entanglement’ (Wolfe 1966: 426).

¹⁴² Source: interview Kilo Goldmines, 2011

ince Orientale. This chapter showed how current international mining operations nearly exclusively concern gold exploration. International mining corporations, mediated by an industrial technological apparatus, engage in the reordering of the gold economy by qualifying gold as a commodity that can be freely traded on global markets. Yet to qualify gold as such, gold needs to be extricated from its pre-existent entanglements. In Province Orientale, these relations comprise the artisanal mode of gold extraction which involves over half a million Congolese. This means gold mining is more than merely a technical matter: constituting gold as an object exclusively for industrial mining, rather than an entitlement for artisanal miners, is a site of struggle, that involves the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands Congolese.

If the main difference that sets industrial mining apart from the status quo in Province Orientale—artisanal mining—consists in the mediation of the mining process through advanced infrastructures and transport technologies, extractive machineries and qualification devices, then this explains why these are central referent objects of private security governance. While in the social sciences economic action, infrastructure, and security governance form discrete and independent dynamics, studied as tied to their respective institutions—companies and states—in contexts where infrastructure is scarce, their necessary entanglement, and the coercive power necessary to assemble gold as an international object of governance for ‘free markets’, becomes visible. It is the entanglement of these arrangements that is pivotal for the functioning of extractive orders. While historians of state formation share with contemporary development economists the optimism that market expansion is a form of state-building because the formation of markets requires that certain strong state institutions be in place, this chapter has shown that, on the contrary, mining companies have taken it upon themselves to produce the ‘contextual’ goods such as security and infrastructure hitherto associated with state formation and have even gone as far as actively reshaping the Congolese state in relation to their operations.

The enclavization of the mining economy within political economy refers to the disconnection of productive sectors of the economy from the broader economy (so typical for extractive industries), thus inhibiting effective development despite spectacular economic growth rates (Congo’s economy grows annually at over 8,5%) that are concentrated in ‘pockets of foreign direct investment’ (FDI, see Ross 2004: 344; Sachs & Warner 1997: 5, for discussion). This chapter seems to illustrate that this pattern is locally produced through the very particular entanglements of coercive and infrastructural power that configure the ‘construction sites’ of gold as embedded in an international extractive order, one which involves steering the spatial concentration and circulation of the mineral resources concerned. It is thus possible to locally trace the construction of this

extraverted ordering pattern and the concomitant co-production of skewed macro-economic patterns of underdevelopment. Congolese are well aware of the stakes involved. As one taxation officer responsible for taxing minerals explained,¹⁴³

‘In order to develop, we need the capacity to transform things into other things. It requires electricity, machines—but in Congo we lack these capacities, they only exist as promises Kabila makes with his 5 chantiers. If you make money with machines, you generate taxes that can be paid to the state and reinvested, that’s development. What we have here is that we simply export the raw material we have in abundance; it means you don’t make any money—even if it is formally tagged as coming from here, we don’t earn a thing.’

PSC are pivotal in the contemporary politics of mining, by constituting highly local and disconnected mining enclaves, which place valuable resources from Congo’s soil into a specifically ordered international circulation. That is, the enclavization of excavation economies is built into the infrastructural and coercive setup of the technological zones of industrial mining in Province Orientale. The role of PSC is to create stable asymmetrical access to safeguard such flows and accumulations of valuables, forming part of ‘the ways in which processes of governance are aggregated’ (Murphy 2000: 789, cited in Acuto 2013: 22). Speaking back to the main research question of this thesis, this chapter has shed light on how private security companies co-constitute an internationalized extractive order in the DRC. If Congo’s mineral resource wealth constitutes a vast development potential that is central to the potential transformation of Congo’s political order, then the way in which these mineral resources are defined and acted upon constitutes a core element of political ordering. Private security companies are co-constitutive of a political order in which transnationalized industrial relations of gold extraction prevail over artisanal modes of extraction.

¹⁴³ Source: interview with Ministry of Mining official, Bunia, November 2011

8

Private security companies and the international humanitarian community in Goma, North Kivu

Introduction

Chapter 6 showed that growth of the private security sector in the DRC in a significant way intersected with the growth of the 'humanitarian community' during the second Congo War. This chapter relates that co-incidence back to the main concern of the thesis, by investigating the way in which private security companies co-constitute political order in the DRC through their involvement with humanitarian organizations. Where the previous chapter looked at the role of PSC in the constitution of an international extractive order in Province Orientale, this chapter focuses on the role of PSC in the constitution of the international humanitarian order in North Kivu.

Since the 1990s, North Kivu is home to a vast concentration of international development organizations, accompanied nearly without exception, as we will see, by private security companies. In the same way as the importance of private security companies in Province Orientale cannot be understood without looking in-depth at how PSC are imbricated in processes that produce that province's gold as a globally tradable commodity, so it is necessary to look at the way in which private security companies are entangled with, and constitutive of, international and local relations of humanitarian intervention.

Chapter four has shown how the constitution of the 'Congolese population' within a colonial ordering pattern has involved different entanglements of coercive and infrastructural power arrangements. This chapter aims at exploring how the entanglement of both forms of power play out in contemporary internationalized processes of humanitarian governance within the 'international humanitari-

humanitarian organizations have drawn to Goma, transforming what was a relatively calm regional tourist destination into a sprawling urban hub.

The adjacent map (Figure 13) shows the vast presence of ongoing projects by UN agencies in North Kivu. The map shows the space where humanitarian organizations are active, and already reveals the concentration of aid agencies in Goma, turning the city into a veritable 'NGO-pole' (Büscher & Vlassenroot 2010) or 'humanitarian hub' (Schouten 2011b). Goma has formed the focal point of foreign involvement and is considered 'a laboratory of change' for the international community (Vlassenroot and Büscher 2009: 2) where new modalities of humanitarian governance are tested. It concerns a site where international humanitarian actors who are linked to overseas centers of power and decision-making act on local objects of governance that revolve around the life and development of the Congolese population (cf. Murphy & Augelli 1993: 79). If, in that respect, humanitarian work most closely resembles the historical preoccupation of Belgian colonial administration with the colonial object of government of the 'indigenous order', then the key difference is that the network of international actors associated with that object of government in Congo has never been more globalized and diffused as it is under the 'new international humanitarian order' (Barnett 2010). Hundreds of international organizations converge in Goma involved in a wide range of humanitarian efforts ranging from relief to IDPs to education related to sexual violence and from SSR to infrastructure development. According to a 2013 estimate by the UN, there are around 500 aid agencies in Goma, 100 of which are international (IRIN 2013). According to my calculation based on the latest OCHA survey (OCHA 2011), this means there are over 1.100 humanitarians present in North Kivu, the majority of which concentrate in Goma (see Table 3 below).

Where humanitarian aid in North Kivu initially comprised a pure problem-solving agenda of emergency relief to Rwandese refugees, it quickly turned into a more diffuse and permanent presence linked to western policy agendas aimed at altering structural determinants of the lives of Congolese, including the nature of Congo's political order (cf. Barnett 2010: 174-174). In particular, under the currently dominant stabilization agenda, the OECD/DAC donor governments, their subcontracting UN and NGO partners (Fennell 1998: 97) and independent aid organizations engage in a wide specter of activities ranging from short-term emergency relief to long-term state building and civil society engagements aimed at realizing development goals related to education, health, sanitation, infrastructure, gender, and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG's). The integration of short-term humanitarian relief with long-term state building and development agendas is evidenced most explicitly by the UN-managed multi-donor International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS or I4S), which aims at

establishing a political order in Congo that aligns both with the international community's and the Congolese government's priorities (SSU 2014; cf. Schouten & Bachmann 2014).

Table 3. Number of humanitarian organizations and workers in North Kivu

Type of organization	Number of organizations	Employees
Embassies	4	5
UN Agencies	na	436
Donors	na	20
Media	6	8
Int. orgs	5	46
INGOs	85	426
NGO (national)	na	226
Total	100	1167

Source: data compiled by author from OCHA, '*Qui fait Quoi? Nord Kivu. L'action humanitaire par projets. Septembre 2011*'. 'Type of organization' follows the categories deployed by OCHA.

Thus, where I here mention the 'humanitarian' community, I actually refer to a diffuse field of intervention where long- and short-term goals are increasingly blurred and entangled (e.g. Agier 2010: 34; Collinson, Elhawary & Muggah 2010; Smirl 2008: 243-244). The influx of aid agencies has meant that this diffuse field of social intervention has come to constitute a very significant portion of total aid to Congo. The international humanitarian "order" might be understood as the "ideal worlds" that development actors aim to bring about through the execution of proper policy and project design' (Lewis & Mosse 2006: 2; cf. Schlag 2012: 326) to the extent that humanitarian action in North Kivu is partially lodged within a broader stabilization agenda. However, framing Congolese in North Kivu as objects of 'development with a human face' should be seen as the 'left' hand of an international development assemblage, the 'right' hand of which constitutes the ensemble of financial, infrastructural and military mechanisms aimed at reforming Congolese political order through extension of state authority, police reform, macroeconomic adjustment, and market-oriented reform (cf. Agier 2003). Since 2002, official development aid (ODA) involved in these overall ordering efforts has on average constituted the equivalent of over 50% of Congolese national income (Development Initiatives 2013: 258). In 2011, Congo was the largest aid recipient in the world, receiving over 7 billion USD (ibid: 82).

The mechanization of aid

As indicated, the emergence of Goma as an aid hub can be understood as the indirect result of the Rwandese refugee crisis that spilled into Zaïre in 1993. Rather than being an a-political humanitarian relief operation, the swarm of aid organizations became considered party to conflict dynamics when they sustained and effectively funded the reorganization of Hutu *génocidaires* in Zairian refugee camps after the Rwandese genocide (Barber 1997; Cooley & Ron 2002; cf. Büscher 2011: 134). In part a response to that unfortunate event, donors have set up governance mechanisms such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) for UN agencies, aimed at keeping the contracting aid organizations accountable according to New Public Management principles, in effect entailing the contemporary homogenization and standardization among humanitarian governance practices (Barnett 2010: 176; Brauman, Petit & Clift 2004: 415; cf. Stubbs 2003). A subsequent surge in civil-military cooperation under the header of stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan only served to intensify this pattern.

This ushered in a central role for technical systems in the governance of humanitarian action and a more central emphasis on knowledge generation for international humanitarian work (Stone 2003) attached to the new condition that donor money is only disbursed based on the production of specific kinds of knowledge about humanitarian problems. Development knowledge—like industrial mining exploration—needed to become a form of knowing ‘in which linguistic artifacts transact business with physical artifacts, tools, implements, apparatus’ (Dewey cited in Hickman 1990: 4). Rony Brauman, founder of *Médecins sans frontières* (MSF, or Doctors without Borders), has called the central role that ICTs have come to play within contemporary humanitarian work the “mechanization” of humanitarianism’ (2004: 415). This is reflected in the often-heard complaint in Goma that aid workers now spend much of their time behind computers engaging with complex knowledge management systems, communicating globally rather than acting locally. Since the 1990s, therefore, aid only became recognized as international humanitarian aid when such aid was linked to technical expert knowledge, which in practice means that the intermediation of aid by technical systems forms the ‘DNA of humanitarian action’ (Donini 2008: 28).

As a result, a crucial component of contemporary humanitarian aid as it plays out in North Kivu is that it hinges on the constant deployment of the expert capacity to generate up-to-date development knowledge about the latest and most acute problems in light of internationalized priorities. To illustrate, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) brandishes part of its core mission as ‘gathering data to improve lives in DR Congo’ (UNOPS 2013). There is even a considerable set of NGOs in Goma (advocacy NGOs such as the Enough Project) for whom humanitarian work explicitly limits itself to the inscription and dis-

semination of development problems into political objects and representations to mobilize western publics.

Development actors cannot act on urgent humanitarian crises in abstract nor intervene in the immediacy of the entangled complexities of the 'local' reality. The problems need to be translated into humanitarian objects of governance that meet very specific criteria. While these criteria often differ per organization and even project, the dominant reliance on like technologies of inscription means there are sufficient commonalities that allow some level of generalization (cf. Dijkzeul, Hilhorst & Walker 2013). The predominance of technologies in international humanitarian work means that a fair share of the work by necessity becomes 'technical assistance'. The effect is that the accounting and management methods which guarantee that international aid organizations are eligible for, and can justify, their donor funding, condition and shape their framing of problems, agendas, and limit and direct their on-the-ground practices (Martinez & Cooper 2013). Development work by necessity becomes more technical as it is coordinated with more agencies: as the aggregate object of intervention under coordinated stabilization frameworks increases in size, the more reporting standards, logistical technicalities, and accountability mechanisms are involved. Humanitarian technologies of inscription—the reporting and accounting techniques and requirements—form 'epistemic infrastructures' making sure individual aid efforts do not diverge from the consensus in the international humanitarian order (Bueger 2014; cf. Koddenbrock & Schouten 2014).

Just as the crucial difference between artisanal gold and gold as a tradable commodity on world markets resides in the intermediation of the extraction process through technological infrastructures, so, too, I want to suggest, the difference between local issues and international humanitarian problems does reside in the addition of technological infrastructures to the inscription of those issues (cf. Robson 2002: 691). And in the same way that international mining exploration envisions the translation of subsoil minerals into globally traded commodities so aid envisions the translation of 'vulnerable' or 'affected' populations (IASC 2013) into autonomous subjects endowed with universal political, economic, legal and rational capacities (Swidler 2013: 681; cf. Agier 2010; Barnett 2010). Many of the organizations in Goma share a commitment to 'human-oriented approaches' in development thinking, which focus on such global development boundary objects as Basic Needs, Capabilities, Human Development, and the MDGs, which function as the 'ultimate external vision of development' (King 2004: 9) and the backbone of the 'dense normative structure' reflecting the international consensus regarding the basic criteria of good order in developing countries (Barnett 2010: 1). Yet just as gold dispersed in Province Orientale's soil is an object of industrial mining because it is not yet a commodity on global markets,

the EU, ‘the new UN cluster system, being piloted in DRC, shows signs of being able to provide a more real-time picture of the humanitarian needs and better targeting as individual partners continuously feed information into their respective cluster’ (Humanitarian Aid Committee 2006: 6). This example aside, a variety of humanitarian organizations produces a vast array of mappings of Congo as a humanitarian space, that is, a space projecting humanitarian priorities—and knowledge—onto the landscape of North Kivu, in the same way that gold exploration results in geological maps superimposing minerals deposits on the landscape. Yet besides numbers, as the UNOPS recognizes, ‘humanitarian agencies often have little or no information at all about the people they are trying to help’ (UNOPS 2013).

While technical assistance—i.e., working with technologies of inscription—is predominantly carried out by expatriate workers, technologies also function as governing devices for the national staff that do ‘implementation’. New public management techniques of accountability (audits, reporting techniques) make it possible to govern humanitarian objects of governance at a distance by having local subcontracting aid organizations act upon the humanitarian subject (cf. Duffield 2001: 313; Kerr 2008: 99). Interestingly, this technologically mediated division of labor between international and national humanitarian staff strongly resembles the division of labor within contemporary industrial mining (see previous chapter), a division of labor that echoes colonial rule in important ways but only became institutionalized in the postcolonial moment and reproduced in the way in which expertise was institutionalized as the international counterpart of Congolese mining and development work in the postcolonial period (see chapter 5). The continuity concerns the reproduction of ‘international’ governance as the locus of technical expertise, not incidentally the stage in international chains of humanitarian governance where most revenues are accrued.

In sum, mirroring the previous chapter, it is by adding such technologies of inscription to international relations of development with Congolese that development organizations become credible spokespersons for the aggregate object of vulnerable populations for a specific audience. This audience is not situated locally but comprises the international humanitarian order, distributed over headquarters of donor agencies, multilateral development fora, and the living rooms of concerned publics around the ‘western’ world.

The critical infrastructure of the international humanitarian order

While the reliance on technologies of inscription constitutes a central aspect of the aid industry in Congo, aid goes beyond mere registering of problems and disseminating them in circuits around the globe. There is another, more direct, way in which they ‘make’ their context. The other side of the coin is aid implementation, which is concerned with the problem of ‘governing at a distance’ (Rose 2000: 48-49)—as Mark Duffield puts it: ‘given that multitudes of private implementers intervene, how can the calculations of donor governments at the centre translate into actions in the global margins?’ (2001: 313) Just as the importance of what we now understand as infrastructure for the Belgian colonial enterprise is made clear in the adage ‘coloniser, c’est transporteur’ (Bézy, 1957: 91, see chapter 4), I want to draw attention to the importance of infrastructure for contemporary aid efforts in Congo.

Humanitarian organizations—whether IO or NGO—increasingly bring with them and develop their own infrastructures in order to create ‘humanitarian corridors’ or construct ‘humanitarian space’. The notion ‘humanitarian space’ surfaced as a concept to denote the operating space that humanitarian organizations ideally retain as autonomous from political influence—both from ‘above’ (donors) and from ‘below’ (parties to conflict) (ECHO 2003; Esteves 2010: 622). I propose to use the notion in an analytical way, one that resonates in important ways with the way Büscher & Vlassenroot employ the term to articulate how Goma’s urban development has been ‘re-spaced’ due to the presence of humanitarian actors (2010: 259). As chapter 6 already introduced, humanitarian organizations have largely adapted to infrastructural absences in Congo as a natural condition by structurally providing for their own infrastructure—or bypassing the public (absence of) infrastructure by privatized air travel. But the ‘territorialization of aid’ (Boano 2011: 39-40) goes further—in operational language, humanitarian aid implementation translates into ‘physical deliverables’: construction of camps, resettlement sites, humanitarian spaces, wells, rudimentary housing and schools.

The spatialization of international humanitarian aid has by necessity followed the pathways carved out by the interplay of colonial infrastructure development and infrastructural disassembly during subsequent decades, and one of the principal goals of the humanitarian community in Congo seems to have been to locally project humanitarian space by creating a number of localized ‘islands of stability’, most notably around Kinshasa and regional towns such as Goma, Lubumbashi and Bunia (Beneduce et al. 2006: 34-35; Van Herp et al. 2003: 152). The suggestion in this section is that the production of these islands of stability hinges

implicitly both on a vast logistical apparatus of intervention and on the projection of coercive power, which is by nature projected unevenly and combined. The landscape around these islands is littered with traces of ongoing, finished, or abandoned aid projects of all possible sizes, ranging from the rehabilitation of rudimentary village market stands to pre-built health centers and from water wells and sanitation infrastructures to schools. In Goma, where most of the state infrastructures have been destroyed by the volcanic eruption of 2002, UNOPS has selectively rebuilt state infrastructural power according to donor priorities ('47 new buildings, including police stations, a police training centre, courts, prisons') (UNOPS, undated).

Outside Goma, UNOPS is a key actor in producing humanitarian space by temporarily projecting infrastructural power both to facilitate the projection of coercive power by UN peacekeepers and Congolese armed forces, and access for humanitarian workers. As UNOPS puts it, 'More than 580 kilometres of roads in the eastern provinces are currently being reopened, rehabilitated or maintained to reduce the isolation and the vulnerability of the local population and allow for the deployment of security forces and humanitarian organizations' (*ibid*).

Over the last few years, the projection of humanitarian space has started to become framed as lodged within larger multilateral efforts at infrastructure development within the framework of political stabilization. Increasingly, short-term relief and peace building efforts are interwoven and negotiated with long-term stabilization agendas, within which infrastructure figures as a central component (Schouten & Bachmann 2014). Recognizing the narrow link between infrastructural networks and political order, international relief and humanitarian organizations have identified key infrastructures that would have to be rehabilitated for durable stabilization of Congo (Bynens & Taylor 2012: 4). As such, peace building and relief are increasingly being linked to a long-standing pattern of internationalized governance of Congo's critical infrastructures in the production of political order—an international ordering pattern that dates back to the first World Bank infrastructure project in 1951, in what was then Belgian Congo (cf. Kamarck 1951; World Bank 1951). In interviews I held, UNOPS officers often pointed to the most radical example of display of infrastructural power by the international community in Congo, defying the inherent spatial limitations of international development efforts: in 2006, the UN flew in a complete electoral infrastructure. The pop-up infrastructure that the UN supplied for the elections stands out as a 'logistical miracle', for in a country without infrastructure the UN managed to assemble country-wide 'free and fair' elections by temporarily putting in place country-wide election infrastructure through no less than 10.000 UN-flights.

To supply their operations in Congo, the UN and other large humanitarian organizations rely on large transnational logistical chains that are partly privatized and partly overlap with East Africa's main transport corridors to haul their material equipment and personnel into North Kivu (see Figure 7 on p. 137). From Goma onward logistics is much more problematic because road infrastructure ceases to exist. Humanitarian infrastructural power projection within Congo concerns a parallel infrastructural transport assemblage—'logistics corridors' constituted by special military trucks and an elaborate humanitarian air transport system—overlapping only summarily with decrepit Congolese infrastructures, restricted to humanitarian personnel and to the bare operational necessities of opening up and stabilizing humanitarian space in key sites. Thus, while the notion of humanitarian space in the first place might appear to denote nothing more than the neutral background of action, as a grid-like bounded space (Fredriksen 2013: 3-4), infrastructural techniques are endogenous to the co-production of internationalized humanitarian spaces, local governance and even a democratic Congolese political order.

However, the most direct articulation of humanitarian space, and hence expression of humanitarian infrastructural power in governing 'vulnerable populations', is constituted by the approximately 55 IDP camps that are located around North Kivu and which house approximately 350,000 people. Refugee camps such as Mugunga 3, located around 7 km outside of Goma, are institutionalized spaces of exception (Elden 2006: 482). Besides the obvious adaptations to the built environment they entail—water and sanitation, fencing of the camp, compartmentalization into zones and within zones tent numbers—increasingly, international humanitarian actors are deploying more advanced technologies of rule for IDP governance. UNHCR and UNOPS have started using GIS and biometric registration of refugees in order to more efficiently administer refugees, and share data among humanitarian partners through the Data Center for IDPs, 'an up-to-date and real-time database that allows for population tracking and the production of disaggregated data on IDP populations' run by UNOPS in Goma and which facilitate acting on humanitarian populations from humanitarian centers of calculation across the globe (UNHCR 2013).

In contrast to the semi-permanent nature of refugee camps, most of the infrastructural power projection of humanitarian involves more 'mobile' logistical technologies and infrastructural presences that produce a shifting archipelago of temporarily localized humanitarian spaces (cf. Agier 2010: 38; Pandolfi 2003; Smirl 2008: 240; Wiredu & Sørensen 2006).

While the above discussion perhaps conveys the impression of a smooth functioning logistical apparatus of humanitarian power, in practice, the capacity to stabilize humanitarian space to allow for humanitarian operations in anything

but very local contexts is severely circumscribed, despite the vast infrastructural apparatus that underpins the humanitarian assemblage in North Kivu. This is partly for security reasons. The archipelago of humanitarian spaces is continuously monitored by UN agencies that assemble snapshots of 'humanitarian access' both in terms of infrastructural constraints and the shifting topography of insecurity. The adjacent map (Figure 15) is an example superimposing infrastructural disassembly (in red and orange) on red flash points of security incidents, producing a geography of danger in North Kivu that challenges the projection of humanitarian space (OCHA 2013: 11). Even MONUSCO has in many instances been unable to swiftly project coercive power because of these challenges (Boutellis 2013: 4; Ponthieu, Vogel & DerDerian 2013).

Because of these restrictions in North Kivu, the possibility for humanitarians to circulate through 'humanitarian space' to gather data and act on their objects of governance often requires the local and temporary projection of both coercive and infrastructural power in the form of military logistical support to humanitarian activities (MONUC 2006: 14-15). While NGOs until the late 1990s avoided working with the UN to retain humanitarian space, now, under significant competition from each other and private contractors, their access to humanitarian space in ever-more contested environments depends increasingly on collaborating with politicized UN missions to gain access to their logistics (Bolletino 2007: 8). The UN simply has most infrastructural power to muster in the production of humanitarian space. Just to illustrate, in 2009 only 0,9% of 5.300 km of roads was accessible to humanitarians in North Kivu, mainly around Goma. The rest of the humanitarian expeditions into the province—mostly assessment and monitoring—required some form of either infrastructural intervention and/or UN military escorts (OCHA 2009: 8). In order to facilitate this, UNOPS annually spends around USD 42 million on physical infrastructure-related projects in the DRC (UNOPS 2011: 22) and MONUSCO peacekeepers conduct over a hundred military escorts annually to protect civilian aid workers.

Perhaps most notable among these temporary humanitarian projections of infrastructural and coercive power are the UN's mobile operating bases, which aim at temporarily projecting coercive power, for instance to allow humanitarian access. MONUSCO uses three different kinds of operating bases: temporary operating bases (*Tobs*), mobile operating bases (*Mobs*) and company operating bases (*Cobs*). The strategy behind deploying these bases—which have no aggressive mandate—resembles the use of the colonial Force Publique as a visual display of force to dissuade disorder (cf. Reynaert 2011: 25). The intertwining of military infrastructural and coercive power through the projection of humanitarian space makes it difficult to distinguish between the humanitarian worker on a forward operating base or traveling in UN convoy or the peacekeepers—they are part of the same assemblage engendered by the integrated use of international military infrastructure.

This civil-military entanglement of logistical chains and the temporary humanitarian spaces activated through them, combined with the fact that humanitarian spaces are expressly *depoliticized* spaces (Weizman 2012: 60), suggests that the aggregate topography of humanitarian spaces are extricated from Congolese political (dis)order. They are disembedded, access-restricted enclaves within which the 'normal' political (dis)order of the surrounding Congolese landscape is suspended in favor of an infrastructurally mediated, hybrid military-civilian, and internationalized humanitarian order. While it is increasingly becoming acknowledged within the 'international community' that humanitarian governance is to some extent political (particularly through linkages with stabilization operations), the ever-increasing involvement of humanitarian organizations entangled in the governance of expanding spheres of life of Congolese in North Kivu as a technical matter, resembles the way in which the Belgian colonial government explicitly conceived of its activities with the 'indigenous order' as non-political but rather a matter of 'administration'.

Private security and humanitarian order

Goma has been designated the regional logistical cluster hub for many organizations involved, meaning that it forms the base where a wide array of technological infrastructures are flown in, stored, operated, and from where logistical missions are dispatched into the hinterland of the province. Most visible among the resulting changes in Goma is the vast proliferation of compounds, trucks, antennas, jeeps, containers, aircrafts, generators, latrines and construction material, often adorned with the logo of the UN or other large humanitarian organizations. This is only likely to increase as the UN is expected to move its operational HQ and offices from Kinshasa to Goma throughout 2014.

The humanitarian topography in North Kivu extends beyond humanitarian space in the classical definition, and is tied into an archipelago that is related to the international humanitarian presences in Congo. Given the persistent concentration of unrest in the East of the country and specifically the Kivu provinces, much of the annual budget of MONUSCO and the broader international development aid—a stunning total of 7 billion USD annually (Development Initiatives 2013; MONUSCO & OHCHR 2012)—is channeled through, and spent from, Goma. Much of this money is used to fund not only over a thousand expatriate humanitarian workers and at least double that number of national humanitarian staff (numbers by OCHA, see Table 3 on p. 184), but also the vast logistical apparatus they bring with them. Furthermore, in Goma, I found all manner of subcontractors who provide essential logistical and security services to the humanitarian community, which the overview by OCHA of the humanitarian community (OCHA 2011) excludes. Büscher and Vlassenroot (2010) describe how a whole formal economy, including occidental-style hotels and supermarkets, has arisen in Goma, mimicking the surroundings, institutions, rules and comforts humanitarians and peacekeepers are used to elsewhere.

This vast assemblage of humanitarian organizations, valuable technological infrastructures, and wealth is however highly contested. Informal conversations with inhabitants of Goma show that many Congolese are disappointed with the results of this hugely expensive and pervasive invasion of Goma. While the international humanitarian order needs to stand outside the socio-political and economic fabric of the context in which it is supposed to intervene, the presence of a vast number of expatriate humanitarian workers and the vast capital they spend professionally and privately profoundly impact on local urban dynamics. Additionally, the concentrations of wealth, infrastructure and white people contrast starkly with the surrounding urban landscape—affected by a mix of the volcanic eruption in 2002, successive rebel occupations and inflows of refugees—and as such form a ready target for petty theft, looting, and other forms of crime. While detailed records are difficult to come by, access to monthly reports by the UN Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) in Goma indicate that not a month goes by without incidents against humanitarian personnel or property in Goma, and a centralized database of humanitarian security incidents indicates that since the arrival of the humanitarian community in Congo, at least 150 humanitarian staff have been heavily wounded or killed in the country.¹⁴⁵ The most important threat to humanitarian space is by far material damage. Indeed, a cursory perusal of UNDSS weekly security reports to humanitarian staff in North Kivu¹⁴⁶ shows that the majority of security incidents centrally reported concerns damage and

¹⁴⁵ <https://aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/search?detail=1&country=CD> (last visited 12-11-2013)

¹⁴⁶ Source: access to non-public weekly humanitarian security reports.

theft of things, not violence against people. According to one humanitarian security manager in Goma,

‘Most of our security incidents [in Congo] do not involve our staff. Of course, those incidents get most attention because it’s about people, but Congolese don’t generally harm expat staff. The real issue is our materiel: theft of satellite phones, laptops, fuel, construction materials, damages to vehicles and all of that. It stops the workflow, you can’t work for weeks, because maintenance and restocking is terribly expensive and because our stuff comes from across the globe it takes long—not to mention the paperwork. So the thing is really: how do you secure all the stuff our people need to do their work?’¹⁴⁷

That is, in practice, a key concern of humanitarian security managers is to secure the logistical infrastructure so central to humanitarian work, without which the international humanitarian order is considered to be imperiled because without humanitarian logistics and technologies of inscription, it is impossible to do the kind of technical work necessary to act on humanitarian objects of governance. It is for this reason that local security incidents resulting in material losses are construed as threats to humanitarian identity and the international humanitarian order (e.g. Vaughn 2009: 272; cf. Renouf 2011). Concomitantly, while the notion of humanitarian space initially surged as an answer by humanitarian organizations to perceived increases of political pressures on impartial humanitarian action (Esteves 2010), the security incidents involving humanitarian personnel or goods in North Kivu—ranging from violent attacks to petty crime—have come to be defined as threats to, or the shrinking of, humanitarian space (OCHA 2013: 4; cf. Hubert & Brassard-Boudeau 2010).

This means that the traditional understanding of humanitarian space as an anti-political space—explored in the previous section—has started to become securitized. The notion of humanitarian security derives exactly from the experience that such space is *not* in place and its borders are in fact *too* permeable, turning humanitarian space and security into controversies. This is reflected in the definition of humanitarian space that former president of MSF, Rony Brauman, coined in the late 1990s. For him, humanitarian space is a ‘space of freedom in which we are free to evaluate needs, free to monitor the distribution and use of relief goods’. According to this framing, it is a synonym for a secure ‘humanitarian operating environment’ (cited in Grombach Wagner 2005: 24). While this discourse is detached from the material environment in which humanitarians operate, as the previous section has shown, this operating environment—and the international humanitarian order more generally—derives its particularities as international humanitarian space from the infrastructural power that projects it.

¹⁴⁷ Source: interview humanitarian security manager, Goma, December 2010, translation by author.

This section explores how the securitization of humanitarian space plays out in Goma and how it entails the inextricable intertwining of private security companies into the fabric of the international humanitarian order.

Securing international humanitarian order

While one can by no means speak of an integrated security apparatus, increasing efforts by a host of large organizations that are globally involved in international development and humanitarian operations facilitate the connection, integration, and standardization of security measures for the intervention assemblage. These efforts to integrate humanitarian security entail an aggregate strategy very similar to the way in which international mining companies combine coercive power with corporate development schemes to secure their operations in Congo (see previous chapter). The now dominant Saving Lives Together (SLT) initiative—a program aimed at UN and NGO security collaboration—is illustrative, as it is premised on merging UN physical security measures such as deterrence and protection with the ‘acceptance’ security management theory of many NGO’s (IASC 2011; cf. Sokpoh, Levy-Simancas & de Geoffroy 2004).

However, interviews indicated that the merging of humanitarian security measures is the result, not of a top-down discourse lodged within the War on Terror, but rather the result of the increasingly standardized interactions around security between aid organizations that rely on the joint socio-technical security reporting, monitoring, and management systems.¹⁴⁸ Security incidents involving one humanitarian organization are inscribed in such systems and by circulating among the ‘humanitarian community’ become decontextualized security incidents against which each member of the international humanitarian community needs to arm itself (Vaughn 2009: 267 & 275). After the General Assembly adopted ‘Saving Lives Together’, the United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) started adopting a more central role within the UN, but it also entailed that NGOs working under this security regime needed to hire a separate field security manager—often ex-military—to liaise with UNDSS’s local SLT representative. In practice, this means that humanitarian organizations hire security managers or directors from the private security field, thus integrating security knowledge and practices from that field into the fabric of humanitarian security governance. The tightening association between humanitarian development agencies and security is also strengthened by the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which aims to increase correspondence in security practices across the humanitarian assemblage through a program targeting ‘good practices for humanitarians in complex security environments’ (Egeland, Harmer and Stoddard 2011). Furthermore, shared international security stand-

¹⁴⁸ Source: interviews conducted with humanitarian security managers in Goma, Kinshasa and New York.

ards are enshrined in such efforts as UN Minimum Standards for Security; the European Interagency Security Forum, collaboration efforts at sharing security information and training in Goma.

To the extent that such efforts hinge on the institutionalized inscription of security events, we can therefore speak of a UN-centric epistemic security infrastructure that allows security incidents, best practices and norms to circulate across the ascendant network of ‘humanitarian security’ experts, leading to the similar translation of security measures from one context to another—raising, as the responsible OCHA officer in Goma put it, ‘humanitarian security awareness’.¹⁴⁹ Such developments in effect enhance the consolidation of a homogeneous ‘humanitarian order’ as a distinct security ‘referent object’ with specific characteristics and security needs and co-produces it as external to the security threats it identifies.

In effect, SLT itself resulted from increased incidents against UN personnel and humanitarians in such disparate settings as Afghanistan and Somalia, while leading to shifts in security governance in field offices in locations that are arguably unrelated, such as Goma in the DR Congo. Ultimately, the goal of UNDSS is to impose a security regime on the global archipelago of humanitarian spaces that is ‘globally applicable in a consistent, de-politicised manner’ (UNDSS 2010: 10), indicating the extent to which security arrangements have become dislodged from individual contexts and become efforts to manage local risks as a global security threat.

The humanitarian private security apparatus

‘We are hired by people who have things and who want those things secured’ —PSC manager in Goma¹⁵⁰

The notion of ‘apparatus’ is used here consciously to convey that humanitarian security not only increasingly concerns a shared global norm on the use of coercive power to safeguard internationalized humanitarian spaces, but that the production of secure humanitarian space also hinges on the intertwining of infrastructural power through these security arrangements—what can be labeled the ‘bunkerization’ of humanitarian space (Duffield 2010; IRIN 2009; Pingeot 2012).

In Goma, this bunkerization hinges crucially on the UNDSS security system. In response to elevated threats to humanitarian security in Goma and across the globe, in 2011 UNDSS determined the overall threat level in Goma at three (‘considerable risk of armed conflict’) and four for the rest of North Kivu in its new

¹⁴⁹ Source: interview OCHA, Goma, September 2012

¹⁵⁰ Source: interview NGO security manager, Goma, July 2011

Security Level System, which means, among other things, that all MONUSCO employees and expatriate employees of affiliated agencies are obliged to hire private security at their homes and offices and are only allowed to move through the highly secured spaces of Goma.¹⁵¹

This entails the building in of security measures into the architecture of the humanitarian spaces. In the most direct sense, the ‘technological zone’ of humanitarian agencies in Goma—all compounds of humanitarian personnel and logistical infrastructures—are secured by fortress-like walling and fencing technologies. Many of the humanitarian organizations mimic the high military standards set by MONUSCO and UN agencies leading to a homogenization of the militarized outward appearance of humanitarian space in Goma. This involves barb-wiring of compound walls, double entry gates, and often a security checkpoint. While many of the fortified aid compounds mainly cluster in one *quartier* (Himbi), the compounds are not joint and humanitarian space thus comprises an archipelago of compounds dotting the urban landscape of Goma. The fortification of humanitarian space is considered crucial as, in the words of Lisa Smirl, ‘compounds secure the vehicles, materials, and delivery systems that are used to interact with the target beneficiaries and provide communications networks when others have been destroyed, or are not working’ (2008: 241).

While the material security setup of humanitarian security is immutable and ‘silent’, this territorialization of humanitarian space is indicative of an understanding of those who built it of their relation to the wider environment (Duffield 2010: 455). The compound, in its defensive functionality, conveys an understanding of the outside environment as one that is not under control nor necessarily secure—the environment is potentially hostile and the humanitarian subject beleaguered.

Just like spaces of humanitarian intervention, the production of humanitarian bubbles involves the entanglement of infrastructural power and coercive power, that is, the ‘right’ hand of international humanitarian presence. In the same way that a few guards would hardly be able to secure the bulky volume of their humanitarian clients so too are material security arrangements such as walls, barb-wire and fences in and of themselves incomplete security solutions. Agency is distributed across human and non-human elements of the humanitarian security apparatus—indeed, the first indicator of the presence of an international humanitarian organization is constituted by the private security guards that patrol compounds, man gates, or sit in compound watchtowers.

Table 4. Overview of the private security sector in Goma

¹⁵¹ Source: interview UNDSS, Goma, July 2011

CHAPTER 8

Name company	Since	Personnel in Goma	Former militia	Police	Main clients
1. HDW	2006	725	'A lot'	24	Only IO's/NGO's; 30% MONUSCO
2. Delta Protection		238			
3. Magenya		28		3	UNDP
4. Royal Sec		85		8	Mainly local businesses
5. Graben	2002	120	15%	3	80% IO's/NGO
6. Star Sec		30			
7. Top SIG		75			Mainly extractives
8. G4S	2005	85			Mainly IO's
9. KK Security	2002	700	15% ex-military 5% ex-militia		MONUSCO
10. Warrior Security	2010	50			
11. Beta Security		32			
12. GSA		70			
13. HSS (Humanitarian Security Services)	2011	45			Only IO's/NGO's
14. Protigent	2011	20			

Source: compiled by author through fieldwork and interviews in Goma, 2010-2013. Many PSC were reluctant to provide detailed information on their modalities of cooperation with the Police. The 'main clients' category reflects assessments by management-level private security managers.

There are currently around 20 private security companies in Goma, including global ones such as G4S and national ones such as Graben Security and Star Security (see Table 4 above). Whereas Büscher and Vlassenroot found only four PSC in Goma (KK Security, Delta Protection, Graben Security, and Intersec) in 2008 (2010: 267), this number tripled in less than two years, while in late 2010, the four found were complemented by Human Dignity in the World (HDW), Magenya Protection, Royal Security, Star Security, Top Security, and G4S—one year later, the number had risen again.

Two local PSC stand out for being dedicated solely to humanitarian security: HDW and HSS, the latter a recent breakaway from the former. In interviews,¹⁵² HDW personnel explain that the PSC started out in 1994 as a national humanitarian subcontractor created by UN agencies involved in the management of the humanitarian spaces of refugee camps. Beside camp logistics and static guarding of humanitarian materiel, HDW gradually became involved in broader private security services to international humanitarian organizations, and in 1999—with the arrival of MONUC—HDW started taking security-only guarding contracts. In 2010, the Congolese government forced HDW—employing by that time well over 4,000 private security guards—to register as a commercial security company; the organization, however, still uses the same name for its commercial humanitarian security branch and for the humanitarian subcontracting work they still do. The way Graben Security profiles itself best underscores the centrality of logistics and infrastructure for prospective clients. The company’s full name is ‘Graben Technique, Logistique et Security’ and, according to its manager, it provides the full spectrum of logistical support, maintenance and security work necessary for any international client—80% humanitarian, 20% mining and banks—to conduct its operations in Congo in a space within which infrastructural power is core to operations and thus a core referent object (see chapter 6).¹⁵³

A survey I conducted in Goma indicates that the approximately 1,100 humanitarian expats in Goma (see Table 3 above) employ and concentrate around them around 1,800 private security guards, 80% of the total in the city. All international humanitarian organizations—irrespective of their vocation—use private security contractors in Goma. This means private security companies are literally built into the humanitarian space of the city, and humanitarian-employed private security companies, while made up of locals, are paid to police the border between intervener and intervened. As one local PSC manager puts it:

‘Most international humanitarians budget in private security even before they arrive here. Private security is an a priori. It provides security and stability. For the others, when they arrive they see all other humanitarian organizations have PSC, so they want it too, because they think Goma is insecure. They’re trying to protect themselves against fear. It’s a question of mentality, because there’s a lot of Congolese that have just as much money, cars, computers and so forth but no private security!’¹⁵⁴

For the private security sector, humanitarian clients have become so important that the international association of private security contractors in 2012

¹⁵² Source: interviews HDW, Goma 2010 & 2011

¹⁵³ Source: interview, Goma, 2010. However, in Goma PSC guards do not only provide security services, but operate across a specter that includes maintenance of logistical equipment and attendant functions like opening the gate.

¹⁵⁴ Source: interview HDW, Goma 2011

changed its name to the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA)—employing the key term around which the United Nations mission in Congo is organized. A swath of hybrid organizations—a mix of non-governmental and commercial organizations catering exclusively to the humanitarian community—has arisen that consults exclusively in humanitarian security and logistics, provides training in security and mobility specifically for humanitarian organizations, and produces security and risk assessments.

MONUSCO is the single largest consumer of private security in the DRC. In 2012, it employed 1.191 guards, rising to 2.000 if one takes the entire UN.¹⁵⁵ In Goma, the UN and agencies hire about 30% of all private security guards.¹⁵⁶ All expatriate humanitarians employed by large agencies are required to employ private security guards at their home, select them from a list of UNDSS, and have the costs reimbursed by the UN or their respective employer.¹⁵⁷ As a result, security guards in military-looking outfits bar anything that does not look like a 4x4 jeep from entering barb-wired, watch-towered and fenced humanitarian spaces (Schouten 2011b).

The entanglements of infrastructural security technologies and private security guards work to structure ‘the physical and material encounter between international aid worker and local beneficiary’ (Smirl 2008: 238). This illustrates that the ways in which private security companies co-constitute political order in Goma cannot be understood by taking private security companies as discrete actors—their agency firmly depends on their entanglement with infrastructural security arrangements and only becomes visible as a component of the local production of enclaved spaces associated with the international humanitarian order when analyzed in relation to humanitarian space in Goma.

As with mining companies (see previous chapter), the ‘human’ component of the humanitarian security apparatus is often complemented by armed police. As private security companies are by law prohibited to carry arms, Congolese police agents carrying Kalashnikovs are hired to accompany private security guards deployed at humanitarian compounds. In Goma, this is loosely formalized in a separate unit of the police, the so-called *brigade* or *battalion de garde*. The chief of police in Goma estimates that currently, around 600 police agents are hired out to private clients in Goma in this way, but he admits that commanders of other units also hire out individual police agents.¹⁵⁸ He adds: ‘For around USD 100 monthly, anyone in Goma can hire an armed police agent’.

¹⁵⁵ Source: interview UNDSS Kinshasa, 2012.

¹⁵⁶ Source: interview with PSC manager, Dec. 2010

¹⁵⁷ Source: Interview UNDSS, Goma, July 2011, cf. (Büscher & Vlassenroot 2010: 267)

¹⁵⁸ Source: Interview with PNC Goma 2010

When asked why clients do not just hire police guards and bypass private security companies, clients and PSC point to two main reasons. First is that PSC guards are better trained and disciplined and as such are pivotal to adhering to protocol and overseeing armed police guards. Second and related, PSC have more infrastructural power—logistical and communication technologies that the police lack. The manager of KK Security, for instance, explains that communications equipment allows governing PSC guards at a distance, requiring them to report every 30 minutes to HQ.¹⁵⁹ More generally, all PSC working for humanitarian agencies have logistical capabilities allowing them to rapidly dispatch mobile intervention teams, where the Congolese police lacks such means.

The integration of the police into humanitarian security arrangements means that the security apparatuses around humanitarian spaces in Goma are not straightforwardly private, but rather more ambiguous assemblages, as they formally incorporate representatives of Congolese political order into their arrangements. Police agents detached at PSC often receive training to comply with the rules and protocol of their employer. According to the manager of private security company HDW, ‘this way, we turn the Congolese police into HDW police’.¹⁶⁰ Because the Congolese state is reassembled in this way inside the private security arrangements for internationalized humanitarian space, the contrast is thus rather between disproportionally securitized international humanitarian spaces on the one hand and criminalized urban public space (cf. Reyntjes 2005)—where the police behave as agents of disorder (Smith 2011: 19)—on the other. As such, the humanitarian security assemblage not only co-constitutes a secure international humanitarian order but also co-produces a particular kind of Congolese state, in service of that order.

It is significant, however, that the same security regime—and living standards—do not hold for the national staff of international organizations or the employees of local NGOs implementing much of the developmental work (cf. Bolletino 2007: 8; Smirl 2008: 241). In an interview a UNDSS manager in Goma explained that ‘nationals do not get private security reimbursed because they can find other informal ways of securing themselves’.¹⁶¹ However, in Goma, this has led to a systematic crime displacement meaning that most security incidents, thefts and burglaries actually occur with national staff—because they aren’t entitled to the same security measures.¹⁶² In line with what Mark Duffield (2007) argues, the international humanitarian order seems to translate into the institutionalization of two distinct normative regimes in Goma: one for those belonging

¹⁵⁹ Source: interview with KK Security, Goma 2011

¹⁶⁰ Source: interview Goma Dec. 2010

¹⁶¹ Source: interview UNDSS, Goma, 2011

¹⁶² Source: interview with UNDSS, viewing of crime statistics, and interviews with local NGOs.

to the international humanitarian order and another for ‘locals’. Despite this, UNDSS maintains, as we have seen earlier, that it imposes an international security regime that is ‘globally applicable in a consistent, de-politicised manner’ (UNDSS 2010: 10) upon the urban architecture.

Finally, because one of the central points in the mandate of MONUSCO is the protection of civilian aid workers, peacekeepers not only figure as key security consumers but also as providers part of the humanitarian security apparatus, deployed around key agencies and accompanying, as we have seen in the previous section, the temporary projection of humanitarian space in North Kivu. Given that blue helmets are more concerned with protecting humanitarians than civilian populations at large, as Vircoulon puts it, in Congo, ‘the blue helmets often simply figure as a mere international guarding force’ (2005: 85, translation by author). While the UN vigorously insist on regarding blue helmets as public security forces,¹⁶³ the partial provision of security in service of the international humanitarian order makes them one more addition to the internationalized humanitarian security assemblage.

In historical perspective, the security arrangements in Goma can be contrasted with the architectonic government at the apex of Belgian colonialism, during a large part of the first half of the 20th century, when colonial residencies and institutions were organized in neighborhoods that were off-limits to natives, something that was built into urban planning, ingrained in the natives themselves, and reinforced by colonial police (see chapter 4). While this still takes place to a certain extent in Goma—with many humanitarians clustering in a single neighborhood—the spatialization of security around expatriates and their limited physical presence is more atomized and decentralized, making its spatial articulation in some ways closer to the model of the militarized trading outpost system of the period of expansion of the Léopoldian Free State. Adding the transformations that Goma underwent during nearly two decades of humanitarian bunkerization to its central role as a regional trading and smuggling hub, has turned the city into a postmodern version of the garrison-depot (Roitman 1998).

Securitizing humanitarian space

To the extent that international humanitarians—particularly those of organizations attached to the UN mission—are instructed to remain within spaces that irrevocably combine infrastructural security arrangements with a hybrid assemblage of security agents, their perception of the operating environment of Goma and the wider province and the security situation in it are profoundly distorted by the security apparatus. While international actors—standing out as they do for their skin color, lofty compounds, and expensive jeeps—indeed form an obvi-

¹⁶³ Source: interview UN political officer in Kinshasa, September 2012

ous object for theft and as such are perhaps targeted disproportionately by crime, the structural securitization of their presence paradoxically only helps to underscore their fragility. Indeed, when conducting an interview with UNDSS—the UN’s security service—one humanitarian officer complained to the agency’s manager that she found the deployment of military-looking private security guards and a police officer armed with a Kalashnikov in front of her organizations’ compound disconcerting and felt it led to heightened tension and thus, insecurity. However, while many individual humanitarians would attest to that, the aggregate tendency engendered by their institutional presence is that of an acceleration of the bunkerization of humanitarian space. Since 2011, in a mimicking of the UN, an increasing number of aid compounds in Goma have installed guard towers next to the gate or, in the case of larger compounds, also on all four corners of their site. Seen on the aggregate level, large parts of Goma are militarized; this bunkerization entails the privatization of public space and the production of two alternate segregated urban spatialities.

This purely material and architectural expression of the disentanglement of the intervention assemblage from its surroundings is, however, only part of the security apparatus involved. The extrication of humanitarian space through physical security measures and private security companies is reinforced by the security and safety policies that interveners—both humanitarians and civilian peacekeeping staff—are required to observe when in Goma. It concerns a set of precautionary principles that humanitarian expatriate staff are supposed to observe, policies that are centrally determined by UNDSS.¹⁶⁴ According to standard security protocol, humanitarian security has become the first and foremost way in which aid workers have to ‘see’ the Goma as they navigate the city (cf. Löwenheim 2007).

This is facilitated by the continuous inscription and circulation of private security knowledge through the humanitarian assemblage. PSC are important actors in producing humanitarian security knowledge as their own mappings of the spatial distribution of security and insecurity become part of the security strategies of humanitarian organizations. HDW, for instance, divides the city into different parts each under the mandate of an inspector. This also translates into ‘*grands points d’intervention*’ where private security intervention teams are statically deployed. This re-organization of space along the lines of private security


¹⁶⁴ Source: interview UNDSS, Kinshasa, September 2012. However, as the UNDSS director in Kinshasa explained, the security level is outcome of controversy and struggle between different agency’s security measures + DSS staff. Some agencies want to make it a family post, but that requires a level 3 hospital, fire brigade, and facilities for the families, thousands. Other agencies—the hard core, like UNHCR and WFP—want to keep it a non-family post because that means that the people who will work for them will not be ‘softies’ but people that work 19 hours a day, and, frankly, these kind of people *don’t want* it to become a family base, because that would mean being with the family all the time.

management is subsequently picked up and translated by humanitarian actors in their own mapping of Goma. OCHA, for instance, distributes maps to aid workers in Goma with the deployment of these intervention teams as a security navigation tool for the humanitarian community in Goma (see Figure 16). Through this, spaces in Goma guarded by private security companies are legitimized as safe points for the humanitarian assemblage, as humanitarian spaces part of the international humanitarian order. Aid workers are precluded from entering certain 'red zones' in the town and can only visit a set of accredited spaces that monitored by and conform to the UNDSS security regime. As such, hotels, bars, restaurants and potential living quarters have been preselected for humanitarians.¹⁶⁵ According to the logic of UNDSS, spaces that are not vetted are potentially dangerous. As expat humanitarians are finally precluded from strolling about, using public transport, and have to adhere to security curfews, the formal segregation from Congolese popular life is nearly complete.

The aggregate securitization of humanitarian space means it is hard to avoid falling back on the typical anecdotes about Congo that circulate through the social outlets of humanitarian space (Koddenbrock & Schouten 2014). While it can be argued that this only operates at the level of individual perceptions, such security arrangements directly inform NGO policies, entangled as they are with the way in which humanitarian space is conceived as a depoliticized space. To put it the other way around, the production of an external, depoliticized space where humanitarian action can take place has become a security matter. This means that while aid workers and their enclaved logistical apparatus are central in mapping Congo as an object of intervention, their agency is circumscribed through the security arrangements that direct their gaze and movements through an archipelago of security-vetted spaces.

¹⁶⁵ Source: interviews with aid workers and UNDSS, Goma, July 2011

Figure 16. Map of Goma indicating deployment of Congolese Police and private security companies in 2011



Source: OCHA

Global connection through local disconnection?

Because the work of international humanitarian organizations hinges predominantly on the inscription and circulation of knowledge related to their humanitarian object of governance to relevant audiences—donors and concerned publics—this means that the discursive presence of these development organizations is overwhelming on a Western stage, because their development discourses circulate rapidly through social and news media after each new humanitarian disaster in North Kivu (cf. Abrahamsen & Williams 2014). By contrast, their presence on the ground—and, arguably, their impact on the lives of the humanitarian population in Goma—is strangely circumscribed, standing in stark contrast to the sense of grand urgency conveyed by their communication to global publics. The international humanitarian order in Goma—circumscribed to self-contained bunkerized compounds, only venturing outside over highly securitized pathways for temporary excursions armed with mobile technologies—conveys a different sense of the mission of development organizations.

Since UN agencies—owing to the UN’s insistence that the mission is there by government invitation—needs to follow a strict policy of negotiating security policies only with national governments,¹⁶⁶ local power brokers and civil society representatives see themselves as cut off from the money flows and processes of decision-making concerning the political-economic architecture that emerges.¹⁶⁷ Büscher & Vlassenroot report in Goma of the ‘general perception of the humanitarian presence as a money-making enterprise, profiting from conflict and human suffering, and serving the international donor community in the first place’ (2010: 268; cf. Sokpoh, Levy-Simancas & de Geoffroy 2004). These impressions hold true to the extent that the parts of the stunning USD 7 billion in official development aid that are not channeled to political elites in Kinshasa, does not even leave donor countries, either by being spent on administration in the offices of development organizations, or transferred to the accounts of subcontractors, technical experts, and consultants from donor countries (see Development Initiatives 2013; cf. Annan 2004: 37). As development aid hinges crucially on a process of translation mediated by technologies of inscription, this means that development activities—just as the extractive economy—can expand and flourish without any aid actually reaching Congolese.

A humanitarian program officer showed me around the office where a prestigious and vastly expensive humanitarian program was executed, and pointed out:

‘Look, what do you see here? We’re 3, and a bunch of computers, airco, and a working fridge. Do you think that if donors really cared about our mission they wouldn’t have that reflected in our mandate? Perhaps in the end a visit to some of the offices here [in Goma, red] should tell you that underneath public talk there is no political will—neither at home nor in Kinshasa—to actually change anything.’¹⁶⁸

This can be better understood when related to the way in which aid can be seen as a mechanism of extraverted rule, configured from and in the service of interests decided in distant centers of power. Trefon (2011) posits that policy documents of international development programs, which display a high level of engagement and ambition in lofty language, are a diplomatic ‘masquerade’ for many international efforts have hardly had any impact. And indeed, a recent audit of the overall impact of the EU’s efforts in Congo suggests that the results in terms of improvements of the lives of vulnerable populations are most notable for their absence (ECA 2013). Instead, the global expansion of humanitarianism

¹⁶⁶ Security of UN staff is traditionally a responsibility of the host country.

¹⁶⁷ Source: interview governorate of North Kivu and local bureaucrats, Goma, July 2011

¹⁶⁸ Source: interview UN-agency officer Goma Sep. 2012

is coupled with the local proliferation of security spaces and asymmetrical power relations. This is important for the purposes of our analysis as it shows the degree to which, in a long historical tradition, extraverted mechanisms of aid in Congo are irrevocably accompanied by the deployment of coercive power.

However, I do not want to suggest that a seamlessly disembedded humanitarian system is in place. First, it is common knowledge in Goma that some of the buildings that expat interveners hire, and the hotels they visit, are indirectly owned by notorious rebel leaders such as Bosco Ntaganda of M23 and Laurent Nkunda.¹⁶⁹ Additionally, during the Second Congo War, RCD made Goma their HQ and international humanitarian organizations that were present substantially contributed both to their revenues—due to import taxes—and to their vary capacity to run a stable town because aid organizations provided for much-needed social and health services (Büscher 2011: 135). While interveners aim at disentangling themselves from crime and corruption, they indirectly sustain some of the prime concerns of their interventions. More broadly, the importance of aid as budget support (around 13% of Congo's budget, cf. World Bank 2006) can be said to support an at least contested regime.

Second, the centrality of security measures to interveners leads to increased mimicking of these measures by Congolese entrepreneurs, who wish to attract expats and their money to their hotels, restaurants, and parcels by building watchtowers and high fences around them. Fancy hotels and bars now frequently also hire PSC guards and build watch towers and barb-wired fences, in order to pass the UNDSS vetting and become entangled into the intervention assemblage. Wealthy Congolese too—including individuals targeted by the UN and the International Criminal Court—by preference 'hang out' and organize their meetings in similar settings as a way of affirming prestige. Additionally, the money circulating in providing security and logistics to the humanitarian community has made the humanitarian assemblage into a key focal point of informal government accumulation. According to an interview with a taxing authority in Goma,¹⁷⁰ the Congolese police is required by their bosses in Kinshasa to make a certain amount of money each month through guarding, showing how the 'state' has formally institutionalized ways to benefit from the enclaved infrastructural topography of the international humanitarian community.

¹⁶⁹ Source: interviews conducted in Goma in 2010 and 2011

¹⁷⁰ Source: interview conducted in Goma, 2011

Chapter summary

While in 1995 it was observed for development projects in Congo that ‘when a government is not capable of [...] maintaining the peace or protecting assets, successful implementation is impossible, no matter how good the project’s design’ (World Bank 1995: 13-14), nearly 2 decades later, it seems humanitarian organizations have structurally adapted to these absences in the ‘operating environment’ by translating infrastructural and coercive power arrangements into the fabric of their own operations. As a result, we see ‘expanded field operations in fragile contexts’ and ‘the blurring of the distinction between civilians and combatants’—at least in the perception of the NGO’s—leading to incidents that in turn prompted a ‘concerted effort [within larger organizations] to institutionalize security measures through improved policy and practice’ (Christian Aid 2010: 2). Locals in Goma—including some national managers of private security companies—see the war-like state of their city as a state of exception, a temporary condition that will eventually subside.¹⁷¹ Yet the way in which the deployment of private security companies and the infrastructural fortification measures has been regulated by Congolese state and incorporated into the protocol of many organizations rather points to a structural transformation in the way in which the international humanitarian order is spatialized locally. Given the historical resonance throughout this thesis, it seems a consistent political ordering pattern.

By superimposing humanitarian security arrangements onto the spaces marked by the physical presence of humanitarian actors, secure humanitarian space has become premised on a physical separation between the space where humanitarians should be able to operate freely and what lies outside it. This spatialization further overlaps with the spatial concentration of infrastructural power, both humanitarian logistical pathways and ‘technological zones’ where humanitarian inscription processes concentrate. In relation to the key concern of this thesis, this chapter has provided an in-depth discussion of the way in which private security companies are entangled in complex processes of the co-constitution of political order in the DRC. UNDSS argues that increased risk to humanitarians result from the fact that ‘some extremist groups targeting humanitarians see only black and white, with little perception of the nuanced shades of neutrality’. It can however be argued that the production of humanitarian space through bunkerization homogenizes humanitarian actors, in effect leading to a Manichean distinction between international spaces and local contexts. So how can we relate this back to the main research question of the thesis? If, for example, in contrast to colonial rule, liberal interventionism purports to work to re-

¹⁷¹ Source: informal conversations with HDW and Kivisiens in Goma

place might with right (Jahn 2012), then the material and spatial arrangement making possible those interventions paradoxically expresses exactly the opposite of these abstract universal values and standards. Indeed, the mechanisms of extraverted ordering involved, strongly resonate the way coercive and infrastructural power were entangled in the extraverted colonial administration. To the degree that the private security assemblages consolidate international humanitarian order, private security companies can be seen as part of political ordering patterns that reactivate colonial lines of power and authority (Schlag 2012; cf. McLean 2004: 373).

9

Conclusions

‘A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ —Max Weber¹⁷²

This one sentence has been enshrined in most political science manuals, and it looms large in the background of the study of private security companies: a search of academic studies explicitly relating private security to Max Weber returned over a thousand results.¹⁷³ If a state monopoly over coercive power and the management of the threat thereof forms the cornerstone of modern political order, it raises a large question mark with regards to the significance of the global rise of private security companies in the post-Cold War period. The key assumption underpinning the attention for the emergence of private security companies is that it marks a significant departure from how security governance has historically related to political order (e.g. Berndtsson 2009: 195; Krahmman 2011b: 2).

However, an implicit centering on Western states has profoundly shaped this particular framing of the debate both empirically and theoretically. As late as 2011, Abrahamsen and Williams note a profound lack of data on private security companies outside the U.S. and Europe feeding into the debate (2011: 36). This absence is of particular significance as it comfortably brackets all the countries where state formation has arguably *never* conformed to the Weberian state monopoly over coercive power. Congo is a case in point of this consistent divergence from Weber’s definition. If Pierre Englebert provocatively asks in 2003 ‘why Congo persists’, much the same has been raised in 1966, when Aristide Zolberg writes that ‘Congo draws our attention to a serious analytic problem: although the country exhibits every “gap” ever imagined by scholars concerned with development and modernization, although it seems to lack the most obvious requisites posited for the maintenance of a political system, it persists’ (1966: 137).

¹⁷² (Weber et al. 1946: 78, emphasis in original)

¹⁷³ Google scholar forced key term search, 15-4-2014

If private security companies form a concern against a historical background constituted by a state monopoly over coercive power, how then to understand this phenomenon in contexts like Congo, which arguably never resembled the Weberian ideal? This brings us to the theoretical ‘Western bias’ pervading the debate. If Weber’s definition, cited above, looms large in theoretical approaches to private security, it concerns a universalization and abstraction of a much more limited claim that Weber made. In the essay where this sentence comes from, Weber repeatedly stresses that this definition applies ‘*only* in the Occident’ (1946: 83, emphasis in original) and then only in the *modern* Occident (ibid: 78; cf. Thomson 1994). Weber wrote it in 1919 and it would have been hard for him to reconcile the transnationalized imperial and colonial relations between coercive power and political order he would have observed in much of the non-Western world with this definition. Thus, the ‘accepted ontology’ regarding the relation between coercive power and political order that private security companies are understood to challenge (Small 2006) is based on a theoretical claim Weber only made for Western Europe. It has even been asked whether the Weberian specter has ever corresponded to historical realities in Western Europe itself (e.g. Owens 2008).

Reflecting similar insights, scholars of private security have started to move away from state-centric understandings of the relation between security governance and political order, theorizing this relationship instead from empirically grounded analysis in non-western contexts. At the forefront of such advances a body of work has emerged that theorizes the spatial entanglements of private security companies and political ordering processes (e.g. Abrahamsen & Williams 2009, 2011; Avant & Hauffler 2012; Crawford 2006; Hönke 2010; Shearing 2005). In its essence, this amounts to a decentering of private security companies: a move away from studying private security companies as discrete actors and rather focusing on the broader configurations of actors—global security assemblages—within which they are situated as a new social form that is the object of study.

Taken together, this discussion about theorizing the empirical relations between private security companies and political order in contexts that diverge from the (Weberian) norm has prompted me to explore the relations between private security companies and the political order in Congo as a case in which broader questions regarding the relations between security governance and political order can be investigated. If the privatization of security does not occur in a context where security is monopolized by the state, then how can we theorize and explore empirically the relevance of private security for political order? Focusing on the spatial entanglement of security governance and political ordering processes, I have asked how private security companies co-constitute political order

in Congo and in which ways this constitutes a departure from how security governance has historically related to political order in Congo. This question has allowed me to problematize some of the assumptions that were mentioned above but continue to pervade how both political (dis)order in Congo and private security companies are understood both within academic debates and policy circles.

The first assumption that is questioned is that the rise of private security companies forms a marked departure from, and challenge to, the way in which security governance has historically been related to political order in Congo. Instead, the study points to the importance of exploring historical continuities in how security governance has related to patterns of political ordering in Congo and of private security as co-constitutive of such patterns. The idea behind formulating the empirical subquestions in similar terms across the historical and contemporary components of the study was that it would allow systematically investigating how private security companies co-constitute and reproduce longer-standing political ordering patterns in Congo. The study indeed revealed important historical continuities in the topographies of coercive power. Private security companies today seem to concentrate around what French colonials called *l'Afrique utile*, those sites where colonialism projected coercive and infrastructural power because they were of use for the colonial political economy. The contemporary dual topography of private security and infrastructural power in Congo seems embedded in longer-standing postcolonial political ordering patterns, which appear to be the product of the durability engendered by infrastructural power projection earlier in history. In sum, the first point is that situating analysis of private security companies within longer-standing historical relations between security governance and political ordering has proven fruitful to articulate how private security companies co-constitute and reproduce durable patterns of political ordering in Congo in ways that might escape a more narrow contemporary focus on private security companies.

The second assumption that this study has tackled is the correlation, implicit in much work building on Weberian notions of political order, between state space and the spatiality of security. The study shows how the spatial distribution of private security companies today, and of historical security arrangements, was never spread out equally over Congolese territory but has rather always concentrated around specific political ordering processes. Third is the assumption that the relation between security governance and political order is determined within a given national territory. Just as security governance in Congo was at the time Weber wrote profoundly entangled in complex colonial relations with 'the Occident', the relationship between private security companies and political order in Congo today is equally entangled in transnationalized ordering patterns.

This study has been driven by a desire to understand the significance of the rise of private security companies in a context where political ordering patterns exist despite the lack of an overarching ‘political order’. Focusing on how private security companies co-constitute political order in such a context helps us to better understand their significance in relation to the durability of particular international configurations of power. In the following section, I recapitulate how this focus has enabled me to explore the role of private security companies in relation to political order by discussing how the explorations of the empirical subquestions together constitute an answer to the overarching research question.

Security governance and political order in Congo since Belgian colonialism

This thesis raised historical questions that derived from the observation that while the contemporary rise of private security is often construed as a departure from a pre-existing state monopoly of force, in much of the postcolonial world, the relation between security governance and political order has arguably never taken that shape. To situate the contemporary rise of private security in Congo within the historical context within it emerged, and to investigate the ways in which the appearance of private security companies constitute a departure from historical relations between security governance and political order in Congo, the following two empirical subquestions were formulated:

- 1a. *How has security governance historically been spatialized around political ordering processes in Congo?*
- 1b. *How did the entanglement of security governance with these processes constitute political ordering patterns?*

In order to address these questions it was required to specify how political ordering processes and patterns were conceived theoretically. The above discussion already recapitulated part of the theoretical approach to political order taken in this study, albeit from a different angle. As was elaborated on in chapter 2, this study follows those literatures within IR that take a spatial approach to security governance, studies that raise a more profound challenge to received notions of ‘political order’ as a stable pre-existing phenomenon. Instead, such literatures point towards the inherently transient nature of modern political ordering—i.e. governance—processes. It was argued that if we can better speak of political ordering processes than the substantive political order, durable political ordering patterns become the exception to be explained. Lodged within a meta-theoretical framework inspired by actor-network theory, I operationalized stable political

ordering patterns as hinging on a ‘connective tissue’ (Stoler 2008: 193) composed of infrastructural power: mediating inherently unstable political associations with infrastructures provides durability of government arrangements over time and throughout space. However, in practice, the projection of infrastructural power is always intertwined with coercive power. I posited that there might be two analytically distinct ways in which the two forms of power are entangled: infrastructural power can appear as a conduit for the projection of coercive power and infrastructural power arrangements can be a referent object for security arrangements. Similar observations led to the central methodological assumption that security governance and political ordering patterns have a physical presence that can be mapped. These topographies of power were taken to constitute *de facto* patterns of political ordering and state formation. This framed the overarching approach I took to answering the main research question, in that I consistently applied this spatial approach to security governance and political ordering patterns to empirically explore both the historical and contemporary research questions. Consequently, this framed the focus of empirical inquiry on the spatial entanglement of security governance efforts and distributions of infrastructural power in historical efforts to stabilize ordering processes into durable patterns of political ordering.

The first historical chapter—chapter four—focused on security governance and colonial political ordering patterns under Belgian rule. It first showed how the Congo Free State hinged disproportionately on the deployment of coercive power and much less on infrastructural conduits of colonial ordering. As a consequence, it is difficult to speak of political ordering patterns in the Free State. The second part of the chapter showed that the Belgian governmental takeover of the colony was marked by a radical surge in the deployment of infrastructural power and the concomitant birth of two extraverted political ordering patterns: one around the ‘Congolese economy’, a system premised on mineral resource extraction, and another around the stabilization of the ‘indigenous order’, a colonial entity composed of the mainstay of Congolese population that was not put to work as labor forces in the mines. The chapter showed how colonial security governance—i.e., the Force Publique—spatially concentrated around, and was consistently interwoven with, the colonial efforts to stabilize these political ordering patterns.

The second historical chapter—chapter five—focused on the transformations that the relation between security governance and colonial political ordering patterns underwent during the period from independence to the end of Mobutu’s rule. The first section of this chapter explored the tumultuous years between 1960-1965 and posited that despite political independence during these years—which I characterized as the extended ‘postcolonial moment’—the international-

zation of these political ordering patterns was radically deepened through a set of mechanisms that privatized the productive assets of Congolese economy and created a dependency on foreign experts for the projection of infrastructural power. These years also entailed the disassembly and internationalization of coercive power. The second section showed how Mobutism evolved hand in hand with an entrenchment of the central involvement of international actors in the governance of the extractive economy and the infrastructures making that extraverted ordering pattern possible. While coercive power was initially centralized in Zaïre, centralized control gradually unwound except for the spaces where critical infrastructures of extraversion were concentrated. In continuity with the colonial spatialization of coercive power, Mobutu deployed special security forces around mining zones and transshipment hubs, while the regular Zairian security forces gradually informalized in all but name. All in all, the chapter described the radicalization of a pattern of enclaved and extraverted state formation set in motion under Belgian colonialism.

To sum up, these historical chapters show that security governance since Belgian colonialism has consistently been spatialized around the critical infrastructures of extraversion, that is, the infrastructural conduits through which political ordering patterns were established and stabilized wherein external actors exercised crucial control over, and accrued the benefits of, domestic governance processes in Congo. Rather than linked to ‘the’ Congolese state, security governance entangled with ordering processes in ‘assemblages’ that defied local/global, civil/military and state/market dichotomies.

Private security companies and political order in contemporary Congo

The second component of the main research question shifts focus towards the present, and the main object of study: the rise, in the post-Cold War period, of the private security sector, that is, formally registered companies that offer security services ranging from static guarding to cash-in-transit and form close protection to logistical support. The overarching aim of the three chapters through which I explore this component was to ask how explicitly for-profit private market actors (i.e. private security companies) are potentially involved in the co-constitution of political order. The contemporary component of the main research question translated into the following two empirical subquestions:

2a. Around which political ordering processes are private security companies spatialized in Congo?

2b. How does their entanglement with these processes constitute political ordering patterns?

The third empirical chapter—chapter six—probed question 2a by exploring the emergence of private security companies situated within a discussion of the contemporary privatization and internationalization of Congo’s infrastructures. It showed how international actors have internalized infrastructural power into their organizational arrangements. This means that infrastructural power has become an endogenous property of international relations to and within Congo. Empirical research showed that private security companies concentrate spatially exactly around those governance processes that involve these transnationalized and privatized infrastructures. Given that security around this privatized infrastructure is now also privatized, I speak of a double privatization of governmental power in contemporary Congo. The topography of private security companies and the limited spatial presence of infrastructures in Congo seem to overlap and could perhaps be seen as two sides of the same coin of political order in Congo.

The fourth and fifth empirical chapters probed question 2b specifically. The fourth empirical chapter—chapter seven—zoomed in on one class of the political ordering processes around which private security companies concentrate: industrial mining. It presented a fieldwork-based investigation of how private security companies help co-constitute an internationalized extractive order around gold mining in Province Orientale. The chapter explored how industrial gold mining hinges crucially on technological infrastructures and showed the ways in which security governance is involved in disentangling gold from the social fabric of the artisanal mining economy in Province Orientale.

The fifth empirical chapter—chapter eight—brought into focus another governance process around which private security companies concentrate: humanitarian governance. It explored the example of humanitarian organizations in North Kivu and argued how assembling the ‘international humanitarian order’ in North Kivu hinges crucially on infrastructural power projection. Based on original field-work derived data, it showed how private security companies form an integral part of the institutionalized arrangements that allow for the projection of humanitarian space as a space detached from, and outside of, Congolese political (dis)order.

The analysis of the embedded cases in these two last chapters speak back to the country case level by showing in detail how private security apparatuses are deployed as a way to disentangle ordering processes and transnational actors from Congo’s political (dis)order. At the same time, I attempted to put into perspective the apparent impermeability of the boundaries of the transnationalized topography of private security by investigating the contingent ways in which

private security apparatuses, in order to advance protection of clients, are themselves tightly interwoven with Congolese state representatives, informal boundary actors, and even rebels and as such are profoundly entangled with exactly the kinds of ‘disorder’ that they are meant to provide distance to.

Securing the critical infrastructure of extraversion?

If the main research question was how private security companies co-constitute political order in Congo and if this thesis asked in which ways that forms a departure from longer-standing relations between security governance and political order in Congo, then on the basis of this study—as summarized above—I can now suggest that private security companies co-constitute political order as guardians of the critical infrastructures of durable extraverted patterns of political ordering, that is, the co-constitution of key governance processes in Congo and of the actors involved as external to Congo’s political order. To say that these governance processes are extraverted is to say that the deployment of coercive and infrastructural power in state-like practices and arrangements targeting them is never really or entirely domesticated within mechanisms of contestation of Congolese state to which Congolese have meaningful access. This thesis showed that rather than constituting a departure from pre-existing relations between security governance and political order, the contemporary situation should be seen as genuinely postcolonial because it reproduces extraverted political ordering patterns that can be firmly traced back to Belgian colonial administration. Just as colonial governmental apparatuses were entanglements of railway and colonial police, so now we see technological zones of mining companies irrevocably accompanied by private security forces. One tragedy in Congo it reveals is that mechanisms of power and, potentially, of development that *could* have been public goods have in fact consistently been extraverted and the property of international power relations.

It can be said that the ‘technological *longue durée*’ (Arnold 2005: 91) formed the leading thread around which the organization of coercive power is explored throughout this thesis. It structures how I traced the ‘entangled history’ (Hönke & Müller 2012) of how distributions of security governance and infrastructures entwined to co-constitute patterns of political ordering. Given the fact that modern infrastructure is most notable for its absence in Congo—the country is the size of Western Europe and, for example, has no more than 3.000 kilometres of paved roads (Bynens & Taylor 2012: 4)—it might seem counterintuitive to have centered inquiry into the political roles of private security companies on critical infrastructure protection. However, in Congo—as elsewhere—infrastructure is

crucial for political order: without transport corridors that connect the copper mines of Katanga to the Indian Ocean, Congo would experience a nearly 30% GDP drop. If the logistics of the UN and peacekeepers were to falter in the Kivus, humanitarian crisis and low-intensity conflict could quickly escalate. ‘Critical infrastructure’ denotes how infrastructures that support crucial governance processes are politically framed as requiring extra protection, for if this infrastructure were to give out, Congolese political order would be threatened (cf. Collier & Lakoff 2008). Perhaps its relative dearth makes infrastructure even more prominent a site of political action, security governance and contestation in Congo. However, paraphrasing a question Gabrielle Hecht raises in another context (2009: 3), how ‘Congolese’ is this critical infrastructure? On one level it seems simple: given these infrastructures are in Congolese territory and support governance processes crucial to Congolese political order, they are Congolese critical infrastructures.

Nonetheless, on another level, the answer is more complex. Pending a large Chinese-Congolese resource-for-infrastructure swap that has been lagging for years, transport corridors in Congo are largely privately laid out, maintained and managed by transnational mining companies. The UN and large international aid organizations have their own logistical networks that bypass, where possible, extended insecure zones within Congo. Infrastructures critical to Congolese political order are thus also critical to the operations of international actors in Congo. In this way, asking the question for whom the infrastructures are critical that private security companies secure in Congo, has shed light on the fact that key political ordering patterns in Congo are extraverted. Yet, that these patterns have not been the property of Congolese state apparatus does not mean that we should consider them as unambiguously ‘private’. Rather, they constitute the site where the ‘governed interdependencies’ (Wiess 2006) between a particular kind of Congolese order and international governance processes are construed and reproduced in durable political ordering patterns.

So how does this investigation allow us to better understand the relationship between security governance and political order more generally? One way of interpreting how this study speaks back to debates on security governance and political order is through the assertion that reducing political order to a monopoly over coercive power—as is the dominant understanding of political order that informs both political sciences and policy—turns Congolese state into a failed state, with private security as part of that failure, and renders invisible other ways of ordering. In particular, the way in which the organization of coercive power in Congo is always concentrated around infrastructures of extraversion is hidden from sight. I have shown that with infrastructure, durable patterns contingent on infrastructure in which foreign actors dislodge *le Congo utile* from the social,

economic and political fabric of Congolese political (dis)order are also placed out of sight, as a technical domain exogenous to politics but lodged in international normative orders. Empirically, this separation can be traced back to the way in which Congolese independence was configured as a separation of coercive and infrastructural power with the latter institutionalized in private international relations. The analytical invisibility of this landscape can be attributed to the fact that infrastructural arrangements have been obscured to studies of private security due to the ‘social bias’ pervading political sciences (e.g. Coole & Frost 2010; Fowles 2010; Latour 2005a). The separation between technical and political matters can ultimately be traced back to the late Enlightenment, whence concerns with each gradually became institutionalized as the exclusive domain of distinct and mutually exclusive branches of science and politics (Shapin & Schaffer 1985; Latour 2005a).

Coming back to the question posed in the introduction, based on this study I can now argue that one possible explanation for why it has been so difficult to draw private security into IR as significant for political order, is that the dominant focus on coercive power in political order might blind us to the ways in which private security and security governance more broadly are interwoven with infrastructural power arrangements that are intrinsic to political ordering patterns. Whereas political sciences have dedicated themselves to studying the relations between political order and security governance to the exclusion of technical matters, my study has shown that in practice, the two are always entwined in political ordering patterns. In particular, through this case study I have shown how bringing the technical ‘back in’ to the study of security governance and political order allows a better theoretical grip on questions of how private security companies co-constitute political order, and of the durability of ordering patterns extending throughout space and time.

The analysis of this study also allows me to speak back to literatures concerned with postcolonial politics. We can speak of a ‘(post)coloniality of power’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013) to emphasize the ways in which contemporary configurations of security governance and political ordering in Congo constitute a kind of infrastructurally-mediated metempsychosis, echoing and reproducing colonial ways of acting on Congo. Yet in articulating the sources of that power, this thesis diverges substantially from postcolonial literatures. In most studies of political order in postcolonies, the exercise of power, to borrow from Patrik Wolfe, ‘has a distinctly Cartesian quality’ (1997: 409) in that it is studied exclusively at the level of ‘culture’. What postcolonial literatures thus share with political sciences, is that by undercutting the centrality of infrastructural power for understanding the role of private security companies, PSC are made into agents of change rather than actors involved in upkeeping an extraverted postcolonial political order.

Foregrounding durable material forms of power in the (re)construction of the political allows attenuating the emphasis on private security companies as representing a sea change in the way that security governance co-constitutes political order in Congo.

While I thus take issue with the reduction of political order to questions of control over coercive power or culture, in no way do I purport that my analysis is not also subject to some sort of reductionist mechanisms. In exploring the relations of security governance and political order in Congo in terms of the entanglement of coercive and infrastructural power, I also hide from view many elements that I recognize would be fundamental to provide a more complete picture of 'political order' in contemporary Congo (e.g. Kabamba 2012; Trefon 2004). The point of the approach adopted in this thesis has rather been to provide a different analytical reduction, if you will, in order to articulate a dynamic that would otherwise remain invisible.

Further research

While, as discussed before, increasing studies come off press in Anglophone academia investigating the role of socio-technical systems in colonial rule and, to a lesser extent, postcolonial state formation (e.g., Carroll 2006; del Testa 1999; Elena & Ordóñez 2000; McClellan & Regourd 2000; Mitchell 1988; Osborne 2000; Raj 2000), to date, I have found no systematic discussion on this topic in relation to Congo. This is unfortunate, because as this preliminary investigation shows, a focus on infrastructure in relation to state formation in Congo opens up a broad set of exciting historical and contemporary puzzles that merit further investigation. Which brings us to potential avenues for further research.

I would like to frame the first direction for further research as a cautious discussion of how this case study resonates to broader contexts. Given that extraverted state formation formed the operationalization of the context, it also constitutes the 'universe' of cases to which this study purported to speak back to. So to which degree does the analysis offered in this study resonate within other contexts of extraverted state formation? Rather than providing a definitive answer, I'd like to point to exciting suggestions of dynamics that merit further study.

If studies of extraverted state formation mostly focus on sub-Saharan Africa, what does research on private security within the broader subcontinent indicate in relation to the pattern emerging from this case study of Congo? A dominant suggestion is that the sites in Africa where private security companies concentrate are the locations where global capital 'touches down' (Abrahamsen & Williams 2011: 122). To rephrase in topographical terms, the individual nodes in this

landscape of private security are the ‘pockets of productivity’ (Leonard, 2008): sites that contrast to the surrounding landscape for constituting concentrations of international economic activity. It seems that from Nairobi to Cape Town and from Freetown to Lagos, PSC concentrate geographically in African capitals and around enclaves constituted by industrial operations (often mineral extraction) owned and run by foreign corporations. However, this study showed that an important part of private security activities in Congo are also found around international development actors. And, as chapter six showed, the privatization of infrastructure and security form a regional, if not global, tendency, leaving its mark in governance patterns across the continent. Thus, perhaps private security companies focus on ‘transnationalised bubbles of governance’ (Hönke 2010: 126) more generally.

While IR, through its focus on institutionally different actors, focuses on such bubbles of governance mainly in terms of the variety of institutional actors involved—the ‘global security assemblages’ that challenge structuring dichotomies in IR—within science and technology studies it is common practice to study such bubbles of governance also in terms of their highly technological nature (e.g. Barry 2006). I expect that bringing these literatures in conversation with empirical investigation of the spatial concentrations of security governance and infrastructurally mediated governance processes—as this thesis has made a modest attempt to do—can serve to explore whether a consistent pattern of clustering of security and infrastructure emerges within contexts of extraverted state formation. What would make this topography politically significant is that whereas ‘in large swaths of sub-Saharan Africa, the capacity to execute any form of policy has quite simply evaporated’ (Bayart, Ellis & Hibou 1999: 19), private security seems to be entangled within the spaces where this capacity—what we have throughout called infrastructural power—*does* exist.

However, as the processes of financialization and privatization of infrastructure and security and rising inequalities sweep the globe, it seems the predicate of extraversion is no longer—if it has ever—limited to postcolonial contexts alone. The analysis presented in this study suggests that the entanglements between globalization and political order are infrastructurally mediated, and through widespread privatization, access to such core conduits of structured circulation of capital, goods and people is redistributed and securitized. As detailed studies of spatial segregation patterns in, for example, South Africa and the US (e.g. Bénéit-Gbaffou 2008; Bislev 2004; Davis 1990; Németh 2009) suggest, perhaps Congo can be considered a forerunner—or a dystopia, if you will—of broader processes of reconfiguration of (private) security, working infrastructure, and wealth in which spatial patterns of concentration and inequality are radicalized. Indeed, the few sources available point towards a significant overlap between the distribution of

critical infrastructures and the spatial concentration of private security companies. Regarding OECD countries, Parformak (2004) shows that 28% of all US PSC are engaged in critical infrastructure protection and the few studies on private security and critical infrastructure protection in Europe show the same—private security companies secure the critical infrastructure of both political order and the global economy (Davidovic, Kesetovic, & Pavicevic 2012; De Clerck 2013). From this perspective, the current study might point towards a broader pattern and provide some tools to explore this phenomenon in other extraverted situations, both in the present and past.

A final venue of further research would be to investigate the extent to which the increasing presence of China, India, and other ‘emerging economies’ in infrastructurally intense sectors in Africa challenges the patterns that this study points to. Field observations in Congo and South Sudan, for example, seem to indicate that Chinese ventures in infrastructure development or extractive industries prefer to rely on host country state security forces, meaning that Congolese and (South) Sudanese soldiers are deployed to guard their operations. However, with smaller gold mining operations of Chinese in Province Orientale this often takes the form of ad hoc private arrangements between Chinese entrepreneurs and individual army commanders (Schouten 2011a), calling into question once again the utility of the public/private divide to study such entanglements. Some indications exist that Chinese corporations—often linked to the Party—are increasingly looking to the private security sector for securing their operations in Africa (e.g. Davies 2014; Marino 2013; Veena 2012), but at the time of writing, systematic research on this is absent.

Postscript

If Congo was conceded to King Léopold II at the Congress of Berlin on condition that he kept access open to other countries (hence: Congo *Free State*), the contemporary privatization of both infrastructures and security in Congo echoes a colonial past. Ultimately, the tragedy of the historical continuity that this thesis pointed to is well-captured by the following observation by Janet McLean (2004: 373):

‘From a colonized peoples’ point of view it did not, and still does not, so much matter whether they are engaged in an encounter between states or transnational corporations because the effects of such encounters have been, and still are, pretty much the same. This is not because concepts of public or private do not matter but rather because, as they have evolved, they have been applied to the colonized peoples’ disadvantage. The new world economic order is built on this colonial legacy.’

As long as the universal values and norms that those who throughout history have controlled and steered the assemblages of which contemporary private security assemblages are only the latest incarnation are not universally practiced, they are not universally shared. And that renders those values and norms not universal but partial, provincial, and contested, and their private security guards in Congo guardians of a foreign order.

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Sammanfattning (summary in Swedish)

Avhandlingen undersöker hur privata säkerhetsföretag bidrar till skapandet av den politiska ordningen i DR Kongo; som ett fall genom vilket bredare frågeställningar om förhållandet mellan säkerhetsstyrning ('security governance') och politisk ordning kan utforskas. I avhandlingen studeras den rumsliga spridningen av säkerhetsföretag i Kongo och deras betydande inblandning i internationaliserade säkerhetsstyrningsprocesser. Vidare undersöker avhandlingen hur detta samtida uttryck för relationen mellan säkerhetsstyrning och politisk ordning samverkar med och reproducerar historiska mönster av internationaliserad politisk organisering i Kongo.

Avhandlingen reser frågor om hur det är möjligt att teoretisera relationen mellan säkerhetsstyrning och politisk ordning för att fånga hur förhållandet historiskt har tagit sig uttryck i Kongo. Specifikt lyfts frågan om huruvida en utvidgning av vår förståelse av politisk ordning till att omfatta både säkerhetsstyrning, och de infrastrukturella arrangemang som underbygger modern politisk ordning, kan klarlägga varaktiga mönster av politisk ordning som annars förblir dolda—mönster som omfattar utåtriktning, där centrala organiserande processer i Kongo reproduceras som del av internationella maktrelationer.

Appendix

Table 5. List of interviews conducted for this study

Interview No.	Organizational affiliation of interviewee	Date interview	Location interview
1	UNDSS*	20-7-2011	Goma
2	PNC/PWC	6-5-2011 & 13-5-2011	Kinshasa
3	Delta Protection	21-7-2011	Goma
4	G4S	13-7-2011	Kigali
5	JICA	25-11-2010; 7-5-2011	Goma & Kinshasa
6	FARDC	31-7-2011	Bukavu
7	UN Security	Nov 2011	Aru
8	PNC	5-9-2011	Kinshasa
9	PNC	Nov 2010	Goma
10	Olive Group	24-10-2012	London
11	PNC	11-5-2011	Kinshasa
12	AGK	Dec 2010	Mongbwalu
13	ASCO	19-9-2012	Kinshasa
14	GSA	May 2011	Kinshasa
15	G4S	26-7-2011	Bukavu
16	ASCO	18-9-2012	Kinshasa
17	Handicap International	Oct 2011	Kigali
18	EUPOL	July 2011	Goma
19	G4S	9-5-2011	Kinshasa
20	PNC	10-5-2011	Kinshasa
21	Erinys/Banro	26-7-2011	Bukavu
22	Oversight SAS Risk & Consulting	19-10-2010	Phone
23	AGA	3-8-2010	Johannesburg
24	EUPOL	11-5-2011	Kinshasa
25	Delta Protection	July 2011	Goma
26	HDW	19-11-2010 & 19-7-2011	Goma
27	PNC	9-5-2011	Kinshasa
28	Kilo Goldmines	November 2010	Mambasa
29	SOKIMO	Nov 2011	
30	Delta Protection	6-5-2011	Kinshasa
31	Delta Protection	6-5-2011	Kinshasa
32	CSS	Nov 2010	Nia-Nia

APPENDIX

33	Top SIG	6-9-2012	Kinshasa
34	KK Security	19-11-2010	Goma
35	FARDC	24-7-2011	Goma
36	Governorate South Kivu	25-7-2011	Bukavu
37	PNC	22-7-2011	Goma
38	DEI	2-8-2011 & 9-9-2012	Goma
39	Kibali Gold	Dec 2011	Durba
40	GSA	11-5-2011	Kinshasa
41	UN	10-3-2013	New York
42	AGK	9-12-2010	Mongbwalu
43	PNC	6-5-2011 & 13-5-2011	Kinshasa
44	Intersec	8-3-2011	Kigali
45	G4S	19-7-2011	Goma
46	IOM	13-5-2011	Kinshasa
47	PNC	9-5-2011	Kinshasa
48	Dutch Embassy	May 2011	Kinshasa
49	UN	6-9-2012	Kinshasa
50	UN	7-9-2011	Kinshasa
51	Bralima	19-9-2012	Kinshasa
52	UN	6-9-2012	Kinshasa
53	Delta Protection	6-5-2011	Kinshasa
54	G4S	23-8-2010	Amsterdam
55	Kilo Goldmines	Nov. 2011 & Dec 2011	Beni & Mambasa
56	Nestlé	10-5-2011	Kinshasa
57	Delta Protection	6-5-2011	Kinshasa
58	Graben Security	8-12-2013; 11-3-2014	Nairobi
59	Kibali Gold	Nov 2011	Durba
60	Wild Dog Helicopters	Nov 2011	Mambasa
61	GSA	11-5-2011	Kinshasa
* For abbreviations, see p. xi			

Private security companies and political order in Congo

A history of extraversion

Peer Schouten

This PhD dissertation explores how private security companies co-constitute political order in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as a case through which broader questions regarding the relationship between security governance and political order can be investigated. The thesis explores the spatial distribution of private security companies in Congo, and investigates their predominant entanglement with internationalized governance processes. Furthermore, it explores how this contemporary instance of the relationship between security governance and political order resonates with and reproduces longer-standing patterns of internationalized political ordering in Congo.

This thesis raises questions around how it may be possible to theorize the relationship between security governance and political order to capture the historical ways in which that relationship has been articulated in Congolese history. Specifically, it asks whether broadening our conception of political order to encompass both security governance and the infrastructural arrangements underpinning modern political order might bring into view durable patterns of political ordering that otherwise remain hidden—patterns of extraversion, where key domestic ordering processes in Congo are reproduced as the properties of international power-relations.