01 08 12 Le Soir (B) – Rwandan Defense Minister James Kabarebe Spills 'Secrets' About DRC, M23 (translation)

QUESTION:
On the eve of elections in Congo last fall, you said that if you were able to
help the country become more stable, you would. Given the current situation,
what went wrong?

It
is not just on the eve of elections that we had tried to help the Congo. In
2009, we tried to solve the problem of CNDP, which led to the arrest of General
Laurent Nkunda and the sidelining of many other groups, Pareco, the Mai Mai,
Kifwawa, Nakabaka group, FRC … All were eventually integrated into the
government army. Since then, we have restored diplomatic relations with the
Congo, our presidents met several times. It was positive evolution that
surprised everyone, including ourselves.

What
happened? This is a question we ask ourselves too, but nobody is there to
answer. But some people, especially in the West, have decided to question only
Rwanda for whatever is happening in the DRC.

QUESTION:
After the elections, President Kabila was put under pressure by the
international community demanding the arrest of General Bosco Ntaganda, who is
wanted by the International Criminal Court. Has at any time there been some kind
of agreement between Kinshasa and Kigali to get rid of the general and to
replace him?

This
is where the confusion began.

For
a genesis of the situation, we must go back to the 2009 agreements and remember
that even after the elections in Congo and until April 2012, there was no
problem. In 2009, we helped solve the problem of CNDP by supporting the
integration of its soldiers in the government army, just as well for Pareco, Mai
Mai Kifwawa, Nakabaka, and a dozen other groups. But thereafter, the management
of this situation was to be the responsibility of the Congolese
themselves…

CNDP
was integrated as a result of the Nairobi agreement under the supervision of
Presidents Obasanjo and Mkapa. Rwanda had contributed to this agreement, which
for three years, had helped pacify the eastern Congo. But today the integration
of these forces has failed. This failure is not the fault of Rwanda, but it is
due to the mismanagement of the military integration process.

QUESTION:
What happened in this past year?

In
December, after his election, President Kabila sent a special envoy to Kigali,
accompanied by some soldiers. Presidential Adviser, the late Katumba Mwanke,
brought a message comprising four points: the first is that President Kabila was
seeking the support of Rwanda to transfer soldiers of Rwandan origin who were
based in eastern Congo to other provinces. He also wanted our support as the
west was demanding the arrest of General Bosco Ntaganda. After achieving these
above two points, we would have conducted joint operations to neutralize the
FDLR. And finally, from successfully working well together on the previous
points, we would have strengthened economic cooperation between our two
countries, launched several projects that have remained unfinished.

The
delegation told us that the Rwandophone soldiers had refused to be deployed
outside of Kivu and hoped that we would be able to convince them, given our
historical relationship not only with former CNDP soldiers, but also with other
Congolese officers.

According
to them, these men refused to be transferred to other parts of the country
because Bosco Ntaganda forbade them … As usual we offered our help even if my
feeling was that such problems should be solved on a national level.

Regarding
Bosco Ntaganda, remember the international community, which demanded his arrest,
had a UN peacekeeping force of 20,000 with tanks, helicopters, Special Forces –
a force located partly in Goma, next to Bosco. Together, the officers played
tennis, they frequented the same clubs, the same bars and restaurants. Why
couldn't they take charge of his arrest, why would they ask us to do it? We made
it clear that the arrest was not our responsibility, as it was a Congolese
officer very close to President Kabila, with whom they had done business
together. Do you remember the story of a plane load of gold intercepted in Goma?
Very senior Congolese were involved in this case. Ntaganda was no longer under
our control…

We
were told by the members of the delegation that they would arrest Bosco, but
would not hand him to International Criminal Court. It was the 5th February and
the delegation returned to Kinshasa. Two days after this encounter, Mwanke
Katumba was killed in a plane crash in Bukavu.

In
late March, President Kabila sent another delegation to Kigali, headed by head
of the security services, Kalev, Colonel Jean-Claude and others. They still
wanted our assistance because they indicated they could not solve the problems
of the East without our support. What support? They insisted that Bosco Ntaganda
was blocking the transfer of Rwandophone soldiers in the country.

We
proposed to hold a meeting in which Bosco Ntaganda participated and during which
we would try to convince him to let these officers be deployed outside of
Kivu.

The
meeting was set for April 8, during when, we expected these gentlemen, but they
arrived without Ntaganda because a rumor had spread that the governments of
Rwanda and Congo were preparing to arrest him. Frightened, he refused to come.
The Congolese arrived with three officers, Colonel Sultani Makenga, Colonel
Faustin Muhindo and Colonel Innocent Zimurinda. The meeting was supposed to
convince Ntaganda, but he was absent. "He had disappeared the previous night
with 200 of his men outside Goma … Maybe he was on his farm in Masisi …" I
then pointed out that "if Bosco is no longer there, it cannot prevent the
deployment of his officers, the problem is solved …"

I
was told that in fact there was still a problem and that is why the three
officers were here. We listened to our interlocutors, with the desire to help
the DRC, in a manner that was friendly, fraternal. The importance of this
meeting, April 8, is that it was an issue of a missed opportunity. It marked the
turning point of everything that would happen later in the Congo.

If
our interlocutors had listened to the advice that we gave them that day, things
would have been very different.

This
date is crucial because at this meeting we listened to government officials
including Kalev and General Yav. They accused the Rwandophone officers of
refusing to be deployed elsewhere in the country, of not being part of the
system … Kalev explained that the President was determined to protect Bosco
Ntaganda, not to transfer him to ICC but to refer him to Congolese courts.

They
raised so many points, I kept all my notes, meeting minutes … The three
Rwandophone officers for their part explained: "It is not that Bosco blocks us,
but the fact that many issues contained in 2009 agreement have not been
implemented. As a prerequisite for our deployment to other parts of the Congo,
it was necessary to restore security in Kivu, the problem of the FDLR, allow our
parents who have for long lived in refugee camps in Rwanda to return home." They
added: "Our integration was never complete, we were paid differently than other
members, we received grades but they were never confirmed by Order, and any time
we might be driven out of the army." These officers were facing segregation,
exclusion, being regarded as second-class military…

They
mentioned that more than 50 of their comrades, who had been transferred to Dungu
in Orientale Province, were killed in one night and that the government had
never conducted any investigation. They cited the name of the person responsible
for their deaths, a Colonel still in service … "We were integrated of course,
but we are still frustrated. We were ready to contribute to peace in the Kivus,
but we are not supported: we lacked transportation, communications, vehicles,
money. Nothing! And how could we conduct operations against the FDLR and other
armed groups?"

"And
even when we start these operations, the FDLR are informed in advance by people
from the government side, they pass the information."

There
were so many complaints that I cannot remember them all. I then spoke to Kalev,
asking if he knew all this already. He replied in the midst of the others that
he had heard it so many times, that he had often spoken to the president, but he
had nothing to do!

I
then asked how they could get out of this situation. They repeated that they
could not deploy outside of Kivu. The others said that the government could not
tolerate indiscipline and they should leave. I then warned government officials,
telling them that this was a bomb, they had to find solutions before it is too
late.

As
I know very well the situation in Kivu, I know everyone there, I concluded that
it was on the verge of war. I said it should be avoided at all costs and that if
they wanted any assistance, we are willing to help find a solution. War, we
said, will affect everyone, the Congolese population, Rwanda. From our
perspective, if war breaks out, the FDLR will regain ground.

At
the same time, April 8, while we were seeking a peaceful solution, the Congolese
government sent a large military force to Goma, rocket launchers, T52 tanks,
helicopter gunships. Goma was suddenly heavily militarized. At the moment, with
Kalev and Yav, the head of military information, we were trying to solve
problems peacefully, the Chief of Staff, General Etumba and the head of the land
forces Tango Amisi landed in Goma to strengthen the military effort.

We
repeated that the military option was not the best, but they went forward.

It
is at this same time that officers began to desert their units, others refused
deployment.

I
then advised them to reunite the army to stop the transfers, because the
situation was dangerous, look into the administration of the army – because
there were too many irregularities, problems of command, discontent was
general.

About
Bosco Ntaganda, we said that if he were indisciplined, this could not be
tolerated, he had to stopped wherever he was. They told me that this was not
possible because he was in his farm. I offered we carry out together a new
operation against the FDLR, then plan, carry it out. As for commanders who
refused to move to Kinshasa or elsewhere, I advised them not to be too hard on
them, because it would create chaos. The situation was so volatile that using
military force against them could be dangerous.

After
the meeting, President Kabila came to Goma, where he announced that he had to
stop Bosco Ntaganda at all costs, at any price. This message was the opposite of
what I had heard the night before, where I was told that Bosco could stay on his
farm.

At
this time, so many things happened! When Colonel Zimurinda arrived in Goma, he
was disarmed, but the same evening, he was given back his weapons and his escort
and he immediately joined Bosco Ntaganda. The next day, Colonel Baudouin Ngaruye
was also disarmed and when in the evening his weapons were returned after
negotiations, he joined Bosco.

The
same day, in Rutshuru General Amisi ordered to disarm all the former CNDP
soldiers. Then there was a clash between these soldiers. Then, in Fizi ex-Pareco
officers, Nsabimana and Saddam were disarmed, there were skirmishes and they
fled to Uvira. The commander of the area, Delphin Kahimbi, deployed forces to
fight in Uvira and Bernard Nyamungu tried to protect the fugitives before
fleeing himself to Bukavu, where he was arrested. Thus began the chaos.

As
for Colonel Makenga he returned to Bukavu after our meeting. When President
Kabila arrived in Goma, Makenga was supposed to return to attend a meeting, on
the road from Bukavu to Goma, there was an ambush mounted by Delphin Kahimbi.
Makenga escaped and arrived in Goma anyway but never returned to Bukavu.

QUESTION:
This version is controversial because according to other sources, Makenga fled
through the lake towards Rwanda…

No,
he escaped the ambush and after a few days he called Jean-Claude Yav saying he
could not return to Bukavu as long as Kahimbi would be there and he remained in
Goma…

QUESTION:
Are you sure he did not travel to Gisenyi at this time?

No,
he remained in Goma. Makenga never used to come to Rwanda because he thought he
would be arrested because he was close to Laurent Nkunda. During those few days,
operations began against Bosco Ntaganda, the FARDC attacked his farm and they
brought reinforcements from South Kivu. Delphin Kahimbi even advanced from
Bukavu to Goma. Realising that, Makenga left Goma and went to Runyionyi, a place
he knew well.

This
movement when Colonel Makenga moved to Runyioni changed the whole scenario of
war; yes Bosco was not popular among the soldiers, not even with Rwandophone,
but not so with Makenga: for him he was very popular with soldiers … His
departure caused a mass desertion among FARDC…

The
ex-CNDP, were almost defeated in Masisi and reinforced when they did move to
Runyonyi. That's when the alleged support of Rwanda emerged…

This
is false, hopeless. They were defeated, why were they not captured? Between
Masisi and Runyoni, there is a long distance, more than seven hours. They could
have been stopped, blocked…

QUESTION:
But a ceasefire was declared, which allowed them to escape…

No,
there was no ceasefire. What happened was that this force was intact, with its
weapons and commanders; we cannot say it was defeated. It was perhaps left to
pass intact.

What
is important is that when Makenga reached Runyonyi, he had 200 soldiers. In the
days that followed, thousands of soldiers, officers had converged and then
defected to join Makenga, and it was not only Rwandophones. According to our
information, 80% of the forces of M23 are Hutus, Pareco veterans. Bashi, Hutu,
Nande, Barega, and many other groups joined the M23. Even members of President
Kabila's protection services, Katangans, Kasaians, defected and joined Makenga,
so there was discontent…

The
poor management of the troops is the heart of the problem. How can you send
troops into operation by giving them only a handful of beans! Instead of sending
them food, you give them a bag of beans, water, and salt-free rice casserole or
without firewood … This is impossible.

You
cannot say that the Congolese army failed to beat the M23 because the M23 was
backed by Rwanda. No! They failed because they cannot fight in conditions in
which they are. They could not even kill a rat….

QUESTION:
They could have fought if they were fed properly…

The
food is not enough. It also requires a good command structure … Having joined
the M23, the deserters began to fight better. Not only because of the food, but
because they were fighting against a system that abused them … Saying that
Rwanda supported the M23, this is wrong and I will show you how…

QUESTION:
Are you saying no reinforcement have crossed the border?

I
knew this area once. Runyonyi is not on the border, walking from the Rwandan
border to Runyonyi, it takes at least eleven hours of walking, you cross the
forest because there are no roads, and there is no link between Runyonyi and
Rwanda. This whole story of support that Rwanda supposedly provided is a
manipulation. But also a very complicated manipulation.

It
involves the Congolese government wanting to save face after its military defeat
and trouble to explain why its soldiers did not fight. It is supported by the
West, which is disappointed by the fact that Bosco Ntaganda was not arrested by
the International Criminal Court and that Rwanda has not cooperated in the
arrest. Rwanda is punished because it did not cooperate with the International
Criminal Court, this is the real problem. Everyone knows that Rwanda does not
have a single soldier within the M23, it gives them no support. Even the
Congolese know this, they said it to us face to face, but they had to save
face…

QUESTION:
But in Goma in late June, defectors testified that they were recruited in Rwanda
to come to fight in Congo … What do we think?

You
know the Congo; you know Goma, Bukavu, is a melting pot of lies aired on radio
by the governor, the minister of information…

QUESTION:
Still, those who spread these stories that you call lies were many, from
different backgrounds, including UN observers…

This
is why I speak of a conspiracy against Rwanda, in connivance with the Congolese
government and the international community. The problem is there. MONUSCO has
been in Congo for more than ten years, and it has not solved anything. It does
business with the FDLR, conducts trade in gold, coltan, we all know that.

As
for the UN Group of Experts, these young men and women who wrote the report,
like Steven Hege, who advocates negotiations with the FDLR, they were also
manipulated by the Congolese government.

How
can the United Nations designate as experts people as young and inexperienced,
who are lost in acronyms? Even their integrity is questionable … They do not
have the minimum required level of understanding of this area.

For
us, we're not going to stop having contact with the DRC. On the 1st of May, we
had contacts at the level of Army command. They asked us to help them and we
will. We reminded them that on April 8 they had missed an opportunity to avoid
war. We asked them to stop fighting so we can see what to do, how to help.

At
this time, our Congolese interlocutors explicitly asked us to move our forces
into the Congo to help solve the problem. We refused to move our forces….

QUESTION:
However you have forces based in Rutshuru…

Yes,
they were destined to fight the FDLR. It is two companies of Special Forces,
along with two companies of Congolese Special Forces. For two years they are
there and they are still there…

On
May 3, when we had another meeting in Kigali, the Congolese minister of defense
also asked us to intervene. But we could not see how we could solve this problem
militarily. On May 12, another meeting of defense ministers in Rubavu, they
raised the same request. On May 18, another meeting in Kigali, May 26 a new
meeting in Kigali, was including the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs. At
this time, the defeat of government forces was obvious. And it was at this
meeting that, for the first time, the Congolese began to accuse Rwanda of aiding
the M23, and that is while we already had many meetings to discuss how to
help.

They
only mentioned this charge on our side and we said some commanders had
integrated FDLR. We proposed to establish a joint verification mechanism.

On
May 29, the Joint Chiefs of Staff launched the verification mechanism to dispel
rumors. On June 19, there was another meeting in Kinshasa, but two days before
the Congolese government, the UN accused Rwanda…

QUESTION:
Meanwhile, in Goma, defectors had told Monusco they had been recruited in Rwanda
to join the M23…

We
were informed that there was going to be fabricated evidence to challenge Rwanda
and we informed our Congolese interlocutors. We asked them why they did
that.

First
there was the case of the 11, the FDLR who were in the camp Mutobo and were
allegedly sent to Runyonyi. After I had spoken to Colonel Yav, the story
disappeared. But then they reappeared and the 11 defectors were found in a
MONUSCO camp. Kalev, the head of the ANR, is the origin of all these
falsifications, the story was fabricated in Goma, presented to MONUSCO and from
there it was left to the UN…

There
are so many stories … there was this one of captain Saddam who was allegedly
captured somewhere by the FARDC. They found on him a Rwandan identity card and
presented it to the group of UN experts. But we do not know this person; he is
not included on the lists of our army… The truth is that while we were in Goma
for a meeting, the head of the Congolese military intelligence came to me in my
room, and spoke about the story of the captain, he said, "we made a big mistake
by making these kinds of stories against Rwanda, it has already cost us so dear
… this Captain Saddam belonged to the Congolese army, but it was Kalev who
decided to make a fake Rwandan identity card and send fake testimony to the
UN… Can you imagine that decisions are made on such a basis?"

QUESTION:
If Rwanda is the victim of a conspiracy, it is still huge, with the
participation of different people, it is enormous…

There
have been so many, it's true … But let's face it now: Congolese are victims of
chaos they have created themselves, the international community knows, I have
the minutes of the meeting of the eleven foreign ministers during the conference
on security in the Great Lakes in Nairobi. The Congolese government there
clearly states that the primary cause of instability in eastern Congo is the
international pressure put on them for the arrest of Bosco Ntaganda. And then
they put the blame on Rwanda!

As
for us, we will continue meetings and contacts with the Congolese. But we
happened to see two delegations land in Kigali from Congo. Each has its own
message, different from the other and refuses a joint meeting … It's total
confusion.

But
what is clear is that President Kabila has been fed lies by his people on the
ground…

I
think that starting this war, the Congolese have thought it would be a fast
operation. They under estimated. But when things started to change in the field,
they began looking for a pretext, and to accuse Rwanda. Much more so that
whenever things go wrong in Congo, Rwanda is held responsible. To this was added
the frustration of the West who wanted to arrest Bosco Ntaganda and President
Kabila pushed to do so. All this created enormous chaos.

QUESTIONS:
I'm back with the same question: you may doubt the UN experts, their expertise,
their level, you can speak about Kalev and manipulation of the ANR, but don't
you think that the Americans, British, and as well as Belgians also have their
own sources of information. However, all confirm the same facts. Are they all
victims of a collective hallucination?

We
have large embassies in Rwanda, and they have the means to gather intelligence.
They certainly monitor troop movements, logistics, and movements toward the
border. But for the past six years at least, there is no movement towards the
border … How could Rwanda fight in DRC without any visible movement?

What
they say, is information that has been transmitted from the other side of the
border, nothing they found themselves … In Rwanda itself, they saw
nothing…

How,
in this densely populated country, could the passage of hundreds of soldiers,
weapons, trucks have gone unnoticed? No evidence can be provided…

QUESTION:
The Belgian Minister Reynders suggested that "uncontrolled Rwandan elements"
could be involved. Sounds possible?

I
am sure that Rwandan soldiers are more controlled and better organized than the
Belgians. If rogue elements exist somewhere, it is rather in the Belgian army
than within the Rwandan army. The Rwandan army is strong, well organized,
orderly, well-disciplined, rogue elements within it cannot exist…

QUESTION:
And the uncontrolled recruitment of Congolese of Tutsi origin that lives on the
territory of Rwanda, it could be impossible too?

That
is possible. We have refugee camps in Byumba, Gatsibo, Kibuye and Kigeme and
other refugees are not in camps. That there could be recruitment in these areas;
it is very possible 100%. I told the Congolese that if they had information
about the recruitment, they could give us, such that we end it. But the
Congolese prefer to make noise and accuse Rwanda…

QUESTION:
Private interests, mafia, have they been involved in this?

It
is imagination, fantasy, total confusion. How could Rwanda tolerate such
movements? Rwandan society is very disciplined, we cannot have such elements …
And even if it were, it does not explain how an army could have been beaten by a
few hundred elements … Twenty two thousand troops, equipped with tanks,
helicopters were defeated by a few hundred rebels. This shows that in Congo
there is no government or army, only a large emptiness.

QUESTION:
With all these observations made, the pressure being put on Rwanda, what are the
possible solutions?

Rwanda
is not under pressure. Do you really believe that the UN could put pressure on
Rwanda? This is nonsense. Even sanctions cannot frighten us, they mean
nothing…

QUESTION:
But if funds are cut, budget support blocked, it could hurt…

Money
is not a problem. In the bush we survived without resources … Without help, we
will develop better; it will give us even more energy. If they are basing their
point for sanctions on lies, let them do it, it will not influence Rwanda. In
Congo, we did not start these stories, neither did we support them, and now we
will not go there to clean up their mess.

We
rely on ourselves as we have always done…

QUESTION:
What are the possible solutions?

It
is up to the Congolese to find them. And also to the Member States of the
International Conference on Security in the Great Lakes Region, which will
review on September 5. I'm not sure if the neutral force will never be born. By
contrast, it is the Joint Verification Mechanism that will work, which will be
composed of three representatives from each member state of the conference. The
command will be exercised by Uganda, the number two will be from Brazzaville,
the others will come from DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Tanzania … These
officers will watch the border between the DRC and Rwanda, as well as monitor
the implementation of the ceasefire between the Congolese army and M23, and the
FDLR presence in the field. All this as we wait for the eventual deployment of a
neutral force. If it ever comes…

QUESTION:
Are negotiations with the M23 possible?

It
depends on what the conference decides. Now we must let regional mechanisms play
their role. We refer to the decisions of the Conference chaired by Uganda…

If
you want to get out of this crisis, the international community needs to
understand that pressuring Rwanda about the situation in the DRC, is not good to
the DRC: the problems are born there, that is where they should be resolved. And
Congolese must know that the solution to their problems will not come from the
international community, but themselves. It is relying on themselves, building
their own governance mechanisms, their own system, that the Congolese will come
out……

If
in Kasai or Kinshasa people are hungry and revolt, in which way is Rwanda
responsible for this situation? Where is the link … If the Congolese continue
to look for the causes of their problems from outside, they will still encounter
more difficulties … It's themselves that must find solutions…

Original
French version here:

http://blog.lesoir.be/colette-braeckman/2012/08/29/cartes-sur-table-les-quatre-verites-du-general-james-kabarebe/

Interview
done in Kigali, August 29

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